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To be good citizens or statespersons, we need practical wisdom-the moral skill and will to know how to do the right thing in particular situations. Institutions work best when they cultivate practitioners who have the wisdom and judgment to choose the right aims and pursue them in the best way possible. Practical wisdom can be destroyed, however, when institutions rely too heavily on rules and incentives that encourage people to compete for extrinsic rewards or to avoid punishments. This text focuses on the ethical implications of institutional failures and identifies competitive utility-maximizing as a frequent source of such failures.

To be good citizens or statespersons, we need practical wisdom-the moral skill and will to know how to do the right thing in particular situations. Institutions work best when they cultivate practitioners who have the wisdom and judgment to choose the right aims and pursue them in the best way possible. Practical wisdom can be destroyed, however, when institutions rely too heavily on rules and incentives that encourage people to compete for extrinsic rewards or to avoid punishments. This text focuses on the ethical implications of institutional failures and identifies competitive utility-maximizing as a frequent source of such failures.

AbstractScholarly attention has increasingly shifted from diminished subtypes of democracy to hybrid regimes, particularly competitive authoritarianism. Such regimes retain democracy's formal features while failing to meet its minimum standards. When properties of distinct concepts like democracy and authoritarianism are combined, however, confusion, inaccuracy, and mischaracterization of cases may occur. By disaggregating political systems into electoral institutions, surrounding rights and freedoms, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, this article complicates the binary distinction between a midrange definition of democracy and competitive authoritarianism. A number of Andean cases are found to fall on the spectrum of defective democracies between these categories. Defective democracies break down when rulers violate the conditions necessary for institutionalized alternation in power by means of public participation and loyal opposition in an electoral regime. Given leaders' reliance on electoral legitimacy, however, even defective democracies may prove surprisingly resilient.