Suchergebnisse

The institutional framework of Latin American integration saw a period of intense transformation in the 2000s, with the death of the ambitious project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), spearheaded by the United States, and the birth of two new institutions, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). This article offers a historical reconstruction of regional integration structures in the 2000s, with emphasis on the fault lines between Brazil, Venezuela and the US, and how they have shaped the institutional order across the hemisphere. I argue that the shaping of UNASUR and CELAC, launched respectively in 2007 and 2010, is the outcome of three complex processes: (1) Brazil's struggle to strengthen Mercosur by acting more decisively as a regional paymaster; (2) Washington's selective engagement with some key regional players, notably Colombia, and (3) Venezuela's construction of an alternative integration model through the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and oil diplomacy. If UNASUR corresponded to Brazil's strategy to neutralize the growing role of Caracas in South America and to break apart the emerging alliance between Venezuela, Argentina, and Bolivia, CELAC was at the same time a means to keep the US away from regional decisions, and to weaken the Caracas-Havana axis that sustained ALBA.

Abstract Soon after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world saw far-right leaders uniting to promote hydroxychloroquine despite controversial results. Why have some leaders actively promoted the drug since then, contradicting recommendations made by their own government's health authorities? Our argument is twofold. First, hydroxychloroquine has been an integral tool of medical populist performance in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. We adopt Lasco & Curato's (2018) definition of medical populism as a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit 'the people' against 'the establishment' using alternative knowledge claims to cast doubt on the credibility of doctors, scientists, and technocrats. Second, rather than being an individual endeavor, medical populism addressing the coronavirus crisis has led populists to build an alt-science network. We define it as a loose movement of alleged truth-seekers who publicly advance scientific claims at a crossroads between partial evidence, pseudo-science, and conspiracy theories. It comprises scientists, businesspeople and celebrities united by their distrust of governments and mainstream science. In this article, we look at how the hydroxychloroquine alliance was formed, as well as its political and policy implications. To this end, we compare why and how Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have appealed to medical populist performances when addressing the health crisis. By mobilizing the concepts of medical populism and alt-science, this paper aims to contribute to the scholarship on the relationship between populist politics and policy-making.

Soon after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world saw far-right leaders uniting to promote hydroxychloroquine despite controversial results. Why have some leaders actively promoted the drug since then, contradicting recommendations made by their own government's health authorities? Our argument is twofold. First, hydroxychloroquine has been an integral tool of medical populist performance in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. We adopt Lasco & Curato's (2018) definition of medical populism as a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit 'the people' against 'the establishment' using alternative knowledge claims to cast doubt on the credibility of doctors, scientists, and technocrats. Second, rather than being an individual endeavor, medical populism addressing the coronavirus crisis has led populists to build an alt-science network. We define it as a loose movement of alleged truth-seekers who publicly advance scientific claims at a crossroads between partial evidence, pseudo-science, and conspiracy theories. It comprises scientists, businesspeople and celebrities united by their distrust of governments and mainstream science. In this article, we look at how the hydroxychloroquine alliance was formed, as well as its political and policy implications. To this end, we compare why and how Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have appealed to medical populist performances when addressing the health crisis. By mobilizing the concepts of medical populism and alt-science, this paper aims to contribute to the scholarship on the relationship between populist politics and policy-making. ; Poco después del comienzo de la pandemia de COVID-19, el mundo vio a líderes de ultraderecha uniéndose para promover la hidroxicloroquina (HCQ) a pesar de sus controvertidos resultados. ¿Por qué algunos líderes han promocionado activamente la medicina desde entonces, incluso contradiciendo las recomendaciones de las autoridades de salud de sus propios gobiernos? Nuestro argumento es doble. Primero, la HCQ ha sido una herramienta integral de la performance del populismo médico en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Adoptamos la definición de Lasco y Curato (2018) de populismo médico como un estilo político performativo durante crisis de salud pública que pone al pueblo contra el sistema (establishment) usando alegaciones de conocimiento alternativo para poner en duda la credibilidad de médicos, científicos y tecnócratas. Segundo, en lugar de ser un esfuerzo individual, el populismo médico ante la crisis del coronavirus ha llevado a los populistas a construir una red de ciencia alternativa, definida como un movimiento difuso de supuestos buscadores de la verdad que defienden públicamente sus convicciones científicas en una encrucijada entre evidencias parciales, pseudociencia y teorías de la conspiración. Son científicos, empresarios y celebridades unidos por su desconfianza hacia los gobiernos y la ciencia convencional. En este artículo, analizamos cómo se formó la alianza de la hidroxicloroquina, así como sus implicaciones políticas y para las políticas públicas. Comparamos por qué y cómo Donald Trump y Jair Bolsonaro han recurrido al populismo médico performativo al abordar la crisis de salud. Al movilizar los conceptos de populismo médico y ciencia alternativa, este artículo tiene como objetivo contribuir a la investigación sobre la relación entre la política populista y la formulación de políticas. ; Logo após a eclosão da pandemia da COVID-19, o mundo viu líderes de extrema direita se unindo para promover a hidroxicloroquina (HCQ), apesar de resultados controversos. Por que alguns líderes promoveram ativamente o remédio desde então, mesmo contradizendo recomendações de autoridades de saúde de seus próprios governos? Nosso argumento é duplo. Primeiro, a HCQ tem sido uma ferramenta integral do desempenho médico populista no contexto da pandemia de COVID-19. Adotamos a definição de Lasco e Curato (2018) de populismo médico como um estilo político performático durante crises de saúde pública que joga "o povo" contra "o sistema" usando alegações de conhecimento alternativo para lançar dúvidas sobre a credibilidade de médicos, cientistas e tecnocratas. Segundo, em vez de ser um esforço individual, o populismo médico diante da crise do coronavírus levou populistas a construir uma rede de ciência alternativa, definida como um movimento difuso de supostos buscadores da verdade que defendem publicamente suas convicções científicas em uma encruzilhada entre evidências parciais, pseudociência e teorias da conspiração. É composto por cientistas, empresários e celebridades unidos por sua desconfiança nos governos e na ciência convencional. Neste artigo, examinamos a formação da aliança da hidroxicloroquina, bem como suas implicações políticas e para as políticas públicas. Para tanto, comparamos por que e como Donald Trump e Jair Bolsonaro recorreram ao populismo médico performático ao abordar a crise de saúde. Ao mobilizar os conceitos de populismo médico e ciência alternativa, este artigo tem como objetivo contribuir para o estudo da relação entre política populista e formulação de políticas.

Using Brazil as a case study, we examine ways in which radical right activists and leaders actively participate in world politics through religious nationalist narratives which operate on both national and transnational levels. We propose the existence of a particular subcategory of populist radical right (PRR) politics, which we call religious-populist radical right. Our argument is divided into three parts. First, we argue that religion provides ideational and material capabilities that have allowed the PRR to capture state institutions through elections. Second, we claim that once in power, the PRR's governing strategy is conducted through transnational culture wars with religious overtones. Third, we argue that the PRR establishes novel patterns of international alliances to advance their vision of a new world order based on independent ethno-religious communities. By exploring the entanglements between the PRR and religious nationalism, we conclude that religion provides the radical right with the ideas, means, and social power to transform both state forms and world orders. Création de l'État devant Dieu : l'intersection du populisme radical de droite et du nationalisme chrétien dans le Brésil de Bolsonaro

Using Brazil as a case study, we examine ways in which radical right activists and leaders actively participate in world politics through religious nationalist narratives which operate on both national and transnational levels. We propose the existence of a particular subcategory of populist radical right (PRR) politics, which we call religious-populist radical right. Our argument is divided into three parts. First, we argue that religion provides ideational and material capabilities that have allowed the PRR to capture state institutions through elections. Second, we claim that once in power, the PRR's governing strategy is conducted through transnational culture wars with religious overtones. Third, we argue that the PRR establishes novel patterns of international alliances to advance their vision of a new world order based on independent ethno-religious communities. By exploring the entanglements between the PRR and religious nationalism, we conclude that religion provides the radical right with the ideas, means, and social power to transform both state forms and world orders.

Abstract This article makes the case for viewing international organisations (IOs) as global polyarchies. Our argument is twofold: on a theoretical level, IOs often meet the criterion of philosophical coherence, as they are based on rules of membership and decision-making that are compatible with those found in democratic institutions. On a practical level, we believe the concerns of IOs about pluralism, inclusiveness and efficacy go far beyond rhetoric, and may decisively influence their activities as well as their outcomes. To this end, the first section explores Robert Dahl's concept of polyarchy and applies this to global institutions. In the subsequent sections, we advance our empirical argument with the UN as a case study. We reach three main conclusions. The first is that, at the bureaucratic level, the UN Secretariat performs some typically democratic functions, such as multilateral representation and the constitution of international regimes, which turns it into an important channel for feasible democracy in international politics. Second, at the multilateral level, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) represents a specific kind of representative polyarchy by allowing the greatest possible number of countries to have an equal say in global affairs. And third, it also serves as a gateway for multilevelled international representation by including a diversity of non-state actors in what has been called the 'Third United Nations.'

This article looks at this new relationship, in the light of two concurrent trends: the pluralization of actors with stakes in foreign policy; and an active presidential diplomacy (CASON AND POWER 2009). We argue that, more than just a battlefield of ideas, Brazil's most prominent media vehicles have played an active role against Lula's foreign policy, although they had but a limited agenda-setting capacity. To this end, the text will be divided in four sections. The first one deals with the recent developments of foreign policymaking in Brazil, and seeks to understand how the introduction of new actors and institutions has affected the political balance behind the country's external relations. The second provides an overview of Lula's foreign policy strategies and their relationship with presidential diplomacy. The third offers some data on the behavior of two selected newspapers, Folha de São Paulo (FSP) and O Estado de São Paulo (OESP), on foreign policy issues. The third and final section compares media reactions to Brazil's relations with the United States, most specifically regarding negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and to some aspects of Brazilian South-South cooperation, and discusses the most relevant results.

Este trabalho tem dois objetivos fundamentais. O primeiro deles é verificar, valendo-se da narrativa tradicional da evolução disciplinar, como os regimes políticos, mais especificamente o caráter democrático de certos Estados, foram incorporados no debate teórico das RI, especialmente na tradição sistêmica-positivista norte-americana. A ideia é realizar uma leitura crítica da forma como as correntes teóricas de Relações Internacionais encaram este elemento particular, bem como suas diferenças e suas implicações. Argumenta-se, nesse sentido, que a consideração da variável regime político nas relações entre Estados foi perdendo força à medida que se consolidaram as abordagens de "terceira imagem" no centro do debate disciplinar. O segundo objetivo, atrelado ao primeiro, é sugerir que a consideração da democracia como variável não é incompatível com as abordagens sistêmicas da política internacional, especialmente ao olharmos para o conceito de identidades do construtivismo wendtiano. Pelo contrário, ao considerar clivagens como democracia versus autoritarismo no plano relacional, as teorias podem ganhar poder explicativo na compreensão dos fenômenos correntes.

O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar o papel do Ministério das Relações Exteriores na política externa do governo Collor, relação comumente observada como frágil. Argumenta-se que, em vez de marginalizar o Itamaraty, o presidente reconfigurou a chancelaria, tanto em termos de seus decisores principais quanto em termos administrativos. A consequência foi o estabelecimento de uma política externa de feições mais liberais - um americanismo mitigado - em sintonia com os objetivos tradicionais das relações exteriores do Brasil.

Abstract What makes current radical right populists different from other historical radical right leaders of the 20th century? Are there more differences or similarities among populist radical right (PRR) in the Global South regarding how they perform foreign policy? How does the context – marked by contemporary globalization, regional interdependencies and power (geo)politics – influence their perceptions about their own capabilities and interests, but also about the international liberal order, its values and multilateral mechanisms? This forum addresses questions like these, offering theoretical, historical and contextual insights with concrete examples and case studies situated out of the Anglo-American spectrum. Different from traditional approaches to foreign policy analysis, the authors advance reflections about current phenomena such as illiberal foreign policymaking, anti-cosmopolitanism, religious nationalism and its transnational ties, and the re-personalization of sovereignty in the figure of the PRR. Therefore, it enriches the study of populism, radical right and foreign policymaking in IR, bringing to the debate the erosion of the liberal international order and the necessary questioning of Western-led globalization.

O artigo traz os argumentos se política de defesa seria política de Estado ou de governo. Apresenta argumentos sobre relações civis-militares e diferenciação de conceitos em política. Usa as mudanças nas políticas militares nos EUA na Guerra Fria como exemplo. Conclui que política de defesa é política de governo.

Abstract
In this article, we explore cruelty under populism, focusing on radical right populism. We develop our argument by introducing a two-dimensional model of cruel behavior in politics, in which cruelty is conceptualized as a dependent variable defined in terms of empathy (how the leader addresses those who suffer) and action (how the leader acts to alleviate suffering). This framework provides a nuanced understanding of how cruelty and populism connect, providing an original and cutting-edge contribution to both bodies of work. We use our two-dimensional model of cruel behavior to shed light on the different ways radical right populists (RRP) embrace cruelty as part of their political strategies. We have come to three "ideal" types of RRP cruel behavior: downplaying, blaming, and conspiring. In order to advance our ideas, we rely on the qualitative analysis of Brazil's far-right populist President Jair Bolsonaro and his (in)actions regarding COVID-19, who once asked about the soaring number of dead from COVID-19 simply answered: "So what? What do you want me to do?." Using this case study, we empirically illustrate different ways in which how cruelty can manifest itself in practice and what real-life consequences it can have.

Este artigo argumenta ser plausível atribuir à Organização das Nações Unidas a condição de importante lócus de autoridade política das relações internacionais contemporâneas, a despeito de sua flagrante dificuldade em fazer cumprir, por via da violência organizada, parcela significativa de suas determinações - sobretudo, no que toca às questões de segurança coletiva. Para tanto, oferece-se aqui uma nova abordagem da crise institucional desencadeada pela invasão anglo-americana do Iraque, em 2003.