"Der Artikel diskutiert zwei fundamental unterschiedliche Ansätze zur Identifikation von Stakeholdern: Über einen 'Relationship Approach' werden Verpflichtungen von Individuen oder Gruppen durch spezifische soziale Beziehungen bestimmt. Der diesem Ansatz gegenüber stehende 'Assignment Approach' hingegen geht über eine solche Betrachtung hinaus, indem dafür plädiert wird, die Verteilung von Verantwortung auf der Grundlage eines Sets pragmatischer Regeln zu bestimmen, die aus allgemeinen moralischen Überlegungen hergeleitet werden. Der Betrag beleuchtet die Reichweite der beiden Ansätze zur Erklärung des traditionellen Stakeholder-Modells." (Autorenreferat)
A country's right to levy taxes is a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty. Without the power to tax, a government would be unable to redistribute resources among its citizens and provide public goods. The question of how tax rights should be distributed is therefore one of the oldest and most important problems of tax theory. Increased international economic integration has made this question even more important, as a larger share of economic transactions take place across national borders, giving rise to situations in which more than one country is able to tax the same base.How such conflicts are resolved affects both the ability of countries to redistribute resources domestically and the international distribution of tax revenues. The allocation of tax rights therefore raises important questions of distributive justice, questions that require a normative theory of the right to tax. This essay seeks to evaluate the current distribution of tax rights by examining whether it can in fact be justified within the main approaches to distributive justice.
Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. John E. Roemer (1986), 'Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (4), November, 751-84 -- 2. Marc Fleurbaey (1995), 'Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 65 (2), April, 505-21 -- 3. Julian Le Grand (1990), 'Equity versus Efficiency: The Elusive Trade-off', Ethics, 100 (3), April, 554-68 -- 4. James Konow (2003), 'Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories', Journal of Economic Literature, XLI (4), December, 1188-239 -- 5. Hal R. Varian (1975), 'Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (3), Spring, 223-47 -- 6. Amartya Sen (1979), 'Equality of What?', The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University, May 22nd, 1979, Salt Lake City, UT, USA: University of Utah Press, i-ii, 197-220 -- 7. Matthew Rabin (1993), 'Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics', American Economic Review, 83 (5), December, 1281-302 -- 8. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith (1996), 'Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games', American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 653-60 -- 9. Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999), 'A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (3), August, 817-68 -- 10. James Konow (2000), 'Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions', American Economic Review, 90 (4), September, 1072-91 -- 11. Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher (2008), 'Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter', Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (1), January, 287-303 -- 12. Alexander W. Cappelen, Astri Drange Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen and Bertil Tungodden (2007), 'The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach', American Economic Review, 97 (3), June, 818-27 -- 13. Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), 'ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition', American Economic Review, 90 (1), March, 166-93 -- 14. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), 'Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (3), August, 817-69 -- 15. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat and Vernon Smith (1994), 'Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games', Games and Economic Behavior, 7 (3), November, 346-80 -- 16. Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel (2004), 'Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments', American Economic Review, 94 (4), September, 857-69 -- 17. James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (2001), 'Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 293-312 -- 18. Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv and Daniel Markovits (2007), 'Individual Preferences for Giving', American Economic Review, 97 (5), December, 1858-76 -- 19. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000), 'Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3), Summer, 159-81
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Liberal egalitarian theories of justice argue that inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors should be eliminated, but that inequalities arising from responsibility factors should be accepted. This article discusses how the fairness argument for redistribution within a liberal egalitarian framework is affected by a relocation of the cut between responsibility and non-responsibility factors. The article also discusses the claim that equalization of some non-responsibility factors will reduce the ideal level of redistribution.
We look at how one should reward effort without rewarding talent. One way to approach this issue is to ask how an increase in one individual's effort should be allowed to affect the post-tax income of others. The article provides characterizations of three main classes of redistribution mechanism on the basis of how these answer this question.
This paper analyses the welfare effects of a change from centralized to decentralized political authority. The potential disadvantage with decentralization in our model is that local dominant groups with rather "extreme" preferences may win the vote and implement policies that harm the well-being of local minorities. When the national median voter represents a "moderate" position, centralization can be seen as a way of protecting the interests of local minorities. Our main result is that the centralized solution may welfare dominate decentralization even in the absence of scale economics and interregional spillovers. We also demonstrate that increased segregation, increased mobility, and increased heterogeneity in preferences, factors that are normally considered to be arguments in favor of decentralization, may reduce the attractiveness of the decentralized solution from a welfare perspective. Finally, we show that when the national median voter is an "extreme" type, decentralization may represent a way of protecting local minority interests.
We look at how one should reward effort without rewarding talent. One way to approach this issue is to ask how an increase in one individual's effort should be allowed to affect the post-tax income of others. The article provides characterizations of three main classes of redistribution mechanism on the basis of how these answer this question. 11 Tables. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications, Ltd.]
A main focus in economics is how to design optimal policies in second-best situations, which often requires a trade-off between giving some individuals more than they deserve, false positives, and others less than they deserve, false negatives. This paper provides novel evidence on people's second-best fairness preferences from large-scale experimental studies in the United States and Norway. The majority of people are more concerned with false negatives than with false positives, but we document substantial heterogeneity in second-best fairness preferences between the countries and across the political spectrum. The findings shed light on the political economy of social insurance and redistribution. (JEL D63, D72, D78, H23, I38)
