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"This book offers a provocative account of interdisciplinary research across the neurosciences, social sciences and humanities. Setting itself against standard accounts of interdisciplinary 'integration,' and rooting itself in the authors' own experiences, the book establishes a radical agenda for collaboration across these disciplines. Rethinking Interdisciplinarity does not merely advocate interdisciplinary research, but attends to the hitherto tacit pragmatics, affects, power dynamics, and spatial logics in which that research is enfolded. Understanding the complex relationships between brains, minds, and environments requires a delicate, playful and genuinely experimental interdisciplinarity, and this book shows us how it can be done. This book is open access under a CC-BY license and funded by The Wellcome Trust"--

This article is an account of the dynamics of interaction across the social sciences and neurosciences. Against an arid rhetoric of 'interdisciplinarity', it calls for a more expansive imaginary of what experiment – as practice and ethos – might offer in this space. Arguing that opportunities for collaboration between social scientists and neuroscientists need to be taken seriously, the article situates itself against existing conceptualizations of these dynamics, grouping them under three rubrics: 'critique', 'ebullience' and 'interaction'. Despite their differences, each insists on a distinction between sociocultural and neurobiological knowledge, or does not show how a more entangled field might be realized. The article links this absence to the 'regime of the inter-', an ethic of interdisciplinarity that guides interaction between disciplines on the understanding of their pre-existing separateness. The argument of the paper is thus twofold: (1) that, contra the 'regime of the inter-', it is no longer practicable to maintain a hygienic separation between sociocultural webs and neurobiological architecture; (2) that the cognitive neuroscientific experiment, as a space of epistemological and ontological excess, offers an opportunity to researchers, from all disciplines, to explore and register this realization.

In 2016 the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) published a "Bill of Rights." This article considers and analyzes what is at stake in a global professional clinical organization developing such a document that purports to support its efforts to tackle the social injustices experienced by people with mental health issues globally. It critically examines the text of the Bill and suggests that, while the document promises serious engagement with human rights (as distinct from ethics), it fails to meet existing international human rights standards. For the WPA to be a present and engaged partner in the implementation of international human rights standards it should not merely encourage governments to take action, but start with inward-facing tasks. These include establishing minimum human rights-based criteria for its own members and holding them to account, so as to nudge psychiatrists towards a human rights-based approach that would benefit people with mental health issues around the world.

In 2016 the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) published a "Bill of Rights." This article considers and analyzes what is at stake in a global professional clinical organization developing such a document that purports to support its efforts to tackle the social injustices experienced by people with mental health issues globally. It critically examines the text of the Bill and suggests that, while the document promises serious engagement with human rights (as distinct from ethics), it fails to meet existing international human rights standards. For the WPA to be a present and engaged partner in the implementation of international human rights standards it should not merely encourage governments to take action, but start with inward-facing tasks. These include establishing minimum human rights-based criteria for its own members and holding them to account, so as to nudge psychiatrists towards a human rights-based approach that would benefit people with mental health issues around the world.

This article investigates how the turn to affect within the humanities and social sciences re-imagines the relationship between cultural theory and science. We focus on how the writings of two neuroscientists (Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux) and one developmental psychologist (Daniel Stern) are used in order to ground certain claims about affect within cultural theory. We examine the motifs at play in cultural theories of affect, the models of (neuro)biology with which they work, and some fascinating missteps characterizing the taking up of scientific literature. While neuroscience frames the affective as part of a system of regulation that makes both self and social coherence possible, in cultural theory's narratives, by contrast, affectivity becomes a placeholder for the inherent dynamism and mutability of matter. The article interrogates the consequences of cultural theory's strange borrowings from neuroscience and developmental psychology in their institution of a model of subjectivity preoccupied with a lived present in excess of the hold of habit and embodied history.

What can the medical humanities achieve? This paper does not seek to define what is meant by the medical humanities, nor to adjudicate the exact disciplinary or interdisciplinary knowledges it should offer, but rather to consider what it might be capable of doing. Exploring the many valences of the word 'critical', we argue here for a critical medical humanities characterised by: (i) a widening of the sites and scales of 'the medical' beyond the primal scene of the clinical encounter; (ii) greater attention not simply to the context and experience of health and illness, but to their constitution at multiple levels; (iii) closer engagement with critical theory, queer and disability studies, activist politics and other allied fields; (iv) recognition that the arts, humanities and social sciences are best viewed not as in service or in opposition to the clinical and life sciences, but as productively entangled with a 'biomedical culture'; and, following on from this, (v) robust commitment to new forms of interdisciplinary and cross-sector collaboration. We go on to introduce the five other articles published in this special issue of the journal, reflecting on the ways in which collaboration and critique are articulated in their analyses of immunology, critical neuroscience, toxicity, global clinical labour, and psychological coercion and workfare. As these articles demonstrate, embracing the complex role of critical collaborator—one based on notions of entanglement, rather than servility or antagonism—will, we suggest, develop the imaginative and creative heterodox qualities and practices which have long been recognised as core strengths of the medical humanities.

In this introduction, editors Felicity Callard, Kimberley Staines and James Wilkes describe the problem of rest – a ubiquitous concept whose presence or absence affects people, in different ways, everywhere. Depending on whether one is working clinically, historically, artistically, scientifically or through political and economic analysis, 'rest' has many looks and feels. The complexities of investigating such a phenomenon gave rise to Hubbub, the project out of which this edited book emerged. The editors describe how the book draws on research and practice undertaken during Hubbub's two-year residency in The Hub at Wellcome Collection. They outline the book's organizing structure, which groups the work of social scientists, scientists, humanities scholars, artists and broadcasters by scale of investigation, into minds, bodies and practices.

What can the medical humanities achieve? This paper does not seek to define what is meant by the medical humanities, nor to adjudicate the exact disciplinary or interdisciplinary knowledges it should offer, but rather to consider what it might be capable of doing. Exploring the many valences of the word 'critical', we argue here for a critical medical humanities characterised by: (i) a widening of the sites and scales of 'the medical' beyond the primal scene of the clinical encounter; (ii) greater attention not simply to the context and experience of health and illness, but to their constitution at multiple levels; (iii) closer engagement with critical theory, queer and disability studies, activist politics and other allied fields; (iv) recognition that the arts, humanities and social sciences are best viewed not as in service or in opposition to the clinical and life sciences, but as productively entangled with a 'biomedical culture'; and, following on from this, (v) robust commitment to new forms of interdisciplinary and cross-sector collaboration. We go on to introduce the five other articles published in this special issue of the journal, reflecting on the ways in which collaboration and critique are articulated in their analyses of immunology, critical neuroscience, toxicity, global clinical labour, and psychological coercion and workfare. As these articles demonstrate, embracing the complex role of critical collaborator—one based on notions of entanglement, rather than servility or antagonism—will, we suggest, develop the imaginative and creative heterodox qualities and practices which have long been recognised as core strengths of the medical humanities.

What can the medical humanities achieve? This paper does not seek to define what is meant by the medical humanities, nor to adjudicate the exact disciplinary or interdisciplinary knowledges it should offer, but rather to consider what it might be capable of doing. Exploring the many valences of the word 'critical', we argue here for a critical medical humanities characterised by: (i) a widening of the sites and scales of 'the medical' beyond the primal scene of the clinical encounter; (ii) greater attention not simply to the context and experience of health and illness, but to their constitution at multiple levels; (iii) closer engagement with critical theory, queer and disability studies, activist politics and other allied fields; (iv) recognition that the arts, humanities and social sciences are best viewed not as in service or in opposition to the clinical and life sciences, but as productively entangled with a 'biomedical culture'; and, following on from this, (v) robust commitment to new forms of interdisciplinary and cross-sector collaboration. We go on to introduce the five other articles published in this special issue of the journal, reflecting on the ways in which collaboration and critique are articulated in their analyses of immunology, critical neuroscience, toxicity, global clinical labour, and psychological coercion and workfare. As these articles demonstrate, embracing the complex role of critical collaborator—one based on notions of entanglement, rather than servility or antagonism—will, we suggest, develop the imaginative and creative heterodox qualities and practices which have long been recognised as core strengths of the medical humanities.

People with a mental illness may be subject to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), depending on definitions of terms such as 'impairment', long-term' and the capaciousness of the word 'includes' in the Convention's characterisation of persons with disabilities. Particularly challenging under the CRPD is the scope, if any, for involuntary treatment. Conventional mental health legislation, such as the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) appears to violate, for example, Article 4 ('no discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability'), Article 12 (persons shall 'enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life') and Article 14 ('the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty'). We argue that a form of mental health law, such as the Fusion Law proposal, is consistent with the principles of the CRPD. Such law is aimed at eliminating discrimination against persons with a mental illness. It covers all persons regardless of whether they have a 'mental' or a 'physical' illness, and only allows involuntary treatment when a person's decision-making capability (DMC) for a specific treatment decision is impaired whatever the health setting or cause of the impairment and where supported decision making has failed. In addition to impaired DMC, involuntary treatment would require an assessment that such treatment gives the person's values and perspective paramount importance.

People with a mental illness may be subject to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), depending on definitions of terms such as 'impairment', 'long-term' and the capaciousness of the word 'includes' in the Convention's characterisation of persons with disabilities. Particularly challenging under the CRPD is the scope, if any, for involuntary treatment. Conventional mental health legislation, such as the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) appears to violate, for example, Article 4 ('no discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability'), Article 12 (persons shall 'enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life') and Article 14 ('the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty'). We argue that a form of mental health law, such as the Fusion Law proposal, is consistent with the principles of the CRPD. Such law is aimed at eliminating discrimination against persons with a mental illness. It covers all persons regardless of whether they have a 'mental' or a 'physical' illness, and only allows involuntary treatment when a person's decision-making capability (DMC) for a specific treatment decision is impaired — whatever the health setting or cause of the impairment — and where supported decision making has failed. In addition to impaired DMC, involuntary treatment would require an assessment that such treatment gives the person's values and perspective paramount importance.

People with a mental illness may be subject to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), depending on definitions of terms such as 'impairment', 'long-term' and the capaciousness of the word 'includes' in the Convention's characterisation of persons with disabilities. Particularly challenging under the CRPD is the scope, if any, for involuntary treatment. Conventional mental health legislation, such as the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) appears to violate, for example, Article 4 ('no discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability'), Article 12 (persons shall 'enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life') and Article 14 ('the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty'). We argue that a form of mental health law, such as the Fusion Law proposal, is consistent with the principles of the CRPD. Such law is aimed at eliminating discrimination against persons with a mental illness. It covers all persons regardless of whether they have a 'mental' or a 'physical' illness, and only allows involuntary treatment when a person's decision-making capability (DMC) for a specific treatment decision is impaired — whatever the health setting or cause of the impairment — and where supported decision making has failed. In addition to impaired DMC, involuntary treatment would require an assessment that such treatment gives the person's values and perspective paramount importance.

People with a mental illness may be subject to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), depending on definitions of terms such as 'impairment', 'long-term' and the capaciousness of the word 'includes' in the Convention's characterisation of persons with disabilities. Particularly challenging under the CRPD is the scope, if any, for involuntary treatment. Conventional mental health legislation, such as the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) appears to violate, for example, Article 4 ('no discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability'), Article 12 (persons shall 'enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life') and Article 14 ('the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty'). We argue that a form of mental health law, such as the Fusion Law proposal, is consistent with the principles of the CRPD. Such law is aimed at eliminating discrimination against persons with a mental illness. It covers all persons regardless of whether they have a 'mental' or a 'physical' illness, and only allows involuntary treatment when a person's decision-making capability (DMC) for a specific treatment decision is impaired — whatever the health setting or cause of the impairment — and where supported decision making has failed. In addition to impaired DMC, involuntary treatment would require an assessment that such treatment gives the person's values and perspective paramount importance.

Background: This contribution responds to three articles (we refer to all three as 'editorials') concerning something called 'geopsychiatry'. Aims: To evaluate claims made in these editorials for 'geopsychiatry' as a new field of inquiry at the interface between geography and psychiatry. Method: Close critical reading of two editorials in the International Journal of Social Psychiatry – entitled 'Geographical determinants of mental health' and 'Political determinants of mental health' – and one in the International Review of Psychiatry – entitled 'What is geopsychiatry?' Results: While this geopsychiatry initiative is to be applauded, disquiet can be expressed about the almost complete neglect of a pre-existing domain of inquiry – 'mental health geography' or 'the geography of mental health' – that has long been researched by academic geographers and cognate scholars. Key trajectories in this field can be identified and related to the proposed foci for geopsychiatry. Conclusions: The hope is voiced that future developments in geopsychiatry will proceed in dialogue with the literature and practitioners of mental health geography.