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Chapter 1. Introduction: The Good of Freedom -- Chapter 2. Agency and Social Ontology -- Chapter 3. The Metaphysics of Social Being -- Chapter 4. Personal Freedom: The Action Model -- Chapter 5. Personal Freedom: The Culture Model -- Chapter 6. Political Freedom -- Chapter 7. Political Freedom and Social Justice.

"This title was first published in 2000: A systematic analysis of the concept of fairness as a moral notion. The work critically examines and rejects several familiar accounts of fairness - fairness as equality of treatment, as not taking advantage of another, as adherence to rule, and as respect for others - the author proposes an alternative account of fairness as fidelity to social practice. Drawing on examples from a variety of social practices, ranging from the requirement to do one's fair share to the fairness of lotteries and bargaining, this book outlines a new moral theory of fairness and offers insight into the various roles fairness considerations play in our lives and their limitations. Reflecting on the place of fairness and fair mindedness in moral, social, and political thought, this book will be of interest to moral, social and political philosophers as well as those in related areas such as political science and sociology."--Provided by publisher

This book expands the idea of practical liberalism by exploring how a theory of civil association premised upon prudential argument can remain stable through time. The work explores the relation between politics and morality and crafts a theory of social justice that can command the attention of all groups present in a pluralist polity.

This book expands the idea of practical liberalism by exploring how a theory of civil association premised upon prudential argument can remain stable through time. The work explores the relation between politics and morality and crafts a theory of social justice that can command the attention of all groups present in a pluralist polity.

This book introduces a radically different type of liberal political theory by severing liberal thought from all underlying moral foundations. It presents a liberalism that accommodates the differences of worldview and moral theory of the good in today's pluralist societies and also meets liberalism's historic commitment to diversity

Considers David Horowitz's accusation that the left has jeopardized academic freedom to argue that there is no place for political correctness in the academy; there is room only for honest inquiry & reasonable political inquiry. The defense of academic freedom rests on the belief that the pursuit of truth improves the human condition. Distinguishes between education & indoctrination to assert that the difference lies within students themselves. Refutes Horowitz's charges that liberal dominated higher education is out of step with American culture to argue that the US is a liberal political culture that values exploratory & even radical thinking. Progress in the dominantly liberal culture must be realized through engagement & contestation with competing theories & viewpoints. Academic freedom in the liberal culture lives a life of permanent danger because of the commitment independent thought both includes & challenges Mill's "despotism of custom.". References. J. Harwell

Natural law theorizing, it seems, will not die, even in this so-called postmodern era. For some, apparently including David Braybrooke, this is reason to think that there is something true about natural law doctrine, and in Natural Law Modernized, he sets about to convince us of this very point. He thinks that natural law theory, once it is suitably modernized and refurbished in the fashion he recommends, has strengths that may make it preferable to alternative ethical theories, particularly utilitarianism and contractarianism.

KANT'S MORALIZED VERSION OF THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT AVOIDS THE TRADITIONAL LIBERAL TENSION BETWEEN A COMMITMENT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ON THE ONE HAND AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY ON THE OTHER. YET THE RECONCILIATION ACHIEVED BY THE DOUBLE-NEGATION ARGUMENT DEPENDS UPON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE KANTIAN NOTION OF MORAL FREEDOM; AND THERE MAY BE REASONS TO ENTERTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE COHERENCE AND PERSUASIVENESS OF THIS NOTION. THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS HOW THIS CONCEPT ENABLES US TO CONSTRUCT A THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY BASED UPON MORAL RATHER THAN PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS.