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While a great deal is known about public awareness of 'traditional' methods of political participation, far less is known about public awareness and use of democratic innovations such as Scotland's flagship public petitions system. This paper makes use of a survey conducted in 2009 by Ipsos MORI Scotland for the Public Petitions Committee to examine the influence of resource constraints on public knowledge and participation in the petitions system. While resource constraints such as internet access and lack of time influence the amount of knowledge people have of participation options, the effect is significantly greater on actual participation. Adapted from the source document.

Representation, both as a normative concept and a political process, has generated a rich literature across several national contexts. To develop our understanding of representational systems, scholars tend to assess the degree of policy congruence between parliamentarians and constituents as well as the role orientations adopted by elected parliamentarians and legislators. This paper contends that in order to have a complete understanding of representational systems, we must consider not only the representational roles adopted by parliamentarians, but also the publics' preferences regarding parliamentary representation. Specifically, I posit that individuals have attitudes about the type and degree of relationship that they believe should exist between elected parliamentarians, parties and constituents. Using data from a 2003 survey of the British public, I test the related hypotheses that individuals have meaningful and predictable preferences for the representational relationship they share with their members of parliament (MPs) and that these representational preferences in turn influence how individuals evaluate MPs. Finding support for both hypotheses, I argue that developing an understanding of normative public preferences for political representation is an important and overlooked component in advancing models of public support of both elected officials and governing institutions.

Objective. This article begins the process of broadly evaluating the role of nongovernmental actors in regulatory markets by specifically examining environmental groups' use of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) market established by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This research posits that the use of nonexclusionary markets in environmental quality regulation allows interest groups a nonpareil opportunity to seek to directly affect policy outcomes. Methods. This article uses two forms of analysis. The first part of the article provides a qualitative analysis of the motives of interest groups that use incentive‐based policies in an attempt to achieve their desired policy outcomes. The last section of the article uses empirical data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Allowance Tracking System to evaluate interest groups' use of market‐based policies. Results. The use of market‐based mechanisms in public policies offers interest groups a new form of participation in the policy process, yet it seems that only "new" groups are willing to enter the market. Further, I find that though the participating groups may not be able to affect the relative price of allowances (as they claim they will), they nonetheless are able to reduce the absolute number of allowances available. Finally, using market‐based policies to achieve their preferred outcomes may be a "rational" decision for groups in that the "return" on their investment may indeed be quite high. Conclusions. One aspect of pollution markets is clear—they do create an interesting new mechanism of public activism for groups that wish to protect the environment but do not want to "lobby or litigate." By purchasing pollution allowances groups attempt to directly affect environmental policy outputs without entering the policy cycle as it has been previously understood. As market‐based policies are employed more broadly, opportunities accorded to environmental groups for active involvement in seeking to limit ambient pollutants, as well as the groups' potential impact, may only expand.

This article begins the process of broadly evaluating the role of nongovernmental actors in regulatory markets by specifically examining environmental groups' use of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) market established by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This research posits that the use of nonexclusionary markets in environmental quality regulation allows interest groups a nonpareil opportunity to seek to directly affect policy outcomes. The first part of the article provides a qualitative analysis of the motives of interest groups that use incentive-based policies in an attempt to achieve their desired policy outcomes. The last section of the article uses empirical data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Allowance Tracking System to evaluate interest groups' use of market-based policies. The use of market-based mechanisms in public policies offers interest groups a new form of participation in the policy process, yet it seems that only "new" groups are willing to enter the market. Further, I find that though the participating groups may not be able to affect the relative price of allowances (as they claim they will), they nonetheless are able to reduce the absolute number of allowances available. Finally, using market-based policies to achieve their preferred outcomes may be a "rational" decision for groups in that the "return" on their investment may indeed be quite high. One aspect of pollution markets is clear: they do create an interesting new mechanism of public activism for groups that wish to protect the environment but do not want to "lobby or litigate." By purchasing pollution allowances, groups attempt to directly affect environmental policy outputs without entering the policy cycle as it has been previously understood. As market-based policies are employed more broadly, opportunities accorded to environmental groups for active involvement in seeking to limit ambient pollutants, as well as the groups' potential impact, may only expand. 2 Tables, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.

Data from the National Election Survey 1995 pilot study are drawn on to determine the statistical & substantive characteristics of the latent structure of environmental policy support among 486 US respondents. Results of exploratory factor analysis, structural equations with maximum likelihood estimation (via EQS), & ordinary least-squares regression analyses reveal that environmental policy support holds a monarchial hierarchical structure, where the second-order factor, environmental policy support, comprises three subdimensions. A substantive difference exists between these dimensions, as they are predicted by differing exogenous variables. Environmental policy support is shown to be a complex, multidimensional, & multilevel set of attitudes. Implications for the environmental justice literature are drawn from the fact that external efficacy & race are significant predictors of (only) the environmental quality assessment dimension. 3 Tables, 2 Figures, 29 References. Adapted from the source document.

In Representing Red and Blue, Barker and Carman observe that culturally traditionalist Republicans tend to demand -- and get -- less policy responsiveness from their elected representatives than do culturally progressive Democrats. Cultural traditionalists prefer "leaders who lead," while cultural progressives prefer "public servants who listen," creating a dynamic that engenders political inequality.