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This chapter presents a philosophical framework for the understanding of the experience of breathlessness. I suggest that the experience of breathlessness is total and overwhelming to the sufferer, but also largely invisible to the outsider. How does this tension play itself out for the respiratory patient? How does this tension affect respiratory medicine and clinical work? How could the first-person experience of breathlessness be better understood? Can it be usefully harnessed in the clinic? And what can a distinctively philosophical analysis offer this process? These questions are explored in the chapter, in the hope of providing a sketch of such a philosophical framework aimed at understanding this debilitating and common symptom.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. It begins with an overview of breathing and the symptom of breathlessness, and how breathlessness is inter-preted in the clinic and outside it. The second section provides a phenomenological account of breathlessness, moving away from understanding it as a medical symptom to understanding it as a broader existential, social, personal, cultural, and psychological phenomenon. The final section examines how such a philosophical framework may be operationalized in a respiratory clinic, providing some examples of its possible clinical uses.

Ill persons suffer from a variety of epistemically-inflected harms and wrongs. Many of these are interpretable as specific forms of what we dub pathocentric epistemic injustices, these being ones that target and track ill persons. We sketch the general forms of pathocentric testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, each of which are pervasive within the experiences of ill persons during their encounters in healthcare contexts and the social world. What's epistemically unjust might not be only agents, communities and institutions, but the theoretical conceptions of health that structure our responses to illness. Thus, we suggest that although such pathocentric epistemic injustices have a variety of interpersonal and structural causes, they are also sustained by a deeper naturalistic conception of the nature of illness.

Cover -- Contents -- Contributors -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction to the Volume -- I: Political Philosophy -- Philosophy as Politics: Some Guesses as to the Future of Political Philosophy -- Philosophy as Logo: The Thought of Branding and the Branding of Thought -- II: Philosophy and Science -- Philosophy as Biology: Evolutionary Explanations in Philosophy -- Philosophy as Intensive Science -- Philosophy as Dynamic Reason: The Idea of a Scientific Philosophy -- III: Philosophizing from Different Places -- Philosophy as if Place Mattered: The Situation of African Philosophy -- Philosophy as a Problem in Latin America -- IV: Philosophical Method -- Philosophy as Bricolage -- Philosophy as Judgement -- Philosophy as Nomadism -- Philosophy as an 'As' -- V: Philosophy and Literature -- Philosophy as Poetry: The Intricate Evasions of As -- Philosophy as Sideshadowing: The Philosophical, the Literary, and the Fantastic -- VI: Therapeutic Philosophy -- Philosophy as Therapy -- Philosophy as Listening: The Lessons of Psychoanalysis -- VII: Professional Philosophy -- Philosophy as Profession -- Philosophy as Deep and Shallow Wisdom -- Epilogue: The Limits of Philosophy? -- Philosophy as Saying the Unsayable -- Glossary -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- W -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y