Suchergebnisse

Las empresas informativas están aplicando políticas de reducción de gastos de personal para hacer frente a la crisis económica. Este trabajo describe la Estructura Salarial de los Periodistas en España durante la crisis (2009) a partir de los datos recabados mediante una encuesta telefónica suministrada a una muestra de mil periodistas en activo residentes en España. La descripción de los datos se detalla en función de un conjunto de variables sociolaborales. El estudio se complementa con un análisis bivariable de la asociación entre el nivel salarial de los periodistas encuestados y dichas variables.
Los resultados indican que el nivel salarial de los periodistas en España está asociado a su género, edad, experiencia profesional, tipo de medio donde trabaja, tamaño de la empresa informativa, ubicación geográfica de la empresa, categoría profesional, tipo de contrato y antigüedad en la empresa. Sin embargo, el nivel salarial es independiente de nivel de estudios, titulación universitaria en Periodismo o Comunicación, y titulación en estudios de tercer ciclo. Los hallazgos del estudio—de interés para académicos y organizaciones profesionales—permitirán monitorizar en el futuro los efectos de las políticas de reducción de gastos de los medios en las retribuciones de los periodistas.

The Erie doctrine governs, among other things, when a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction may use a federal procedure that differs from the procedure a state court would use. Displacing the state procedure with the federal procedure (or not) may impact the substantive objectives of either state or federal law, but the current Erie doctrine provides little guidance. This Article argues that the Erie doctrine is best understood as governing a choice of enforcement defaults. As argued below, the primary function of civil liability is to protect a substantive entitlement to avoid the legal violation, either directly through specific performance remedies or through deterrence. Accordingly, procedures in federal and state court can be understood as default procedures to enforce this substantive entitlement, and these defaults are often abrogated by private contract or through legislation. Understood in this way, the Erie doctrine governs when a federal court may abrogate a state enforcement default and replace it with a federal one. This Article then uses the existing literature on default rules to argue that the Erie doctrine itself should use default rules to force information from both state and federal governments about the relationship of default procedures to substantive policies. This way, federal courts can make better choices between enforcement defaults.

As the old saying goes, hard cases make bad law. But hard cases also reveal the limits of legal doctrine. In this Article, I turn to a class of hard cases--mass torts--to rethink the law of procedural due process under the Due Process Clause. Mass torts have long perplexed courts and scholars. They include torts caused by asbestos and other toxic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, oil spills, and other mass-produced products and services. The plaintiffs not only suffer significant injuries, but the sheer number of plaintiffs, each with claims that raise unique fact and legal issues, stretch judicial resources to the limit. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has concluded that mass torts "def[y] customary judicial administration and call] for national legislation."

L'étude de la bureaucratie de proximité est dominée par des recherches menées dans les pays du Nord. Les conceptualisations qui dominent sont donc basées sur des observations de contextes institutionnels qui peuvent être très différents des conditions de travail des travailleurs de première ligne dans d'autres pays. Cet article fait le point sur la littérature de plus en plus abondante concernant la bureaucratie de proximité dans les contextes institutionnels faibles et rassemble les idées pertinentes que l'on retrouve dans la science politique comparative et l'administration publique dans un cadre analytique cohérent. Nous identifions quatre facteurs institutionnels qui façonnent les conditions de travail en première ligne et trois modèles de comportement chez les travailleurs de première ligne. Ces tendances dans les organismes de première ligne – qui vont de l'improvisation stratégique à la privatisation informelle – peuvent être considérées comme un effet de matelas d'eau institutionnel causé par des déficiences institutionnelles, telles que la pénurie de ressources et les lacunes en matière d'imputabilité : si la complexité de la prestation de services publics n'est pas abordée au niveau institutionnel, elle est poussée vers le niveau « de la rue » où les travailleurs de première ligne y font face de manières très diverses. Remarque à l'intention des praticiens Les travailleurs de première ligne dans les institutions publiques faibles sont souvent confrontés à des conditions de travail très précaires. Si les conditions structurelles préalables à la mise en œuvre des politiques et à l'application des règles ne sont pas résolues, ces complexités sont reportées sur les travailleurs de première ligne qui y font face par une privatisation informelle, une improvisation stratégique ou un engagement aliénant axé sur la simple survie de l'emploi. L'action de première ligne est un facteur indispensable pour comprendre la nature sélective et souvent distributive de la prestation de services et de l'application des règles dans les pays du Sud

The study of street-level bureaucracy has been dominated by research from the Global North. Mainstream conceptualizations are, therefore, based on observations from institutional contexts that may vary significantly from the working conditions of frontline workers elsewhere. This article takes stock of the growing body of literature on street-level bureaucracy in weak institutional contexts and brings together relevant insights from comparative political science and public administration into a coherent analytical framework. We identify four institutional factors that shape frontline working conditions and three behavioral patterns in frontline worker agency. These patterns in frontline agency – ranging from policy improvisation to informal privatization – can be understood as an institutional waterbed effect caused by institutional deficiencies, such as resource scarcity and accountability gaps: if the complexity of public service provision is not tackled at the institutional level, it is pushed towards the street-level where frontline workers cope with it in highly diverse ways. Points for practitioners Frontline workers in weak state institutions are commonly faced with highly precarious working conditions. If the structural preconditions for policy implementation and rule enforcement are unresolved, these complexities are pushed towards frontline workers that cope with them through informal privatization, policy improvisation, or alienative commitment focused on mere job survival. Frontline agency is an indispensable factor for understanding the selective and often distributive nature of service delivery and rule enforcement in the Global South.

AbstractDespite taking the citizen experience of policy implementation as starting point for analysis, the literature on administrative burdens has mostly portrayed citizens as passive victims of burdens. Based on a literature review, three hypotheses are formulated regarding citizens' capacity to ease the impact of administrative burdens through behavioral adjustment, use of social and human capital, and strategic behavior. Evidence for these strategies is found in a case study of beneficiaries' behavior in a Mexican social program, where even the most vulnerable citizens have resources to reduce the impact of administrative burdens, even if the actual causes of those burdens remain out of reach. The findings contribute to understanding (a) variance in people's experience of administrative burdens, (b) the impact of prolonged street‐level interactions on people's ability to ease administrative burdens, (c) the importance of studying informal street‐level interactions, and (d) the relevance of studying state‐citizen interactions in developmental contexts.

AbstractHow do frontline workers behave when they are, from one day to the other, left without clients because the policy that organized their street‐level interactions has been terminated? This is what happened in early 2019 to the staff of medical centers across Mexico after the sudden transformation of the long‐standing social program Prospera. Interviews with frontline workers show that they respond to this "policy void" by developing strategies of informal talks, community outreach, and the investment of personal resources to recover their clients. The findings presented here are relevant for understanding how frontline workers cope with public service gaps in developing countries. The notion of "policy improvisation" as a coping mechanism—frontline workers developing informal policy activities when being left without proper implementation instructions and capacity—is used here to signal the broader phenomenon of human resource neglect and implementation gaps in Latin American public administration.

The filibuster in the United States Senate effectively imposes a supermajority vote requirement to pass any legislation. Both supporters and critics of the filibuster agree that any filibuster reform would require extraordinary measures. In contrast to this consensus, this Article describes a method we call the "conventional option," which allows the filibuster to be reformed by a simple majority of senators at any time using ordinary Senate procedures. As we show below, a majority of senators using the conventional option (1) cannot be filibustered; (2) can act on any day the Senate is in session (not just at the beginning of a new Congress); and (3) does not need to invoke the Constitution. In fact, this Article shows that both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have limited filibustering in the past by using the conventional option described here.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes an individual mandate that penalizes individuals who do not purchase health insurance. Critics of the individual mandate, including a majority of justices on the Supreme Court, contend that Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause power to coerce individuals to buy a product. Supporters concede that the mandate coerces but argue that it is otherwise permissible under the Commerce Clause. This article questions whether the individual mandate coerces. It uses a simple economic model to show that, under certain conditions, the individual mandate induces insurers to sell health insurance at a price each individual would voluntarily pay. Accordingly, the article concludes that the premise underlying the debate over the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause should not be taken for granted.