Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn this paper, I focus on the concept of embeddedness as the background against which eros is a force and a power in and through interactions. To go beyond an internalist account of eros, I engage in a dialogue with some philosophical accounts of desire from an enactive perspective.This enables me to shed light on the location of the embodied tension as "in-between" lovers and "all-around" them. Crucial to this tensional account of embedded eros is the intertwining between self and others' becomings in processes of participatory sense-making. Through participatory sense-making lovers make their worlds, creating new ways of being and knowing in the ensemble. I advance some steps towards an enactive ethics of eros where, I claim, the cultivation of the space in-between and all-around lovers is the key to avoid the traps of a degenerated form of eros.

Abstract
Through a discussion of the socially extended mind, this paper advances the "not possible without principle" as an alternative to the social parity principle. By charging the social parity principle with reductionism about the social dimension of socially extended processes, the paper offers a new argumentative strategy for the socially extended mind that stresses its existential significance. The "not possible without principle" shows that not only is something more achieved through socially located processes of knowledge building, but also that, and more importantly, what is achieved is something that would not have been possible without social interaction. The social parity principle states that the result of an activity achieved via social interaction should be assumed functionally equivalent to a solitary investigation and is characterized by multiple realisability. Contrary to the social parity principle, the "not possible without principle" holds that the result would not have been achieved without the social interaction between (at least) two agents with specific existential needs. The socially extended mind never happens in a void. This means that the "not possible without" principle should be located in real-life, affectively charged, embodied experiences of skilful interactions between agents. This fundamental conceptual change via reference to the "existential necessity" that regulates socially extended processes is necessary in order to effectively lead the socially extended mind to a truly embedded and embodied account.

Abstract
This essay will demonstrate the nexus between philosophical dialogue and political action by analyzing the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckman and Minna Specht. The central question is: "In which sense can a dialogical education be considered as a political action?"
In the 1920s and 1930s, Nelson promoted Socratic dialogue amongst his students as a practice of freedom in opposition to the rising Nazi power. Nelson understood that to educate the new generation through a very participative model of philosophical inquiry that privileged critical thinking and autonomy was the best form of resistance. Minna Specht's idea of education for confidence gave to this dialogical practice a very innovative dimension, which led her to be engaged with unesco's educational programs in post-war Germany. In this way, the Socratic dialogue faced history.

Through the concepts of ἔργον and βίος, the article describes the two happiest forms of life, i.e., the theoretical and the political one, asking whether happiness is founded on the conjunction of the two. Focusing on the connection between philosophy, education and politics the paper emphasizes the role of contemplation as πράξις and the importance of philosopher for the city. ; Through the concepts of ἔργον and βίος, the article describes the twohappiest forms of life, i.e., the theoretical and the political one, askingwhether happiness is founded on the conjunction of the two. Focusingon the connection between philosophy, education and politics the paperemphasizes the role of contemplation as πράξις and the importance ofphilosopher for the city.