Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe relationships between the State and political parties have often been analysed in dual terms. Yet, as Katz and Mair already noticed in their well-known (and criticized) article on the emergence of the cartel party, a clear separation between parties and public institutions has never been completely achieved, in the evolution of liberal democracies. In contrast, while parties act as agencies of institutionalization, public institutions recognize (de jure or de facto) parties as the legitimate actors of political representation. From this perspective, it is worth considering party change as a process intertwined also with institutional change. To date, however, the analysis of such a relationship has been neglected by political scientists, who have privileged explanations of party change based on other factors, whether at systemic or at a micro level. By avoiding a priori assumptions about causality, our main research question is the following: is it possible to identify patterns of co-evolution between State institutions – more specifically, public administration – and party organizations? Building on a new institutional approach to organization theory, the aim of this article is to investigate to what extent the evolution in the size of party organizations and in the size of public administration has followed similar trajectories. Our study focuses on the United Kingdom and Italy, from 1950 to 2010. Our findings confirm that parties' external face expands when public spending and the number of public employees increase, and vice-versa. The same holds for parties' internal face, at least in the Italian case.

First published online: 15 October 2019 ; The aim of this chapter is to present the evolution and strengthening of the European Parliament Political Groups and European Political Parties from a comparative perspective. The specific focus is on the relation between the two faces of the EU political system. Despite the number of studies on the organizational aspects of the European Parliament Political Groups (EPPGs) and the European Political Parties (EuPPs), the literature is still scarce for what concerns the relationship between the two organizations. This chapter gives empirical evidence to the oft-repeated (yet seldom demonstrated) predominance of the groups in respect to their corresponding European parties. In fact, this is true from a material point view (the groups are stronger in terms of staff and financial resources) and from the point of view of their capacity of limit the institutionalization of new competitors (new groups or new parties), that would participate the distribution of public resources that are assigned to these actors. Our analysis confirms that the European Parliament Political Groups are, from all the considered standpoints, stronger than the corresponding European Political Parties. This indeed still represents a shortcoming that limits the emergence of a proper party system at the European level and weakens the European democracy.

The Italian election of 2018 has been described by many as a 'political earthquake' with effects so destructive they have been felt abroad, especially in Brussels. When elections provide outcomes that are particularly shocking, political commentators and academics often deploy the term 'electoral earthquake' to capture the nature of the impact. Indeed, observers used this evocative metaphor in Italy after the 2013 election (Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014). What we need, then, is an apt but novel descriptor for the events of 2018. In fact, the last two elections really ought to be considered part of the same seismic shock, the effects of which have been felt in in different arenas at various points in time. ; Chapter part of Open Access book.

Published online: 25 September 2018 ; The aim of this article is to assess to what extent the change' after the 2018 Italian election can be observed in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas. We use the indicators of party volatility' and innovation' to measure the change in each arena. The time span is the period 1948-2018, with a specific focus on the time after the watershed election of 1994. In this respect, we have identified a crucial difference between the 1994 change and that of 2013-18: if 1994 was the single moment of passage from one party system to another, in the 2010s the change did not happen in a single moment. Only after the next election, if volatility and innovation in the three arenas is reduced substantially, could we claim that a new party system has developed, that could be considered the third party system' of the Italian Republic.

In the last 20 years an increasing number of scholars have centred their attention on the relationships between party national structures and party sub-national branches. A relevant part of the specialized literature has interpreted party change as the by-product of the denationalization of party politics. The aim of this contribution is to investigate to what extent eight relevant Italian parties have followed patterns of organizational change, after the reforms of the municipal, provincial and regional election sys-tems; and the process of devolution of administrative powers begun during the Nineties. By focusing on two analytical dimensions (the level of involvement and the level of autonomy of party regional units), we analyse diachronically continuity and change in party formal organization, through an in-depth analysis of the statutes adopted from 1992 to 2012

The aim of the present article is to assess the main aspects of the institutionalization of party politics at the European Union level. The Political Parties at European Level (PPELs) originated outside the European institutions and were basically, before the approval of Regulation 2004‑2003, transnational federations of national political parties. The introduction of public funding from the eu budget to the PPELs aimed to institutionalize and reinforce these organizations. However, the influence of ppels in the European political sphere is still limited. Two institutional and political changes – namely the approval of a new Statute for European Parties and the nomination of candidates for the Presidency of the EU Commission – have been implemented, but their consequences on the consolidation of PPELs still need to be verified empirically.

The aim of the present article is to assess the main aspects of the institutionalization of party politics at the European Union level. The Political Parties at European Level (PPELs) originated outside the European institutions and were basically, before the approval of Regulation 2004-2003, transnational federations of national political parties. The introduction of public funding from the EU budget to the PPELs aimed to institutionalize and reinforce these organizations. However, the influence of PPELs in the European political sphere is still limited. Two institutional and political changes - namely the approval of a new Statute for European Parties and the nomination of candidates for the Presidency of the EU Commission - have been implemented, but their consequences on the consolidation of PPELs still need to be verified empirically. Adapted from the source document.

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty assessed new prerogatives to the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This has increased the role of the EP thus changing the balance of power with other EU institutions, as the Council of Ministers, the European Council and also the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). This new situation conveys more powers and responsibilities to the EP and to its main actors, i.e. the political parties. Even if also national parties have their own opinions on CFSP and CSDP issues, it is obvious that their supranational and EU level organisations, the so-called Europarties, devote to the foreign policy of EU much more attention. Aim of this paper is to analyse whether Europarties share the same attitude towards the existence of a EU common foreign and defence policy, and what are the main conceptual frames adopted by each Europarty on some of the main EU foreign and defence issues. Europarties' positions are analysed through a discourse analysis approach in order to understand their ideas towards three fundamental institutional frameworks of the EU foreign policy: the Lisbon Treaty, the existence of the CFSP and the existence of the CSDP (and the European Defence Agency). Moreover, a content analysis is conducted on Europarties' electoral manifestos and on the main EU strategic documents in order to understand which are the main conceptual frames used by parties and by EU on the foreign and defence issues. In particular four categories concerning different aspects of the CFSP and of the CSDP are identified: nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations. Results show that not only the non-mainstream Europarties, whose critical views towards the EU or some aspects of the EU were already known, but also amongst the EPP, the PES and ELDR there are some differences in their attitude towards the CFSP and the CSDP. While the EPP and the ELDR seem to be clearly enthusiastic of the new CFSP and CSDP - as designed by the Lisbon Treaty - Socialists, even if they agree and underline the importance of the reformed CFSP, are more critical towards the CSDP. With respect to the four categories (nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations) the Europarties offer different attitudes and priorities to those expressed in the official documents of the EU. In particular, Europarties seem to have a completely different perception of which threats have to be considered the most dangerous. It is worth noting that every Europarty considers the climate change as the threat which deserves more space and attention while for the official documents the environmental issue represents only one of the menaces posed to the EU.