Suchergebnisse

In October 2019, the Mexican government reformed its General Health Law thus establishing the warning approach to front-of-pack nutrition labeling (FOPNL), and in March 2020, modified its national standard, revamping its ineffective FOPNL, one preemptively developed by industry actors. Implementation is scheduled for later in 2020. However, the new regulation faces fierce opposition from transnational food and beverage companies (TFBCs), including Nestlé, Kellogg, Grupo Bimbo, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo through their trade associations, the National Manufacturers, American Bakers Associations, the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico and ConMéxico. Mexico, as a regional leader, could tip momentum in favor of FOPNL diffusion across Latin America. But the fate of the Mexican FOPNL and the region currently lies in this government's response to three threats of legal challenges by TFBCs, citing international laws and guidelines including the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex Alimentarius, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)/US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In this perspective, we argue that these threats should not prevent Mexico or other countries from implementing evidence-informed policies, such as FOPNLs, that pursue legitimate public health objectives.

In October 2019, the Mexican government reformed its General Health Law thus establishing the warning approach to front-of-pack nutrition labeling (FOPNL), and in March 2020, modified its national standard, revamping its ineffective FOPNL, one preemptively developed by industry actors. Implementation is scheduled for later in 2020. However, the new regulation faces fierce opposition from transnational food and beverage companies (TFBCs), including Nestlé, Kellogg, Grupo Bimbo, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo through their trade associations, the National Manufacturers, American Bakers Associations, the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico and ConMéxico. Mexico, as a regional leader, could tip momentum in favor of FOPNL diffusion across Latin America. But the fate of the Mexican FOPNL and the region currently lies in this government's response to three threats of legal challenges by TFBCs, citing international laws and guidelines including the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex Alimentarius, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)/US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In this perspective, we argue that these threats should not prevent Mexico or other countries from implementing evidence-informed policies, such as FOPNLs, that pursue legitimate public health objectives.

BackgroundThe insidious and pervasive nature of marketing of unhealthy food and beverages has been identified as one of several strategies the unhealthy food and beverage industry uses to exert their influence on population food choices and diet. Regulating the food and beverage industry's marketing practices is one mechanism to mitigate this commercial determinant of health. This paper seeks to understand the main barriers and enablers that governments face when attempting to design an appropriate regulatory system.Methods14 semi-structured expert interviews were undertaken with participants across different jurisdictions (Ireland, United Kingdom, Chile, Canada, Norway, Portugal and Brazil) who were involved in introducing marketing restrictions; and a purposive documentary analysis was carried out. A thematic analysis of this data was conducted informed by the Health Policy Triangle.ResultsMultiple common technical and political issues were experienced by governments regarding the form and substance of the policy design regardless of the jurisdictional context. Such issues included: whether to introduce a mandatory approach; what age group to protect; what nutrient classification system to use; how to define "marketing to children"; and what mediums, settings and techniques to cover. The actors opposing regulation challenged the form and substance of each design element. However, having a strong political mandate to introduce regulation; multiple actors working together, including multiple government ministries, academics and civil society actors; and a strong evidence base supporting the policy design helped policymakers navigate the technical and political challenges faced when designing the regulatory approach.ConclusionDespite the different political contexts and actors involved in different jurisdictions internationally, there are many commonalities in the challenges and enabling factors faced by governments. Understanding the technical and political challenges experienced by governments and how these governments overcame those challenges is critical to improve capacity around designing more effective regulations to improve population's diets, and therefore NCDs.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence that food industry actors try to shape science on nutrition and physical activity. But they are also involved in influencing the principles of scientific integrity. Our research objective was to study the extent of that involvement, with a case study of ILSI as a key actor in that space. We conducted a qualitative document analysis, triangulating data from an existing scoping review, publicly available information, internal industry documents, and existing freedom of information requests. RESULTS: Food companies have joined forces through ILSI to shape the development of scientific integrity principles. These activities started in 2007, in direct response to the growing criticism of the food industry's funding of research. ILSI first built a niche literature on COI in food science and nutrition at the individual and study levels. Because the literature was scarce on that topic, these publications were used and cited in ILSI's and others' further work on COI, scientific integrity, and PPP, beyond the fields of nutrition and food science. In the past few years, ILSI started to shape the very principles of scientific integrity then and to propose that government agencies, professional associations, non-for-profits, and others, adopt these principles. In the process, ILSI built a reputation in the scientific integrity space. ILSI's work on scientific integrity ignores the risks of accepting corporate funding and fails to provide guidelines to protect from these risks. CONCLUSIONS: The activities developed by ILSI on scientific integrity principles are part of a broader set of political practices of industry actors to influence public health policy, research, and practice. It is important to learn about and counter these practices as they risk shaping scientific standards to suit the industry's interests rather than public health ones. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12992-021-00689-1.

Mexico is the largest soft drink market in the world, with high rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Due to strains on the nation's productivity and healthcare spending, Mexican lawmakers implemented one of the world's first public health taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in 2014. Because Mexico's tax was designed to reduce SSB consumption, it faced strong opposition from transnational food and beverage corporations. We analysed previously secret internal industry documents from major corporations in the University of California San Francisco's Food Industry Documents Archive that shed light on the industry response to the Mexican soda tax. We also reviewed all available studies of the Mexican soda tax's effectiveness, contrasting the results of industry-funded and non-industry-funded studies. We found that food and beverage industry trade organisations and front groups paid scientists to produce research suggesting that the tax failed to achieve health benefits while harming the economy. These results were disseminated before non-industry-funded studies could be finalized in peer review. Mexico still provided a real-world context for the first independent peer-reviewed studies documenting the effectiveness of soda taxation—studies that were ultimately promoted by the global health community. We conclude that the case of the Mexican soda tax shows that industry resistance can persist well after new policies have become law as vested interests seek to roll back legislation, and to stall or prevent policy diffusion. It also underscores the decisive role that conflict-of-interest-free, peer-reviewed research can play in implementing health policy innovations.

Mexico is the largest soft drink market in the world, with high rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Due to strains on the nation's productivity and healthcare spending, Mexican lawmakers implemented one of the world's first public health taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in 2014. Because Mexico's tax was designed to reduce SSB consumption, it faced strong opposition from transnational food and beverage corporations. We analysed previously secret internal industry documents from major corporations in the University of California San Francisco's Food Industry Documents Archive that shed light on the industry response to the Mexican soda tax. We also reviewed all available studies of the Mexican soda tax's effectiveness, contrasting the results of industry-funded and non-industry-funded studies. We found that food and beverage industry trade organisations and front groups paid scientists to produce research suggesting that the tax failed to achieve health benefits while harming the economy. These results were disseminated before non-industry-funded studies could be finalized in peer review. Mexico still provided a real-world context for the first independent peer-reviewed studies documenting the effectiveness of soda taxation-studies that were ultimately promoted by the global health community. We conclude that the case of the Mexican soda tax shows that industry resistance can persist well after new policies have become law as vested interests seek to roll back legislation, and to stall or prevent policy diffusion. It also underscores the decisive role that conflict-of-interest-free, peer-reviewed research can play in implementing health policy innovations.

Mexico is the largest soft drink market in the world, with high rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Due to strains on the nation's productivity and healthcare spending, Mexican lawmakers implemented one of the world's first public health taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in 2014. Because Mexico's tax was designed to reduce SSB consumption, it faced strong opposition from transnational food and beverage corporations. We analysed previously secret internal industry documents from major corporations in the University of California San Francisco's Food Industry Documents Archive that shed light on the industry response to the Mexican soda tax. We also reviewed all available studies of the Mexican soda tax's effectiveness, contrasting the results of industry-funded and non-industry-funded studies. We found that food and beverage industry trade organisations and front groups paid scientists to produce research suggesting that the tax failed to achieve health benefits while harming the economy. These results were disseminated before non-industry-funded studies could be finalized in peer review. Mexico still provided a real-world context for the first independent peer-reviewed studies documenting the effectiveness of soda taxation-studies that were ultimately promoted by the global health community. We conclude that the case of the Mexican soda tax shows that industry resistance can persist well after new policies have become law as vested interests seek to roll back legislation, and to stall or prevent policy diffusion. It also underscores the decisive role that conflict-of-interest-free, peer-reviewed research can play in implementing health policy innovations.

BACKGROUND: In Latin America, total sales of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) continue to rise at an alarming rate. Consumption of added sugar is a leading cause of diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Coalitions of stakeholders have formed in several countries in the region to address this public health challenge including participation of civil society organizations and transnational corporations. Little is currently known about these coalitions – what interests they represent, what goals they pursue and how they operate. Ensuring the primacy of public health goals is a particular governance challenge. This paper comparatively analyses governance challenges involved in the adoption of taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages in Mexico, Chile and Colombia. The three countries have similar political and economic systems, institutional arrangements and regulatory instruments but differing policy outcomes. METHODS: We analysed the political economy of SSB taxation based on a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical evidence. We identify the key stakeholders involved in the policy process, identified their interests, and assess how they influenced adoption and implementation of the tax. RESULTS: Coalitions for and against the SSB taxation formed the basis of policy debates in all three countries. Intergovernmental support was critical to framing the SSB tax aims, benefits and implementation; and for countries to adopt it. A major constraint to implementation was the strong influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the policy process. A lack of transparency during agenda setting was notably enhanced by the powerful presence of TNCs. CONCLUSION: NCDs prevention policies need to be supported across government, alongside grassroots organizations, policy champions and civil society groups to enhance their success. However, governance arrangements involving coalitions between public and private sector actors need to recognize power asymmetries among different actors and mitigate their potentially ...

BACKGROUND: In Latin America, total sales of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) continue to rise at an alarming rate. Consumption of added sugar is a leading cause of diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Coalitions of stakeholders have formed in several countries in the region to address this public health challenge including participation of civil society organizations and transnational corporations. Little is currently known about these coalitions - what interests they represent, what goals they pursue and how they operate. Ensuring the primacy of public health goals is a particular governance challenge. This paper comparatively analyses governance challenges involved in the adoption of taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages in Mexico, Chile and Colombia. The three countries have similar political and economic systems, institutional arrangements and regulatory instruments but differing policy outcomes. METHODS: We analysed the political economy of SSB taxation based on a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical evidence. We identify the key stakeholders involved in the policy process, identified their interests, and assess how they influenced adoption and implementation of the tax. RESULTS: Coalitions for and against the SSB taxation formed the basis of policy debates in all three countries. Intergovernmental support was critical to framing the SSB tax aims, benefits and implementation; and for countries to adopt it. A major constraint to implementation was the strong influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the policy process. A lack of transparency during agenda setting was notably enhanced by the powerful presence of TNCs. CONCLUSION: NCDs prevention policies need to be supported across government, alongside grassroots organizations, policy champions and civil society groups to enhance their success. However, governance arrangements involving coalitions between public and private sector actors need to recognize power asymmetries among different actors and mitigate their potentially negative consequences. Such arrangements should include clear mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of all partners, and prevent undue influence by industry interests associated with unhealthy products.