Suchergebnisse

Since Mainwaring and Scully's resurrection of the concept in 1995, party system institutionalisation has become something of a buzzword to which many refer without a proper definition. Indeed, most scholars simply assume that its meaning is clear and unproblematic, focusing all subsequent efforts on developing operational indicators, but without really concerning themselves with its conceptual refinement. However, an in-depth literature review of all major works dealing with the concept reveals that in reality there is very little agreement on what party system institutionalisation actually is or how it should be measured. In fact, since Huntington introduced the notion of institutionalisation some 50 years ago, party system institutionalisation has been characterised as a multi-dimensional (mostly four, but also three and two) as well as a uni-dimensional (around stability) concept. Now that half a century has passed, the time has come to look back and, with the benefit of hindsight, take stock of the way party system institutionalisation has been conceptualised and operationalised, trying to distinguish both commonalities and discordances, while looking at what still needs to be done. In order to do so, we will distinguish three different (both discrete and thematic) waves of party system institutionalisation studies.

No matter the region of the world under study, party (system) institutionalisation has been traditionally considered to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the survival of democracy. Despite being one of the most quoted statements in the democratisation literature, the few studies looking at the relationship between institutionalisation and democratic endurance have found no evidence of the 'almost magical' powers of the former. This article revisits the abovementioned research question by making use of an original dataset covering all European democracies between 1848 and 2014. The main findings are threefold: (1) it is not the institutionalisation of political parties but the institutionalisation of party systems as a whole that has fostered the prospects for democratic survival in Europe; (2) there is a threshold of systemic institutionalisation which, once reached, will avoid democratic collapse; and (3) systemic over-institutionalisation does not seem to be so perilous for the survival of democracy.

Although much has been written about the process of party system insti- tutionalization in different regions, the reasons why some party systems institutionalize while others do not still remain a mystery. Seeking to fill this lacuna in the literature, and using a mixed-methods research approach, this article constitutes a first attempt to answer simultaneously the following three questions: (1) What specific factors help party systems to institutio- nalize (or not)? (2) What are the links (in terms of time and degree) as well as the causal mechanisms behind such relationships? and (3) how do they affect a particular party system? In order to do so, this article focuses on the study of party system development and institutionalization in 13 postcommunist democracies between 1990 and 2010. Methodologically, the article innovates in five respects. First, it continues the debate on the importance of ''mixed methods'' when trying to answer different research questions. Second, it adds to the as yet brief literature on the combination of process tracing and qualitative comparative analysis. Third, it constitutes the first attempt to date to use a most similar different outcome/most different same outcome pro- cedure in order to reduce causal complexity before undertaking a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis. Third, it also shows the merits of combining both congruence and process tracing in the same comparative study. Finally, it also develops a novel ''bipolar comparative method'' to explain the extent to which opposite outcomes are determined by reverse conditions and conflicting intervening causal forces.

Building on Casal Bértoa and Mair´s (2010) work on the institutionalization of post-communist party systems and as a response to their uneasiness with the failure of the party politics literature to determine what causes party system institutionalization in the first place, this paper addresses the following question: what are the sources of party system institutionalization in post-communist East Central Europe? In particular, what is it that explains the institutionalization of the Hungarian and Czech party systems in clear contrast to those of Slovakia and Poland, which are considered weak and under-institutionalized, respectively?

Introduction: Does Money Rule Post-Soviet Party Politics?Fernando Casal Bértoa 1. Against The Mainstream? The Impact of Party Regulation in Political Competition in MoldovaSergiu Lipcean, In Collaboration with Elena Prohnitchi 2. Dominance By Default: Political Finance and The Political Party System in MongoliaDagvyn Enkhtsetseg and Altankhuyagyn Bat-Orgil 3. Regulation of Party Finance in Russia and its Implications for The Party SystemValeria Tonhäuser and Alexander Kynev 4. Money For Nothing? The Trends and Patterns of Political Finance Regulation and Party System Development in GeorgiaBakur Kvashilava and Levan Tsutskuridze 5. Fighting For Dominance: Party Funding Regulation and Party System Development in ArmeniaHamazasp Danielyan, Harout Manougian and Fernando Casal Bértoa 6.The Illusion Of Transparency: Party Finance Regulation in Ukraine and its Impact on The Party SystemOleksii Sydorchuk and Bohdan Bernatskyi 7. Kyrgyz Parties In Quicksand: When the Only Constant is Weak Party RegulationAnastasia Griadasova and Emilbek Dzhuraev 8. Autocrats, Oligarchs, and Party Politics in KazakhstanDimashAlzhanov and Nurseit Niyazbekov Conclusions And Recommendations: Party Funding Regulation and Legislative ReformLevan Tsutskuridze

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the regulation of party finance in post-Soviet countries by leading academics and practitioners in the field. Through a series of cutting-edge chapters, using both original quantitative and qualitative data, it systematically sheds theoretical and empirical light on the way party funding regulation has evolved since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as on the manner in which the legal regulation of party finances has had an impact (or not) on the evolution of party politics and democratic consolidation in the region. The book examines regulation in post-Soviet countries like Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia and Ukraine. In analysing the various dimensions of party funding regulation and their impact on political parties, party systems and democracy, it looks at the past and future, and makes recommendations on how legislation could be improved in order to further party development, party system stabilisation and democratic consolidation for all the countries in the region. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students, practitioners and journalists interested in political party finance and anti-corruption, and more broadly to political parties, democracy and democratic governance, and post-Soviet/Russian and East European politics.

Abstract
Political scientists have long been concerned that a popularly elected presidency may destabilize competitive party systems. We develop and test a new theory holding that the impact is more immediate and severe than previously assumed. Coexisting legislative and presidential coalitions first and foremost impede the evolution of predictable party interactions at the executive level, which is the domain of the cabinet. This quality has become accessible for comparative research thanks to the concept of party system closure. Using a new dataset for all European democracies since 1848, we show that presidential elections undermine party system closure in two ways: (1) by confounding patterns of government formation (notably under powerful presidencies) and (2) by disturbing electoral/legislative politics, which in turn affect executive politics. The former, direct effect emerges as dominant from a series of panel analyses and case illustrations. These findings have important implications for current problems of constitutional design and institutional reform.

Polarization is not new in Europe. Looking at electoral support for radical political forces after the Second World War, one can observe how polarization has been on the rise since the 1960s. Still, it is in the 1990s, with the thaw of European party systems and the subsequent emergence of (populist) radical parties, that the percentage of votes for anti-political establishment parties reached unprecedented levels. In this article, we not only show the general (country-level) picture but also highlight both the consequences and causes of polarization, proposing at the same time some potential remedies to combat it. Using an aggregate, longitudinal unique dataset, containing 47 European countries across more than 170 years from 1848 to 2020 (Casal Bértoa, 2021;Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2021), we try to shed light here on the perils of polarization for the quality of democracy, how traditional political parties are to be blamed, and how we can tackle the problem.