Suchergebnisse

Since the 1990s, the literature on External Democracy Promotion (EDP) expanded exponentially. Despite widely supported conclusions on EDP (in)effectiveness in fostering democratization and preventing democratic backsliding are still lacking, the literature has generated sophisticated explanations of these processes. Among them, Levitsky and Way's (L&W's) linkage and leverage theory stands out as one of the most influential. According to Tolstrup, however, their underestimation of domestic agency constitutes a crucial lacuna, which he proposes to fill through the concept of "Gatekeeping Elite" that underlines a significant impact of local actors on the linkage dimension and, consequently, on EDP (in)effectiveness. I believe that Tolstrup's intuition can be further developed, expanding even more the explanatory power of L&W's theory. I claim that domestic actors may exert a crucial influence also on the leverage dimension, thanks to "diversionary behaviours" that local elites may use to change external actors' interests and preferences, persuading them to limit their democratizing pressures and thus reduce their own vulnerability to EDP processes. To assess the plausibility of this claim, I perform a congruence analysis on the recent and crucial case of autocratization in Serbia (EU candidate country), which is not fully explained by the aforementioned models.

Since the 1990s, the literature on External Democracy Promotion (EDP) expanded exponentially. Despite widely supported conclusions on EDP (in)effectiveness in fostering democratization and preventing democratic backsliding are still lacking, the literature has generated sophisticated explanations of these processes. Among them, Levitsky and Way's (L&W's) linkage and leverage theory stands out as one of the most influential. According to Tolstrup, however, their underestimation of domestic agency constitutes a crucial lacuna, which he proposes to fill through the concept of "Gatekeeping Elite" that underlines a significant impact of local actors on the linkage dimension and, consequently, on EDP (in)effectiveness. I believe that Tolstrup's intuition can be further developed, expanding even more the explanatory power of L&W's theory. I claim that domestic actors may exert a crucial influence also on the leverage dimension, thanks to "diversionary behaviours" that local elites may use to change external actors' interests and preferences, persuading them to limit their democratizing pressures and thus reduce their own vulnerability to EDP processes. To assess the plausibility of this claim, I perform a congruence analysis on the recent and crucial case of autocratization in Serbia (EU candidate country), which is not fully explained by the aforementioned models. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Despite growing concerns expressed by international organisations about the deterioration of democracy in Vučić's Serbia, the country has been neglected by the literature on the 'crisis of democracy'. Using a combined qualitative/quantitative research strategy for detecting changes in regime types, including various V-DEM measures and over three dozen indicators provided by the competitive authoritarian framework, the analysis confirms the recent regression of Vučić's Serbia to competitive authoritarianism. The peculiar features of the Serbian case—a double transition to and from democracy in less than two decades—appear to support a pessimistic outlook for the future of democracy. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The main goal of this paper is to explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Erdoğan's Turkey. The recent literature has mainly focused on the taxonomical debate about the type of regime established by Erdoğan, dealing only rarely with the factors explaining the Turkish autocratization. Building on Levitsky and Loxton's framework, which underlines the catalyst role played by the election of populist leaders for the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Latin America, the analysis identifies the interactions among Erdoğan's populism and threats and opportunities provided by both domestic and international environments as the major cause explaining Turkish autocratization. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

There is international consensus among scholars that democratic transitions are multicausal processes in which both internal and international variables are involved (Pridham 1991, 1995; Whitehead 1996; Schmitter 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Carothers 1999; Morlino and Magen 2008; Grilli di Cortona 2009). This chapter is limited, on the one hand, to the dependent variable consisting solely of the crisis/breakdown/transformation of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave of democratization, and, on the other hand, to an independent variable identified solely with the international dimension of democratic transition. This factor, which can be termed the Proactive International Dimension (PID), specifically concerns that combination of actions or processes, produced by one or more international actors, that, intentionally or not, cause or contribute to the crisis/breakdown/transformation of a non-democratic regime.

AbstractInstitutionalization processes are among the topics most researched by the literature on party systems. This literature is advanced and the debate has led to the construction of effective theoretical models. However, there are still discernible problems of different magnitudes: a) quite often the dynamic dimension related to the institutionalization of a party system and the static dimension, which detects an institutionalized party system (i.e., the outcome of a process of institutionalization) are not sufficiently distinct in the literature; b) static analysis has gathered comparatively much more attention; c) the literature dealing with the dynamic dimension of the problem does not adequately consider the interaction of causal, macro and idiosyncratic factors. This paper aims at dealing with these problems through the elaboration of a set of suggestions constituting a guide for the empirical analysis tested on the Italian and German cases during the 1940s and 1950s. This research shows that a greater attention to the dynamic analysis and to possible interactions among causal factors is able to enhance the understanding of the processes considered. Moreover, this approach provides us with crucial information on how a party system emerges and on how it consolidates itself.

The growing presence of technocrats in contemporary governments has emerged as a relevant phenomenon worldwide. Italy, once known as a paradigmatic case of party government and now identified as the promised land of technocracy, constitutes a crucial case to test the major short-term (critical junctures) and long-term (complexity of policy-making; party decline) factors identified to explain this phenomenon. Our analysis is based on two innovative tools: a new dataset updated to the current back-to-politics Meloni Italian government, including all the cases of the 'technocratic decade' (2010s); and a new typology combining partisanship and expertise, which allows us to overcome dichotomous categorizations equating technocrats and non-partisans. This more accurate and updated picture of minister profiles in Italy unveils unexpected dynamics and allows us to reassess both previous findings on the Italian case and the explanatory power of the tested theories on the growing diffusion of technocrats in contemporary governments.