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Abstract
There is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fail to yield a satisfactory foundation, 2) sketch an alternative foundation that exploits Kant's account of human dignity in a rather critical way; and 3) address one major objection my approach is bound to attract (and in a certain form has already attracted). Since my foundation suggests that we have dignity (and as a consequence human rights) because we are autonomous, that is, capable of moral behavior, some scholars have argued that I am bound to the counterintuitive conclusion that people with a temporary or permanent lack of rational capacity, which would cause a condition of "impaired autonomy," are not entitled to the protection of human rights. While this objection does nothing but reformulate in the language of human rights an old, classical objection to Kant's ethics, replying to it requires mobilizing new intellectual resources.

The paper centers on some problematic theses of my book Kant's Political Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress (UWP 2017). This reconsideration is occasioned partly by comments I received and partly by my own process of self-criticism. I focus on the point that commentators have mainly criticized, that is, the link I suggest between human dignity and our capacity for moral behavior, or autonomy. The first part recalls the basic features of my Kant-inspired and yet in many regards anti-Kantian account of the relation between dignity and autonomy and replies to some criticisms received from orthodox Kantians. The second part is strictly connected to the first because it deals with the reasons we have to believe that we are autonomous. While in the book I sketched Kant's own reasons for the 'reality of freedom,' as he puts it, I focus now on Bojan Kovačević's suggestion to look at characters in novels written by artistic geniuses (in particular Leo Tolstoy) to find indirect evidence in favor of autonomy. This allows me to reflect on the kind of evidence one can legitimately expect in the proof at issue. Thirdly, I reply to a classical objection, ignored in the book, that impacts with equal force Kant's ethics and my own position. The problem concerns people with temporary or permanent impairment of rational capacities. If I let human dignity depend on our capacity for autonomous behavior, am I committed to the counterintuitive (and rather devastating) conclusion that children or people suffering from momentary or irreversible loss of rational capacity, and a fortiori of autonomy, do not have dignity and therefore do not deserve to be protected by human rights? ; Članak se usredsređuje na neke problematične teze moje knjige Kantovo političko nasleđe. Ljudska prava, mir, progres (UWP 2017). Preispitivanje je jednim delom podstaknuto komentarima koje sam dobio a drugim delom procesom samo-kritike. Osnovni problem koji su komentatori uglavnom kritikovali jeste moj pokušaj da dovedem u vezu ljudsko dostojanstvo i našu sposobnost za moralno ponašanje, ili autonomiju. Prvi deo članka podseća na osnovna obeležja mog Kantom inspirisanog a ipak u mnogo čemu anti-Kantovog shvatanja veze između dostojanstva i autonomije i odgovara na neke od kritika koje upućuju ortodoksni Kantovci. Drugi deo je striktno povezan sa prvim budući da razmatra razloge zbog kojih mi verujemo da smo autonomni. Dok sam u knjizi skicirao dokaze samog Kanta za "stvarnost slobode" kako on to kaže, sada se usredsređujem na predlog Bojana Kovačevića da se indirektni dokazi u korist autonomije potraže u likovima iz romana kao delima umetničkih genija (posebno Lava Tolstoja). To mi omogućava da razmišljam od tome kakva se uopšte vrsta dokaza može legitimno očekivati u ovoj stvari. Treće, odgovaram na klasičnu primedbu, koja se u knjizi ignoriše, a koja podjednako pogađa Kantovu etiku i moju sopstvenu poziciju. Problem se odnosi na ljude sa trenutnim ili trajnim poremećajem racionalnih sposobnosti. Ako dozvolim da ljudsko dostojanstvo zavisi od naše sposobnosti za autonomno delovanje, da li se onda suočavam sa kontraintuitivnim (i prilično razornim) zaključkom da deca ili ljudi koji pate od trenutnog ili nepovratnog gubitka racionalnog kapaciteta, i a fortiori autonomije, nemaju dostojanstvo i stoga ne zaslužuju da budu zaštićeni ljudskim pravima?

The paper centers on some problematic theses of my book Kant's Political Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress (UWP 2017). This reconsideration is occasioned partly by comments I received and partly by my own process of self-criticism. I focus on the point that commentators have mainly criticized, that is, the link I suggest between human dignity and our capacity for moral behavior, or autonomy. The first part recalls the basic features of my Kant-inspired and yet in many regards anti-Kantian account of the relation between dignity and autonomy and replies to some criticisms received from orthodox Kantians. The second part is strictly connected to the first because it deals with the reasons we have to believe that we are autonomous. While in the book I sketched Kant's own reasons for the 'reality of freedom,' as he puts it, I focus now on Bojan Kovačević's suggestion to look at characters in novels written by artistic geniuses (in particular Leo Tolstoy) to find indirect evidence in favor of autonomy. This allows me to reflect on the kind of evidence one can legitimately expect in the proof at issue. Thirdly, I reply to a classical objection, ignored in the book, that impacts with equal force Kant's ethics and my own position. The problem concerns people with temporary or permanent impairment of rational capacities. If I let human dignity depend on our capacity for autonomous behavior, am I committed to the counterintuitive (and rather devastating) conclusion that children or people suffering from momentary or irreversible loss of rational capacity, and a fortiori of autonomy, do not have dignity and therefore do not deserve to be protected by human rights? ; Članak se usredsređuje na neke problematične teze moje knjige Kantovo političko nasleđe. Ljudska prava, mir, progres (UWP 2017). Preispitivanje je jednim delom podstaknuto komentarima koje sam dobio a drugim delom procesom samo-kritike. Osnovni problem koji su komentatori uglavnom kritikovali jeste moj pokušaj da dovedem u vezu ljudsko dostojanstvo i našu ...

The paper centers on some problematic theses of my book Kant?s Political
Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress (UWP 2017). This reconsideration is
occasioned partly by comments I received and partly by my own process of
self-criticism. I focus on the point that commentators have mainly
criticized, that is, the link I suggest between human dignity and our
capacity for moral behavior, or autonomy. The first part recalls the basic
features of my Kant-inspired and yet in many regards anti-Kantian account of
the relation between dignity and autonomy and replies to some criticisms
received from orthodox Kantians. The second part is strictly connected to
the first because it deals with the reasons we have to believe that we are
autonomous. While in the book I sketched Kant?s own reasons for the ?reality
of freedom,? as he puts it, I focus now on Bojan Kovacevic?s suggestion to
look at characters in novels written by artistic geniuses (in particular Leo
Tolstoy) to find indirect evidence in favor of autonomy. This allows me to
reflect on the kind of evidence one can legitimately expect in the proof at
issue. Thirdly, I reply to a classical objection, ignored in the book, that
impacts with equal force Kant?s ethics and my own position. The problem
concerns people with temporary or permanent impairment of rational
capacities. If I let human dignity depend on our capacity for autonomous
behavior, am I committed to the counterintuitive (and rather devastating)
conclusion that children or people suffering from momentary or irreversible
loss of rational capacity, and a fortiori of autonomy, do not have dignity
and therefore do not deserve to be protected by human rights?

Kant's theory of peace has been reinterpreted under one of the most influential research programs of our times: The so-called democratic peace theory. In particular, the third ingredient of Kant's "recipe" for peace —the cosmopolitan right to visit—has been recognized as a powerful and effective instrument to reduce militarized interstate conflicts. In the hands of political scientists, however, this ingredient has often become nothing more than a set of rules for securing and facilitating international trade and economic interdependence. This article argues that this narrow reading mistakes international trade as the essence of the third definitive article. Kant sees economic interdependence as a means to realize what cosmopolitan right is truly about, that is, the affirmation of a set of rules for protecting humans qua humans, the creation of communal bonds among individuals beyond national or group loyalties, and the promotion of a global moral conscience modeled on the natural rights of man. An accurate understanding of cosmopolitan right is essential to avoid the popular - yet mistaken - idea that Kant sees progress towards peace as possible without individuals' and peoples' moral progress.