Suchergebnisse

This article examines John Stuart Mill's influential proposal of how to tax wealth transfers. According to Mill, every person should be free to bequeath but not to receive bequest. Mill proposed an upper limit on how much each person could receive from wealth transfers. We discuss three objections against this proposal. The nonseparability objection holds that it is not possible to separate the freedom to give from the freedom to receive. The objection from private property holds that private property includes an unlimited right to dispose of one's assets and that this right is violated under Mill's scheme. The objection from incentives holds that Mill's scheme would have negative effects on people's willingness to work and save. We argue that these objections can be met and that taxing bequeathed wealth according to Mill's scheme is more just and more efficient compared to systems that rely less on wealth transfer taxation.

AbstractWe examine whether intra-EU migration affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes, i.e. the idea that immigrants' access to the welfare system should be restricted. According to the in-group/out-group theory, migration can unleash feelings of insecurity and thus trigger welfare chauvinism. According to intergroup contact theory, welfare chauvinism should decrease when immigration is higher, because contact reduces prejudice and softens anti-immigrant stances. We test these theories using data from the European Social Survey 2008/2009, supplemented with country-level data, and analyse these data using a multilevel ordered logit approach. We find a negative relation between intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism, supporting the intergroup contact theory: in countries with more intra-EU migration, welfare chauvinism tends to be lower. Furthermore, the higher the percentage of East European immigrants compared to other EU immigrants, the higher the level of welfare chauvinism.

This article identifies how labour migrants' participation in undeclared work is triggered by a combination of voluntary exit from the formal labour market in the host country as well as structures that makes it more likely for this type of worker to be forced to accept unregistered work. The argument is built by examining how East‐West European Union migration can foster or reinforce reasons for participating in undeclared work. At the EU level, the issue of undeclared work is seen as a mounting challenge, and public discussion now associates a supposed increase in undeclared work with the EU's open borders. For this study, 74 semi‐structured interviews were conducted with Polish labour migrants in Norway – both temporary migrants and more settled ones. A substantial part of these interviews focused on undeclared work. The results indicate that immigration enhances as well as creates new reasons for participating in undeclared work. In particular, they highlight how decisions to participate in undeclared work are not just an effect of labour market dynamics, but also a question of social integration.

A main focus in economics is how to design optimal policies in second-best situations, which often requires a trade-off between giving some individuals more than they deserve, false positives, and others less than they deserve, false negatives. This paper provides novel evidence on people's second-best fairness preferences from large-scale experimental studies in the United States and Norway. The majority of people are more concerned with false negatives than with false positives, but we document substantial heterogeneity in second-best fairness preferences between the countries and across the political spectrum. The findings shed light on the political economy of social insurance and redistribution. (JEL D63, D72, D78, H23, I38)

AbstractIn recent years, many countries have faced pressure to cut the costs of the welfare state, and different strategies have been utilized to achieve this, including stricter eligibility requirements, reduced level of benefits, and reduced maximum duration of benefits. This contribution reports the results from a Norwegian survey designed to measure which of these strategies the general population would prefer in a situation where the government has to tighten various social security schemes. For a given reduction in total costs, there is a trade‐off between the desire to avoid large individual benefit reductions and the desire to protect some groups of benefit recipients from any cuts. Different preferences for how to retrench the welfare state will reflect how individuals trade off these concerns. We find a striking association between political affiliation and preferred retrenchment strategy. Right‐wingers typically prefer to tighten the eligibility criteria, while left‐wingers typically prefer to reduce the benefit level. Furthermore, our results indicate that labor market outsiders are less in favor of tightening the eligibility criteria, but more in favor of reducing the maximum duration of benefits, than labor market insiders. This article contributes to the literature on welfare state retrenchment by examining which retrenchment strategy that the public prefers, which in turn sheds light on which measures that are likely to receive popular support from different demographics in the population.

The concentration of the world's refugees in developing countries calls for international collaboration on the matter. In the face of concerns voiced not only amongst politicians but also the public, we investigate how people trade-off the two most prominent responsibility-sharing mechanism. We conduct a survey experiment in 26 countries asking whether people would rather: (a) admit more asylum seekers and (b) provide financial assistance to the host countries. We find that most respondents prefer admitting asylum seekers over paying. We also establish significant individual-level heterogeneity that sheds new light on people's attitudes towards asylum seekers. Importantly, we report on the effect of welfare chauvinism and nativism on the willingness to admit rather than to pay.