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ABSTRACTManuscript Type: ConceptualResearch Question/Issue: Our study evaluates the role of social capital in new director selection, board composition, and board effectiveness.Research Findings/Insights: We take steps toward a theory of director selection, explaining how social capital at the individual‐level influences director selection and at the group level influences board effectiveness. At the individual level, social capital is defined as the interpersonal linkages that director candidates have to others, both inside and outside the firm. At the group level, board social capital is an asset that includes both relations of directors and potential resources arising from the relations.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We argue that: 1) social capital can be divided into internal and external dimensions according to its locus and function; 2) both internal and external social capital are associated with board composition through director selection, although the causal logic differs considerably; 3) the influences of social capital on director selection vary according to the context; and 4) both internal social capital and external social capital generate unique resources that are important to board effectiveness.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study informs practicing managers, because we describe how and why most research and public discussion has emphasized the role of directors as monitors of managers and this has significantly downplayed the role of directors in providing advice, counsel, and other resources to their organizations. We provide a strong logic for seeking directors with specific types of social capital (internal or external) under specific contexts.

The Cox proportional hazard model has often been used for survival analysis in organizational research. The Cox model needs to satisfy one critical assumption—time independence—that the effects of independent variables are constant over survival time (also known as the proportional hazard assumption). However, organizational research often encounters time dependence in the Cox model. Organizational studies have traditionally seemed to view time dependence as an empirical nuisance, but we highlight that it is also a theory-development opportunity. Indeed, from our review of AMJ and SMJ papers published in a recent 10-year period, we found that researchers rarely considered time dependence as a theory-development opportunity, and worse, many of them did not test for (or report tests for) time dependence. The purpose of our study is to change this pattern. To this end, we provide a step-by-step guide to facilitate testing for time dependence and using time dependence as a theory development opportunity. We also demonstrate our step-by-step guide with an empirical example.

Knowledge creation requires the combination and exchange of diverse and overlapping knowledge inputs as individuals interact with exchange partners to create new knowledge. In this study, we examine knowledge creation among university research scientists as a function of their professional (ego) networks—those others with whom they collaborate for the purpose of creating new knowledge. We propose that knowledge creation relies, in part, on two attributes of a researcher's professional network structure—average tie strength and ego network density—and we provide insights into how these attributes jointly affect knowledge creation. Our study of over 7,300 scientific publications by 177 research scientists working with more than 14,000 others over an 11-year period provides evidence that the relationship between a research scientist's professional network and knowledge creation depends on both ego network density and average tie strength. Our evidence suggests that both attributes affect knowledge creation. Moreover, average tie strength interacts with density to affect knowledge creation such that researchers who maintain mostly strong ties with research collaborators who themselves comprise a sparse network have the highest levels of new knowledge creation.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueChief executive officer (CEO) tenure—the time a person spends in the CEO position—is a key observable characteristic of the CEO that has attracted considerable attention in the fields of management and accounting/finance. Yet, the research has evolved in parallel streams, and scholars have used CEO tenure as a proxy for various aspects of CEO givens and behaviors. The purpose of this paper is to consolidate, assess, and integrate the extant knowledge about CEO tenure from the fields of management and accounting/finance and, on that basis, stimulate future research.Research Findings/InsightsOur review reveals five key themes in CEO tenure research that have been studied across the management and accounting/finance fields: (1) CEO tenure and motivations; (2) CEO tenure and power; (3) CEO tenure and social capital; (4) CEO tenure and human capital; and (5) CEO tenure and stakeholder perceptions. We review the extant research along these research themes, highlighting the collective insights, contributions, and shortcomings within and between these themes.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur review suggests that CEO tenure is a multifaceted, complex construct. To advance extant knowledge, we propose three pathways for future research: (1) substantiating knowledge within themes; (2) expanding knowledge across themes; and (3) advancing knowledge about temporal dynamics. We hope that research along those lines will help foster a richer and deeper understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of CEO tenure, which will also advance our understanding about CEOs in general.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur study offers a comprehensive understanding of the nature of CEO tenure and its implications. Such an understanding can be leveraged to define appropriate policies and governance decisions that account for the dynamic nature of the CEO position.

Using a quasi-experimental design, the effects of purpose (evaluative vs. developmental) on both peer-rating quality and user acceptance were examined. Subjects were 65 undergraduates divided into 11 project groups. Six groups conducted peer ratings for evaluative (i.e., grading) purposes, whereas the remaining 5 did so for the purpose of providing developmental feedback. Peer ratings conducted for evaluative purposes tended to contain greater halo and to be more lenient, less differentiating, less reliable, and less valid than those performed for developmental purposes. User acceptance as measured by recommendation for future use was more favorable under the developmental than the evaluative conditions. These results suggest that the quality of peer ratings and user acceptance are highly susceptible to the influence of rating contexts and that peer ratings are more useful for developmental than for evaluative purposes. Implications of these results for future peer-appraisal practices and research are discussed.

AbstractOur study theoretically and empirically examines performance antecedents and consequences of the Fortune annual Survey of Corporate Reputation. Accounting‐and market‐based measures of performance are used to predict the raings, and investor reactions to the publication of the ratings are predicted to be associated with the extent to which the ratings diverge from antecedent predictions. Lower‐than‐predicted ratings should generate a negative response while higher‐than‐predicted ratings should generate a positive response. Contrary to expectations, we found a negative relationship. In addition, this negative relationship was only for the lower‐than‐predicted ratings. For higher‐than‐predicted ratings the relationship with investor reaction was insignificant.RésuméNotre étude consiste en un examen théorigue et empirique des facteurs influençant le classement annuel du magazine Fortune et des conséquences de ce classement sur la performance des firmes évaluées. Nous utilisons des mesures comptables et financières pour examiner le lien entre la performance et la réputation de la firme. La façon dont les investisseurs réagissent à ces révaluations doit en principe être proportionnelle au degré de divergence par rapport aux prédictions antérieures. Théoriquement, les évaluations qui sont moins élevées que prévues entraînent une réaction négalive des investisseurs, tandis que les évaluations qui sont plus élevées que prévues entraínent une réponse positive des investisseurs. Mais dans la réalité, on observe plutôt une relation inverse, en l'occurrence dans le can des évaluations qui sont moins élevées que prévues. Les évaluations qui sont plus élevées que prévues n'ont qu'un impact limité sur la réaction des investisseurs.