Suchergebnisse

Escalation processes are found in many types of international conflict. However, a great deal of the theoretical and empirical literature on escalation is context specific and concentrates on explaining the outcomes of an escalation process. This approach has generated numerous insights; however, our understanding of escalation processes, in general, remains partial and incomplete. In this article, the author develops a two-sided incomplete information model to identify the kinds of escalation strategies states are likely to adopt in conflict. The model produces several hypotheses, one of which is tested empirically in the context of militarized interstate disputes. The hypothesis states that as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances increases, the lower cost tolerant actor is more likely to escalate to the maximum of his or her ability on the first move in the conflict. The results of the test confirm the theory's expectations of an inverse relationship between cost tolerance and an actor's escalation behavior. The article concludes by noting implications for future research on escalation processes.

The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the particulars of the decision problem. These two variables permit us to resolve the puzzle of inconclusive empirical results by identifying the separating conditions under which each risk-related claim holds.

Abstract
Caruso, R. 2020. "What Post COVID-19? ‹‹Avoiding a 21st Century General Crisis››." Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 26 (2). May 2020 provides a prescription for avoiding a general global crisis in the Post-Covid-19 era via the revitalization of Post-WWII era international organizations. Here we examine the implications of contributions from the game theory and the trade and conflict realms of the peace science literature to assess the likelihood of successful revitalization of the relevant organizations. Unfortunately, we are more pessimistic than optimistic since the contributions of peace science suggest that countries are more likely to fail to implement the guidelines needed to revitalize these organizations.

"A Unified Analysis of the Diversionary and Constraint Accounts of Crisis Initiation" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractThis note examines a methodological issue pertaining to the empirical specification of the probability of crisis initiation. We show that the empirical specification of the probability of crisis initiation encounters an insurmountable methodological problem, and, by example, that the problem leads empirical researchers to incorrect conclusions regarding the relationship between regime type and crisis initiation, in particular.

This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-sided incomplete information version of the Traditional Deterrence Game. The analysis shows when the use of the emotions of fear and anger is effective, ineffective, and counterproductive in altering the decision to initiate or not initiate a crisis. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-sided incomplete information version of the Traditional Deterrence Game. The analysis shows when the use of the emotions of fear and anger is effective, ineffective, and counterproductive in altering the decision to initiate or not initiate a crisis.

AbstractThe purpose of this note is to present a surprising result regarding crisis initiation and termination. The decision problem treated here is distilled from an extension of the two-sided incomplete information version of the traditional deterrence game. We employ a two-stage analysis of the decision problem faced by the Challenger that formally links the onset of a crisis to the decision over whether to escalate the crisis should the Challenger face resistance from the Defender. The two-part result is as follows. A crisis is more likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately back down if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to escalate if Defender chooses to resist. Contrariwise, a crisis is less likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately escalate if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to back down if Defender chooses to resist.