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International trade law
In: International library of essays in law and legal theory
In: second series
Separating Powers in the Administrative State: Understanding Delegation, Discretion, and Deference
In: C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State Research Paper No. 23-22
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Adding Judges: Issues in Federal Courts' Governance
In: C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State Research Paper No. 21-25
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Nationwide Injunctions' Governance Problems: Forum-Shopping, Politicizing Courts, and Eroding Governance Structures
In: George Mason Law Review, Band 27, Heft 1
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Working paper
Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation's Defects
In: Fordham Law Review, Vol. 87
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Due Process and Delegation: 'Due Substance' and Undone Process in the Administrative State
In: George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 17-11
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Working paper
Quality and Quantity in Constitutional Interpretation: The Quest for Analytic Essentials in Law
In: George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 17-42
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Working paper
Staying Agency Rules: Constitutional Structure and Rule of Law in the Administrative State
In: George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 16-32
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Working paper
Weighing Constitutional Anchors: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the Misdirection of First Amendment Doctrine
In: First Amendment Law Review, Band 12 (Winter
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Working paper
Viva La Deference? Rethinking the Balance between Administrative and Judicial Discretion
In: George Washington Law Review, Forthcoming
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Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Rule of Law
In: Engage, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 2015
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Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk
In: ICER Working Paper No. 12/2012
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Economics and International Law
In: New York University journal of international law & politics, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 473
ISSN: 0028-7873
The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy
In: https://doi.org/10.7916/D8BK1C9Z
After all is said and done, the presidential signing statement clearly should be understood to be an appropriate, often helpful-and certainly constitutional-tool of presidential participation in the process of enacting and enforcing our laws. Although a smaller set of signing statements accompany actions that are not consistent with rule of law values, and others express interpretations of questionable validity, the signing statement itself is implicated as a problematic device only when it lowers the cost of the offending conduct. This occurs when the President signs a law that he believes, in its core provisions, so fundamentally violates the Constitution that he cannot with a straight face declare its constitutional merits outweigh its flaws. The problem is not that the President says too much too often about the laws he signs, but instead that he reduces the clarity and predictability of the law if he signs legislation that he is declaring wrong at its core-and wrong in ways that, as an independent constitutional actor, he has an obligation to confront. Ultimately, it is the very fact of his independent constitutional authority that makes a subset of signing statements problematic-not because the President oversteps his bounds in saying so much but because he falls short of his obligation to the Constitution to veto laws that he believes stand primarily as vehicles for violating our most fundamental legal charter.
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