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This thesis examines the question of environmental dilemmas from both a local and a global perspective. It explores the open question of cooperation in the climate commons and provides evidence in favor of a key role of trust in spurring cooperation in global dilemmas. Given the potential for cooperation in both local and global environmental dilemmas, this thesis explores the rationales for the limited diffusion of environmental taxes. It encompasses the issues of effectiveness and public acceptability in local and global situations and concludes that what most likely hampers the implementation of environmental taxes is the general public's perception of ineffectiveness rather than any empirical ineffectiveness. Finally, it provides new insights on how to overcome this barrier to effective policymaking tackling local and global externalities. Overall, this thesis sheds new light on the question of environmental dilemmas. It examines from different perspectives the issues related with the application of market-based instruments to environmental externalities and provides original evidence-based insights to the political economy of commons. While different in terms of methodology, all chapters share the same behavioral implications. Individuals may be willing to play cooperatively in environmental dilemmas if they trust others to do so. That is, people's reticence to environmental taxes most likely stems from a general suspicion with respect to the taxes themselves rather than from a pure unwillingness to cooperate. This thesis provides the literature with a better understanding of cooperation and policy formation in the environmental arena, bringing to the issue both a touch of optimism, by underlying the importance of social norms, and a touch of pessimism, by recalling the endogeneity of environmental policy and emphasizing the obstacles to its acceptability. With no spirit of cooperation, the future would not look very bright for environmental taxation. There is no surprise though, it always takes two to ...

[eng] This thesis examines the question of environmental dilemmas from both a local and a global perspective. It explores the open question of cooperation in the climate commons and provides evidence in favor of a key role of trust in spurring cooperation in global dilemmas. Given the potential for cooperation in both local and global environmental dilemmas, this thesis explores the rationales for the limited diffusion of environmental taxes. It encompasses the issues of effectiveness and public acceptability in local and global situations and concludes that what most likely hampers the implementation of environmental taxes is the general public's perception of ineffectiveness rather than any empirical ineffectiveness. Finally, it provides new insights on how to overcome this barrier to effective policymaking tackling local and global externalities. Overall, this thesis sheds new light on the question of environmental dilemmas. It examines from different perspectives the issues related with the application of market-based instruments to environmental externalities and provides original evidence-based insights to the political economy of commons. While different in terms of methodology, all chapters share the same behavioral implications. Individuals may be willing to play cooperatively in environmental dilemmas if they trust others to do so. That is, people's reticence to environmental taxes most likely stems from a general suspicion with respect to the taxes themselves rather than from a pure unwillingness to cooperate. This thesis provides the literature with a better understanding of cooperation and policy formation in the environmental arena, bringing to the issue both a touch of optimism, by underlying the importance of social norms, and a touch of pessimism, by recalling the endogeneity of environmental policy and emphasizing the obstacles to its acceptability. With no spirit of cooperation, the future would not look very bright for environmental taxation. There is no surprise though, it always takes two to tango.

This paper analyzes the drivers of carbon taxes acceptability with survey data and a randomized labeling treatment. Based on a sample of more than 300 individuals, it assesses the effect on acceptability of specific policy designs and individuals' perceptions of carbon taxes advantages and disadvantages. We find that the lack of perception of primary and ancillary benefits is one of the main barriers to the acceptability of carbon taxes. In addition, policy design matters for acceptability and in particular earmarking fiscal revenues for environmental purposes can lead to larger support. We also find an effect of labeling, comparing the wording "climate contribution" with "carbon tax". We argue that proper policy design coupled with effective communication on the effects of carbon taxes may lead to a substantial improvement in acceptability.

This paper analyzes the drivers of carbon taxes acceptability with survey data and a randomized labeling treatment. Based on a sample of more than 300individuals, it assesses the effect on acceptability of specific policy designs and individuals' perceptions of carbon taxes advantages and disadvantages. We find that the lack of perception of primary and ancillary benefits is one of the main barriers to the acceptability of carbon taxes. In addition, policy design matters for acceptability and in particular earmarking fiscal revenues for environmental purposes can lead to larger support. We also find an effect of labeling, comparing the wording ''climate contribution'' with ''carbon tax''. We argue that proper policy design coupled with effective communication on the effects of carbon taxes may lead to a substantial improvement in acceptability.

AbstractWhile instruments to price congestion exist since the 1970s, less than a dozen cities around the world have a cordon or zone pricing scheme. Geneva, Switzerland, may be soon joining them. This paper builds on a detailed review of the existing schemes to identify a set of plausible design options for the Geneva congestion charge. In turn, it analyzes their acceptability, leveraging a large survey of residents of both Geneva and the surrounding areas of Switzerland and France. Our original approach combines a discrete choice experiment with randomized informational treatments. We consider an extensive set of attributes, such as perimeter, price and price modulation, use of revenues, and exemption levels and beneficiaries. The informational treatments address potential biased beliefs concerning the charge's expected effects on congestion and pollution. We find that public support depends crucially on the policy design. We identify an important demand for exemptions, which, albeit frequently used in the design of environmental taxation, is underexplored in the analysis of public support. This demand for exemptions is not motivated by efficiency reasons. It comes mostly by local residents, for local residents. Further, people show a marked preference for constant prices, even if efficiency would point to dynamic pricing based on external costs. Hence, we highlight a clear trade-off between efficiency and acceptability. However, we also show, causally, that this gap can in part be closed, with information provision. Analyzing heterogeneity, we show that preferences vary substantially with where people live and how they commute. Even so, we identify several designs that reach majority support.