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We study how the opportunity to trade in trash might influence the equilibrium outcome when the tax on the externality is determined by a political economy process. In our model, individuals have heterogeneous preferences for environmental quality, and there is a leakage when funds are transferred from the pressure groups to the politicians. When hard-core environmentalists and capitalists are organized interest groups while moderate environmentalists are not organized, we find that the politically chosen tax on the externality is below the optimal Pigouvian level. The opportunity to export waste in unlimited quantities, but at a price, is not the environmentalists' panacea and does not eliminate political social tension and suboptimal results.

En este artículo los autores estudian empíricamente las consecuencias de un ciclo boom-crisis en recursos naturales en la presencia de distorsiones domésticas del comercio internacional. Más específicamente se desarrolla un sistema contable adecuado para luego examinar la información estadística de seis países en desarrollo. A la luz de dicha información se formulan y prueban algunas hipótesis sobre los ciclos boom-crisis, poniendo particular énfasis en sus efectos sobre la tasa de crecimiento de la economía, la proporción relativa del sector gobierno, los movimientos en los productos sectoriales y los precios relativos. ; In this paper the authors study, in an empirical way, the consequences of natural resources boom-crisis cycles in the presence of domestic distortions of Ínternational trade. More specifically, a suitable accounting system is developed so as to then analize statistical data from six underdeveloped countries. Some hypothesis on boom-crisis cycles are stated and tested in this light, paying special attention to their effects on the economy's rate of growth, the relative proportion (size) of the government sector, and movements in sectorial product and relative prices.