Suchergebnisse

Tras la reciente etapa de agitación en los mercados financieros, tanto los académicos como las instituciones reguladoras han iniciado un debate sobre el papel de las agencias de rating en la inestabilidad financiera. Parece ser que sus recomendaciones optimistas han sido seguidas por la gran mayoría de los inversores, a pesar de que con posterioridad se han revelado erróneas. Como ejemplo, en el caso de Islandia, las agencias de rating no fueron capaces de predecir su inminente colapso en 2008. Como consecuencia de ello, en los últimos meses se ha agudizado el debate sobre agencias de rating y su contribución en las turbulencias en los mercados financieros. Así, un gran número de comisiones gubernamentales y grupos de investigación a nivel mundial han propuesto diferentes reformas del sistema financiero. Entre ellas está aumentar el número de agencias de rating, dado que uno de los factores que pueden favorecer un comportamiento colusivo entre ellas es su reducido número. Como ejemplo Standard and Poor's, Moody's y Fitch controlan el 90 % del mercado. ; Following the recent period of unease on the financial markets, both academics and regulatory institutions have begun a debate on the role played by rating agencies in financial instability. It seems that their optimistic recommendations have been followed by the vast majority of investors, even though they later proved to be mistaken. As an example, the rating agencies were unable to predict Island's imminent collapse in 2008. Consequently, in the last few months the debate on rating agencies and their contribution to the turbulences of the financial markets has become more pronounced. Thus, a large number of governmental commissions and research groups around the world have proposed different reforms to the financial system. One of these changes would be to increase the number of rating agencies, since one of the factors that can favour collusive behaviour among them is the fact that they are very few in number. Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, for example, control 90% of the market.

El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar, utilizando un modelo teórico, el impacto que el tamaño del mercado tiene sobre la regulación de las emisiones consecuencia de la actividad productiva de las empresas. En nuestro modelo asumimos dos países con mercados del mismo tamaño. En cada país opera una sola empresa que produce tanto para el mercado doméstico como el mercado extranjero. Los gobiernos deciden controlar las emisiones resultantes de la actividad productiva de las empresas gravándolas con un impuesto y dar así incentivos a las empresas a invertir en actividades de I+D con el fin de reducir sus emisiones. En un contexto en el que tanto las empresas como los gobiernos actúan de forma estratégica demostramos que un aumento en el tamaño del mercado reduce los incentivos de los gobiernos a aplicar impuestos a la contaminación. ; This paper aims to analyse, through the application of a theoretical model, the impact that the size of markets has on the regulations over the resulting emissions of the production activity of companies. In our model we acknowledge two countries with similar size markets. In each country there is just one operating company, producing both for the domestic and the foreign market. The governments decide to control the abovementioned emissions by introducing a tax, while, at the same time, incentives are given to those companies in order for them to invest in R&D and thus reduce their emissions. In a context where both the companies and the governments assume strategic roles we prove that an increase in the size of the market reduces the incentives governments grant regarding the introduction of taxes against pollution.

This article empirically evaluates advocacy in low- and middle-income countries as a key tool for raising policy priority and securing high-level decision maker support in eye health. We used a unique data set based on a survey conducted by World Health Organization in 2011 on eye care and prevention of blindness in 82 low- and middle-income countries. The theoretical framework derives from the idea that a plethora of stakeholders at local and global level pressure national governments, acting in economic and the political spheres. Previously, eye care has not been investigated in such a framework. We found structural differences across countries with different income levels and proposed policy recommendations to secure high-level decision makers' support for promoting eye health. Three case studies suggest that, in order to secure more support and resources for eye health, domestic and international stakeholders must strengthen their engagement with ministries of health at political and above all economic levels. ; We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2011-23634) and from Universitat Jaume I (P1.1B2012-27).

The field of artificial economics (AE) embraces a broad range of methodologies relying on computer simulations in order to model and study the complexity of economic and social phenomena. The overarching principle of AE is the analysis of aggregate properties of artificial economies populated by adaptive agents that are equipped with behavioural rules and specific individual targets. These aggregate properties are neither foreseen nor intended by the artificial agents; conversely they are emerging characteristics of such artificially simulated systems. The book presents a peer-reviewed collect

AbstractWe present the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt cleaner abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. We consider two emission control instruments—emission taxes and tradable permits—as well as different combinations of the inspection probability and fine for non-compliance, which can result in full or weak enforcement scenarios. We review and qualify existing theoretical predictions in several ways and find the main result is that allowing for weak enforcement causes tax evasion, reductions in permit prices and lower adoption rates of cleaner abatement technologies. As a result, there are increases in aggregate emissions. Finally, treatments with tradable permits under weak enforcement encounter insufficient trading.

In this review we discuss advances in the agent-based modeling of economic and social systems. We show the state of the art of the heuristic design of agents and how behavioral economics and laboratory experiments have improved the modeling of agent behavior. We further discuss how economic networks and social systems can be modeled and we discuss novel methodology and data sources. Lastly, we present an overview of estimation techniques to calibrate and validate agent-based models and show avenues for future research.