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Investigating cyber conflict is enormously difficult. The domain is complex, quality data are sparse, international affairs are shrouded in secrecy, and despite its seeming ubiquity, cyber power has only recently entered the battlefield. In the face of these challenges, we must rise to meet the challenges of cybersecurity research by deploying creative methods that collect verifiable and probatory data, and which allow for predictive models of cyber behavior. Against this backdrop, our special issue offers a vision of cybersecurity research that embraces a culture of rigorous inquiry based on theoretically robust, and policy relevant investigation. We highlight two key features. First, research at the intersection of cybersecurity and political science must incorporate the human dimension of cyber conflict. A human security approach to cybersecurity places people as the primary objects of security and recognizes that individual-level analyses can shed light on macro-level trends. Second, cyber research must adopt rigorous, empirical methods. We embrace a broad tent of empirical data collection techniques – spanning qualitative and quantitative, experimental, and observational research. What is integral is that all scholarship abides by the highest standards of replicability and falsifiability. The articles contained in this special issue collectively form a proof of concept that expands the horizons of cybersecurity research from a substantive viewpoint (adding a human dimension to the prevalent military/strategic analyses), and from a methodological perspective (propounding the importance of empirical scrutiny). Together, these 10 pieces of scholarship collectively affirm that there is now a critical mass of substantively diverse and empirically rigorous research in the field of cybersecurity, and that we as a community are capable of making bold, theoretically grounded, and empirically tested claims that verify how cyber power is or is not altering the nature of peace, conflict and international relations.

"This chapter assesses the rote of different psychological factors in explaining voting behavior, particularly right-wing voting patterns. In the contemporary Is- k raeli political arena, we studied the effects of three facets of authoritarianism (individual, social, and political) on voting patterns in the 1999 Israeli general elecdons (both for prime minister and parliament). This study was based on a comprehensive survey of 965 university and college students in Israel. The questionnaire focused on authoritarian attributes and individual voting inclinations. i Two major points were examined: which type of authoritarianism was significant in predicting a voting preference for the right-wing or left-wing prime ministerial candidate; and the prediction of voting preferences for the two largest right-wing parties, Likud (moderate right-wing) and Shas (militant religious right-wing), in comparison to the two largest left-wing parties, Labor (moderate left-wing) and Meretz (militant secular left-wing). Results reveal that the complete, multifaceted (individual, social, and political) authoritarianism syndrome best predicted voting for the right-wing prime ministerial candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu. However, regarding partisan voting ,patterns, results showed that a segregated or single-faceted authoritarianism was more important. Findings indicate that in the cases of larger and more moderate parties, only political authoritarianism had a significant effect; but for more militant parties, other factors (individual authoritarianism in the case of Shas and social authoritarianism in the case of Meretz) had the most significant effects. This research yields several conceptual insights. On the whole, it uncovers the variable sensitivity of the different facets of authoritarianism. Voting for a single candidate can be best predicted by a more integrated conception of authoritarianism. However, the distinct, respective aspects of authoritarianism can best predict partisan voting. The individual aspect corresponds with the prediction of right-wing party voting, but for left-wing voting, the social form of authoritarianism is more reliable. Finally, the political form of authoritarianism appears to serve as a reliable predictor of voting for both moderate parties." (author's abstract)

"This chapter assesses the rote of different psychological factors in explaining voting behavior, particularly right-wing voting patterns. In the contemporary Is- k raeli political arena, we studied the effects of three facets of authoritarianism (individual, social, and political) on voting patterns in the 1999 Israeli general elecdons (both for prime minister and parliament). This study was based on a comprehensive survey of 965 university and college students in Israel. The questionnaire focused on authoritarian attributes and individual voting inclinations. i Two major points were examined: which type of authoritarianism was significant in predicting a voting preference for the right-wing or left-wing prime ministerial candidate; and the prediction of voting preferences for the two largest right-wing parties, Likud (moderate right-wing) and Shas (militant religious right-wing), in comparison to the two largest left-wing parties, Labor (moderate left-wing) and Meretz (militant secular left-wing). Results reveal that the complete, multifaceted (individual, social, and political) authoritarianism syndrome best predicted voting for the right-wing prime ministerial candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu. However, regarding partisan voting, patterns, results showed that a segregated or single-faceted authoritarianism was more important. Findings indicate that in the cases of larger and more moderate parties, only political authoritarianism had a significant effect; but for more militant parties, other factors (individual authoritarianism in the case of Shas and social authoritarianism in the case of Meretz) had the most significant effects. This research yields several conceptual insights. On the whole, it uncovers the variable sensitivity of the different facets of authoritarianism. Voting for a single candidate can be best predicted by a more integrated conception of authoritarianism. However, the distinct, respective aspects of authoritarianism can best predict partisan voting. The individual aspect corresponds with the prediction of right-wing party voting, but for left-wing voting, the social form of authoritarianism is more reliable. Finally, the political form of authoritarianism appears to serve as a reliable predictor of voting for both moderate parties." (author's abstract).

This article assesses how socioeconomic and psychological factors explain right-wing extremist (RWE) sentiments. A correlation was expected between two psychological factors: authoritarianism and supernaturalist beliefs, and RWE, and a weaker correlation between socioeconomic variables and RWE, compared to psychological variables. Questionnaires were given to 1,247 Israeli university students. Results confirmed the expectation that psychological variables were better predictors of RWE. These conclusions contradict attributing RWE to socioeconomic factors.

To what extent do security threats – such as cyberattacks – undermine trust in government? Fears have emerged that cyberattacks undercut public trust in government and sow doubt in democratic institutions heavily dependent on digitised systems. Nevertheless, the logic of this threat remains untested. This article presents survey experiments conducted in the United States (n = 607), the United Kingdom (n = 594), and Israel (n = 627) that examine whether cyberattacks on critical infrastructure truly undermine public trust in government and, if so, by what psychological mechanism. We exposed participants to simulations of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure before measuring the psychological and political outcomes. Our results reveal that cyberattacks do not undermine voters' trust in the government's ability to protect them. Furthermore, in the United States, exposure to cyberattacks heightens public trust by amplifying anger. Our findings inject a missing comparative component to the theoretical discussion of when, why, and how cyberattacks affect public trust in government.

Across three studies, two experiments, and two different countries (Israel and the United States), we examine how perceptions among members of the public regarding the motives of terrorists' influence support for counterterrorist policy. We find that while perceptions that terrorists are motivated by "hatred" (rather than by a "lack of opportunity"—economic or otherwise) strongly correlate with support for harsher counter‐tactics, and that these perceptions can be changed by providing information from "experts" on the "true" motivations of the outgroup, these changes in perception do not appear to cause change in support for counterterrorism policy. Our findings suggest that among the public, counterterror policy is not as instrumentally driven as much current research assumes.

PurposeThe current work aims to introduce the concept of conflict perception and construct a scale that measures individual differences in perceptions about conflicts along religious, national and material dimensions. The concept and the measure are developed in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.Design/methodology/approachThe research design combines three methodological elements: 14 focus groups in Israel and the West Bank, which represent diversity in place of residence, religion, age and political background; an expert panel review; and a survey of 411 student respondents that was conducted between September 29 and October 9, 2013, among university students in Israel and Palestine.FindingsThe findings show that conflict perception is an individual's subjective view regarding the essence of the conflict and its central issues, the identities of the parties involved and their motivations, which may include material, ideological or symbolic motives, or any combination thereof. A novel scale consisting of five statements that can measure conflict perception that was developed, validated and implemented via a survey sample showed that Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel have a religious perception of the conflict, whereas Jews have a national perception of the conflict.Originality/valueFirst, the paper introduces a new concept that sheds additional light on the micro foundations of peoples' attitudes in conflict situations. Second, it develops and validates a measurement tool for conflict perception that may be usable, with necessary adjustments, in other conflicts. Third, it demonstrates that parties to the conflict do not necessarily share similar perceptions about the conflict, a finding with far-reaching consequences for conflict resolution at both the scholarly and policy levels.

To what extent can cyberattacks wreak havoc and terrorize modern society? Until now, this question has revolved around the potential of cyber operations to cause physical destruction or other material harm. In this paper, we propose a broader interpretation. We submit that assessing cyber-threats through the prism of physical destruction has obscured the human dimension of the threat. Instead, we propose calculating the gravity of cyberattacks by measuring psychological distress. This approach recognizes that even seemingly inconsequential cyberattacks can levy tremendous damage by traumatizing civilians, undermining societal cohesion, and exacerbating cycles of violence. To test whether cyberattacks cause significant individual harm, we employ an internal meta-analysis looking at eighteen studies conducted in three countries over 6 years. Across these studies, we exposed 6,020 respondents to simulated cyberattacks and conventional attacks. We conclude that cyberattacks can cause high levels of psychological harm—equal even to that caused by conventional political violence and terrorism. This finding overturns a widely accepted view that cyberattacks are a mere irritant at best and a threat to information security at worst. Through this lens, the findings suggest that even nonphysically destructive cyberattacks can trigger consequences that constitute a legally defined armed attack that permits using armed force in self-defense. We conclude by discussing how the onset of psychological distress generates political pressure in support of retaliation and can lead to military escalation.

AbstractTo what extent can cyberattacks wreak havoc and terrorize modern society? Until now, this question has revolved around the potential of cyber operations to cause physical destruction or other material harm. In this paper, we propose a broader interpretation. We submit that assessing cyber-threats through the prism of physical destruction has obscured the human dimension of the threat. Instead, we propose calculating the gravity of cyberattacks by measuring psychological distress. This approach recognizes that even seemingly inconsequential cyberattacks can levy tremendous damage by traumatizing civilians, undermining societal cohesion, and exacerbating cycles of violence. To test whether cyberattacks cause significant individual harm, we employ an internal meta-analysis looking at eighteen studies conducted in three countries over 6 years. Across these studies, we exposed 6,020 respondents to simulated cyberattacks and conventional attacks. We conclude that cyberattacks can cause high levels of psychological harm—equal even to that caused by conventional political violence and terrorism. This finding overturns a widely accepted view that cyberattacks are a mere irritant at best and a threat to information security at worst. Through this lens, the findings suggest that even nonphysically destructive cyberattacks can trigger consequences that constitute a legally defined armed attack that permits using armed force in self-defense. We conclude by discussing how the onset of psychological distress generates political pressure in support of retaliation and can lead to military escalation.

To what extent can you engage in political activity in the modern age without Internet access? The growing dependence on Internet access to fulfill basic civil functions is threatened by increasing personal and societal cyber vulnerability. In this article, we explore the extent to which citizens are able, or unable, to engage in specific political activities in the absence of Internet connectivity. To concretize the subject, we test how Internet deprivation affects the ability to realize three basic elements of political participation: political expression, civic association, and access to information. To measure this, we develop a new experimental methodology that tests people's ability to complete tasks related to each function under simulated treatments of Internet access or deprivation. This empirical methodology offers a new framework through which to quantify the realization of social tasks under experimental conditions. Early results suggest that the absence of Internet access significantly reduces task completion for activities related to political expression and political association and conditionally reduces task completion for practices associated with freedom of information. Having substantiated this empirical framework, we encourage its application to additional forms of political activity.

Does nonviolent repression prompt subject groups to obey or rebel? By what mechanism does it do so? To address these questions, we exploit a natural experiment based on a 2009 policy toward the "easement" of checkpoints—nonviolent impediments to movement—in the West Bank. We sample populations across 17 villages (n = 599), beside one checkpoint slated for easement (treatment) and one that will undergo no change (control), before and after the intervention. We then pursue difference‐in‐difference estimation. This design is experimental, as easement was orthogonal to Palestinian attitudes; for robustness, we test our findings against an independent panel (n = 1,200). We find that easement makes subject populations less likely to support violence; we suggest humiliation as the mechanism bridging nonviolent repression with militancy. This warrants rethinking Israeli security policy, as short‐term concerns over Palestinian mobility may be compromising Israel's long‐term interests. By extension, checkpoint easement may positively affect peace negotiations.