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"Coercive diplomacy - the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior - is an indispensable to international relations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations"..

Scholarship on the politics of secrecy in international relations and foreign policy has experienced tremendous growth in recent years. This article begins by providing an overview of this literature, analyzing the conditions under which leaders opt for secrecy in both economic and security domains. These motivations differ greatly depending on whether the presumed audience from which a leader keeps a secret is domestic, international, or corporate in nature. Next, it considers methodological innovations and challenges, particularly in the measurement of secrecy. Finally, it reflects on the lessons learned and discusses some exciting questions that scholars could explore in future research. As a burgeoning field within international relations, the study of secrecy offers a variety of promising and potentially fruitful directions.

This paper argues that the benefits of international institutions accrue disproportionately to pairs of states that find cooperation most difficult. It determines which states achieve the greatest gains from these institutions by identifying a central reason that states fail to cooperate in international relations: they fear being "held up" by other states for political concessions. Political hold-up problems occur when one state fails to undertake an otherwise productive investment due to the increased ability it would give another state to extract political concessions. Focusing on the World Trade Organization (WTO), I demonstrate that political hold-up problems are pervasive in international relations due to links between economic and political policies, but that international institutions can solve hold-up problems by helping to enforce agreements. I first formalize this argument and then empirically test the implications derived from the model, finding that the WTO increases trade most for politically dissimilar states by reducing states' abilities to hold up their trading partners for foreign policy concessions. I provide evidence of the causal mechanism by showing that WTO membership increases trade in contract-intensive goods and boosts fixed capital investment. I conclude that by solving political hold-up problems, international institutions can normalize relations between politically asymmetric states that differ in terms of capabilities, regime types, and alliances.

This article analyzes how fears regarding information disclosure have shaped responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and whether innovations in confidentiality at institutions like the World Health Organization may address those concerns. Sensitive information abounds in global health crises including health data, treatment options, and treatment administration. This creates a dilemma: sharing information is necessary to identify outbreaks but is prevented by concerns regarding privacy, profits, and political scrutiny. Building on insights from other institutions and issue areas, we assess how global governance institutions might respond to these disclosure dilemmas by developing forms of confidentiality in global disease governance. We analyze the benefits and trade-offs in equipping organizations like the World Health Organization with stronger methods for keeping sensitive information secure. We also use new data on a range of international organizations to show that such enhanced confidentiality can improve institutional effectiveness.

AbstractDo peacekeepers protect civilians in civil conflict? Securing civilian safety is a key objective of contemporary peacekeeping missions, yet whether these efforts actually make a difference on the ground is widely debated in large part because of intractable endogeneity concerns and selection bias. To overcome these issues, we use an instrumental variables design, leveraging exogenous variation in the rotation of African members of the United Nations Security Council and looking at its effects on African civil wars. We show that states that wield more power send more peacekeepers to their preferred locations, and that these peacekeepers in turn help to protect civilians. We thus demonstrate the robustness of many existing results to a plausible identification strategy and present a method that can also be applied to other diverse settings in international relations.

AbstractScholars have long argued that international organizations solve information problems through increased transparency. This article introduces a distinct problem that instead requires such institutions to keep information secret. We argue that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states' violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect it. Properly equipped international organizations, however, can mitigate these dilemmas by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide dissemination. Using new data on intelligence disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency and an analysis of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that strengthening the agency's intelligence protection capabilities led to greater intelligence sharing and fewer suspected nuclear facilities. However, our theory suggests that this solution gives informed states a subtle form of influence and is in tension with the normative goal of international transparency.