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AbstractA system of three endogenous equations is used to estimate the determinants of poverty dynamics. The system incorporates: (i) the direct effect of growth and income inequality on poverty, (ii) the feedback effect of poverty on inequality and growth, and (iii) different channels through which economic policies can contribute to poverty reduction. Results suggest that countries tend to move towards one of two possible equilibria. The positive (virtuous) equilibrium is characterized by fast growth, decreasing inequality, and rapid poverty reduction. The negative (vicious) equilibrium involves slow (or even negative) growth, sharpening inequalities, and resilient poverty. The policy mix is critical in determining to which of the two equilibria a country converges.

A Proportional Hazards Specification for cabinet duration data is estimated by mean of a flexible parametric approach. The hazard rate is found to be significantly affected by the majority status, the degree of fragmentation and ideological homogeneity of the coalition, the stability and the polarisation of the legislature and the time horizon at the moment of cabinet formation. Interesting innovative results concern the higher stability of cabinets supported by coalitions ideologically closer to the median party and/or left–oriented. The overall state of the economy also has a role. Graphical evidence suggests that the underlying distribution of duration data might be a Gompertz distribution.

A Proportional Hazards Specification for cabinet duration data is estimated by mean of a flexible parametric approach. The hazard rate is found to be significantly affected by the majority status, the degree of fragmentation, & ideological homogeneity of the coalition, the stability & the polarization of the legislature, & the time horizon at the moment of cabinet formation. Interesting innovative results concern the higher stability of cabinets supported by coalitions ideologically closer to the median party &/or left-oriented. The overall state of the economy also has a role. Graphical evidence suggests that the underlying distribution of duration data might be a Gompertz distribution. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.

Theoretical & empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950-1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners, & that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified. 3 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 31 References. Adapted from the source document.