Suchergebnisse

I The Idea -- 1. The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 2. Storing Votes over Time -- 3. Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 4. Agenda Control -- 5. Storable Votes in Large Elections: Referenda -- 6. A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections -- 7. Conclusions -- II The Proofs -- 1. The Simple Logic of Storable Votes -- 2. Storing Votes over Time -- 3. Protecting Minorities without Sacrificing Efficiency -- 4. Agenda Control -- 5. Storable Votes in Large Elections: Referenda -- 6. A Field Test of Storable Votes in Large Elections.

Storable votes allow the minority to win occasionally while treating every voter equally and increasing the efficiency of decision-making, without the need for external knowledge of voters' preferences. This book complements the theoretical discussion with several experiments, showing that the promise of the idea is borne out by the data: the outcomes of the experiments and the payoffs realized match very closely the predictions of the theory

"We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site