Suchergebnisse

Purpose
Given the importance of competitive intelligence (CI) to the economic performance of firms, understanding whether CI practice is impacted by firm size or by their awareness of CI maybe important when creating programs designed to improve firms' CI performance. This paper aims to address this by examining the extent to which the CI practices of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms differed using a sample of firms with knowledge/awareness of CI.


Design/methodology/approach
A survey was developed that included 10 CI organization questions and 67 CI process questions. The survey was sent to a sample with awareness/knowledge of CI – strategic and CI professionals (SCIP) members and individuals who had attended SCIP events T-tests were then used to compare the SME's and large firms' responses to the 10 CI organization and 67 CI process questions.


Findings
For firms with CI awareness/knowledge, the study results suggest that size has very little relationship with CI practice. Of the 10 CI organization variables, only two were significantly different between the SME's and the large firms. Large firms had more full-time CI staff and were more likely to have a formal intelligence unit compared to the SME's. Of the 67 CI process variables, only four were significantly different between the SME's and the large firms. Large firms made more use of company intranet for distributing CI findings use business analytics software and use commercial databases for information than SME's while the SME's used social media, in particular Facebook more than large firms, in their competitive intelligence activities.


Originality/value
This study uses a sample frame of firms with CI awareness/knowledge in examining differences between SME's and large firms CI practices.

Purpose
With intelligence (a field related to foresight) practice growing, the purpose of this study was to examine the practices of Canadian competitive intelligence (CI) practitioners.


Design/methodology/approach
Survey of Canadian CI practitioners who are SCIP members (Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professional), using a revision to a previously used instrument designed to examine competitive intelligence practices.


Findings
Canadian SCIP member competitive intelligence practices seem to be more formalized than those found in the global SCIP study in 2006 with 84.8 per cent having a manager with CI responsibilities, 61 per cent with a formal centralized CI unit and only 9 per cent responding that CI was done informally. Intelligence units were generally smaller with 38 per cent having one full-time CI resource and 41 per cent having between 2 and 4 full-time resources. Additional findings on information sources used, analytical techniques used, evaluation methods and communication methods are reported.


Research limitations/implications
Despite getting responses from close to 50 per cent of SCIP members, the small sample size (79) makes it difficult to generalize the results beyond the Canadian SCIP environment and limits the testing that can be done.


Originality/value
The last study on Canadian competitive intelligence practices was in 2008, thus part of the originality of the study was getting more recent information on corporate intelligence practice. In addition, this is the first Canadian study to focus specifically on known intelligence practitioners (SCIP members). Past studies focused on companies in general regardless of whether respondents knew what competitive intelligence was or practiced CI.

Purpose
This paper aims to present a categorization scheme and use it to classify Canadian Government (federal and provincial) competitive intelligence (CI) programs and to also look at the impact of these programs on sectoral and regional economic development.


Design/methodology/approach
Based on the author's 25 years of experience designing, running, and studying Canadian Government CI programs, a classification scheme to classify these programs has been developed and used. Also, by using program review information, this paper looks at evidence for program impact on regional and sectoral economic development.


Findings
This paper identifies a broad range of federal and provincially sponsored CI programs aimed at helping both government officers and those outside the department make better decisions. The review identified several roles that the government can play in using CI: creator of CI (both for their own purposes and also for helping Canadian companies), CI environment skills builder (helping Canadian companies develop skills in developing their own CI) and CI partner (working jointly with Canadian companies in developing CI). While there have not been many formal program reviews of the CI programs sponsored by Canadian Government departments and agencies, anecdotal evidence (from training program participant evaluations) and a comprehensive review of a small community CI-based economic development program support positive sectoral and regional economic development results arising from these programs.


Practical implications
CI programs can be used as part of a government's regional and sectoral economic development approach. CI can be used to assist with decision-making both within and outside the government. This paper identifies several different kinds of programs that can be used to further a government's economic development agenda.


Originality/value
There are very few articles that examine how governments have helped companies to develop CI and how they have used CI, and none has looked at the impact of these on regional and sectoral economic development. This paper, based on the author's experiences, provides a view of the Canadian programs and their impact on regional/sectoral economic development.

Can competitive intelligence (CI) be used to assist in regional and sectoral economic development? This article looks at intelligence initiatives (largely around training) sponsored by various government departments and agencies in Canada and their link to regional and sectoral economic development. The article provides examples of the kind of intelligence initiatives that have been used in Canada to support regional and sectoral (industrial) economic development. The article proposes a method for categorizing these regional and sectoral intelligence programs and suggests methods for assessing the impact of these programs on regional and sectoral economic development. The Canadian programs are divided into three broad categories 1) Government programs aimed at enhancing their own ability to develop competitive intelligence 2) Programs that are sponsored by the government for industry and others to develop competitive intelligence and 3) Programs sponsored by the government to help communities develop competitive intelligence for local economic development. Positive economic impacts were identified using program review documents, government officer reports and anecdotal evidence from program participant surveys. However, while the evidence does support positive impact a more comprehensive approach to evaluating these impacts should be considered in the future.

Dans l'univers de l'intelligence économique, il est d'usage de considérer que 90% de l'information est disponible librement et légalement. Le tout est de parvenir à y accéder. Jonathan Calof, Codirecteur du Business Analytics Performance Management Program à la Telfer School of Management, propose dans cet article que nous avons choisi de laisser en anglais, un modèle d'aide à la décision à destination des pouvoirs publics afin qu'ils contrôlent l'efficacité de leurs politiques industrielles (développement d'une filière d'avenir, exonération de taxes pour les entreprises d'un secteur considéré comme porteur...). L'auteur part du constat que les décideurs publics n'ont pas de prise sur l'environnement extérieur et s'exposent donc à un retournement de celui-ci qui viendrait ruiner les efforts consentis. Jonathan Calof identifie trois risques émanant de l'environnement extérieur : le risque de confusion des bénéficiaires d'un programme ( program uptake uncertainty ), le risque de mauvaise appréciation des bénéfices d'un programme ( program impact uncertainty ) et enfin, le risque de décalage par rapport à l'évolution de l'environnement extérieur ( timeline induced external environmental uncertainty ). Pour y remédier, cet article fondé sur une enquête de terrain présente les solutions offertes par les outils d'intelligence économique : l'analyse prospective, le profilage, le suivi des activités des entreprises, la veille abyssale notamment sur les réseaux sociaux, le recours à des modèles économétriques et des algorithmes bancaires pour comprendre le comportement des consommateurs... Autant d'outils permettant d'anticiper les évolutions technologiques ou le lancement de nouveaux produits et ainsi d'adapter les choix de politique publique industrielle et d'accroître la probabilité de son succès. Cette démarche trouve pour finalité l'établissement d'un « tableau de bord intégré » permettant, à partir de KPIs ( Key Performance Indicators ) soigneusement choisis, de recenser en continu les informations permettant de réduire les risques précités et d'évaluer la satisfaction des objectifs fixés en amont.

How do you create a strong and growing cadre of successful exporters? As will be demonstrated in this article, the current direction towards more open trading policies provides a small part of the solution, but does little to stimulate non‐exporters or develop new exporters. This article proposes a framework which could help all exporters reach their maximum potential and in doing so lay the groundwork for economic growth and prosperity. To ensure that South Africa's economy reaches its fullest potential requires that the government follow up on the RDP and the DTI White Papers focus on exports with solid action. This would require a concerted effort on the part of the government to develop, manage, execute and evaluate programmes to the different needs of the firms at different stages of export development. By using the proposed framework, programmes can be created to help non‐exporters to become exporters, help new exporters to become committed exporters and eliminate the barriers to achieve more export successes

No matter where you look, governments today are focusing great effort on the enhancement of international trade. on persuading more companies to export ever more goods and services. But how. exactly, do we create a strong and growing cadre of successful exporters? This article proposes a framework which may help all exporters reach their maximum potential and so lay the groundwork for economic growth and prosperity

PurposeThis paper aims to depict foresight programmes as extended service encounters between foresight practitioners, sponsors, and other stakeholders. The implications of this perspective for evaluating the outcomes of such programmes are to be explored.Design/methodology/approachThe range of activities comprising foresight is reviewed, along with the various objectives that may underpin these activities. The more substantial foresight programmes are seen in terms of a series of steps, in each of which various partners can be involved in generating service outcomes and later steps of the process. The arguments are illustrated with insights drawn from various cases.FindingsA foresight programme is likely to feed into more than one policy process, so that the foresight activities can be linked to various stages of the policy cycles, as well as engaging participants with different degrees of influence on the policies in question. The outcomes of the foresight activity are also heavily shaped by the degree of involvement of various stakeholders, not least the sponsoring agency and any other groups it seeks to mobilise. Seeing foresight as a service activity brings to the fore the notion of co‐production, and the importance of the design of the service encounters involved.Research limitations/implicationsThe task of evaluating foresight is a challenging one, and comparison of foresight activities needs to bear in mind the different scale, scope, and ambitions of different programmes. Simple static comparison of formal inputs and outputs will miss much of the value and value‐added of the activity.Practical implicationsA dynamic approach to evaluation stresses the learning of lessons about the roles of multiple stakeholders – and the responsibilities of sponsors as well as practitioners.Originality/valueForesight programmes are frequently commissioned, and often have significant influence on decision‐making. Attempts to systematically evaluate these efforts have begun, and this essay stresses the need to be aware of the complex interactive nature of foresight, highlighted by viewing it in service terms.

PurposeThe objective of this paper is to contribute to improved practice and impact of foresight through the development and testing of a Foresight Impact Evaluation Schema. The schema is designed to guide foresight practitioners in the more effective design and conduct of foresight exercises to optimise impact.Design/methodology/approachThe development of the schema is based on the significant previous work in this field, and the author's experience of designing and managing more than 100 foresight projects. It also takes into account accumulated experience with heuristics developed to guide foresight design and management, and with various approaches to evaluating the impact of social science knowledge on policy‐ and decision‐making.FindingsA range of impacts identified from major foresight projects have been characterised according to four categories of impact ‐ awareness raising, informing policy, enabling greater capacity to address uncertainty, and influencing policy, strategy, investment, program delivery and public attitudes.Research limitations/implicationsThe schema needs to be tested against a variety of foresight projects to further refine its usefulness.Practical implicationsWith the rapid growth of the application of foresight, it has become essential to guide practitioners in the appropriate design and management of all the processes associated with foresight to achieve maximum impact, and to demonstrate the value of the investment in foresight to consequent policy and planning.Originality/valueThis paper builds on earlier and contemporary work to develop a more refined and applicable schema to guide foresight impact evaluation.

PurposeThe aim of this article and special issue is to propose a framework for foresight impacts on policy and decision making. The need to identify direct impacts, measure them and identify the factors that lead to impact is the primary objective of the special issue and, as outlined in the article, represents a critical addition to the foresight field. On the basis of case studies, experience, and theoretical‐evaluative frameworks this issue seels to offer suggestions regarding the factors that may help policy makers, academics, consultants, and others involved in foresight produce impactful results.Design/methodology/approachThe methodology deployed for this article is both empirical and meta analysis. This introductory article is based on the special issue articles as well as the authors' extensive practical experiences in foresight.FindingsForesight does impact policy. Case studies and experiences in Europe, North America, Africa and Asia identified in the special issue provide support for this. Also, as difficult as it is to measure impact, the authors explore several frameworks that will help the foresight community demonstrate impact and prove the value of foresight.Originality/valueThe article highlights several frameworks that will help the foresight community demonstrate impact and prove the value of foresight.