Suchergebnisse

AbstractAcross countries, young people vote less than older citizens. While a few explanations have been suggested, this paper proposes that one core reason lies in youth under‐representation in partisan politics, in particular as issues such as climate change increase the salience of inter‐generational conflict. I argue that young people are less likely to vote in elections if they do not feel their age represented by candidates. I test this with data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems spanning 223 national elections in 58 countries between 1996 and 2021, combined with data on 980 party leaders and/or presidential candidates in those elections. I find that respondents younger than 30 are up to 4 per cent less likely to vote if the leading candidate of their favourite party is 70 in relation to a leader around 40. However, this effect only appears in more recent years and was nonexistent in the 1990s and early 2000s. Older voters' turnout is unaffected by leaders' and candidates' ages. Two potential mechanisms are the effects of descriptive representation of young voters on their external efficacy and democratic satisfaction. These findings corroborate the possible emergence of age as potential cleavage in contemporary politics and point to an important element of low youth participation as well as to the mobilization potential by parties selecting younger candidates.

Radical parties have been found to succeed under conditions of mass polarization. It is argued that their message resonates better with voters at the extremes of an ideological spectrum. This paper investigates if the reverse also holds, meaning that radical parties may contribute to the polarization of the public. I test this claim in the Netherlands, a country that has experienced the rise of populist radical right parties since 2002, using a synthetic control model built with a pool of comparable countries and Eurobarometer survey data. Results show that, after the rise of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, the level of polarization among the Dutch public increased more than it otherwise would have. These findings contribute to understanding the connection between elite- and mass-level polarization, and the consequences of populist radical right parties' emergence in Western Europe.

As the share of women in parliaments rises, increased attention is paid to how they substantively represent women. Meanwhile, the availability of parliamentary speech data has enabled researchers to dissect politicians' rhetorical patterns. We combine these two literatures to ask whether rhetorical differences between men and women in parliament are connected to style, policy, and preferences of women voters. We apply machine‐learning models to speeches from five West European parliaments (2000–18) to measure the femininity of the rhetoric used in each speech. Results show that women and men talk differently in parliament, and that this distinctiveness is due to both style and substance. Combining these results with public opinion surveys, we find that women MPs have the most distinctively "feminine" discourse on issues that are most salient to women in society. These findings showcase the direct connection between descriptive and substantive representation of women in contemporary democracies.

AbstractThe rise of populist forces in Western democracies is often linked to representation failures. However, to date we lack causally identified evidence for the effect of parties' representation on populist attitudes. We address this lacuna through a survey experiment conducted in 12 European Union countries involving 23,257 subjects. Our experiment manipulates citizens' perceptions of being represented by national parties in the 2019 European elections campaign, and identifies the effect of perceived representation on populist attitudes. The results reveal that poor representation increases populist attitudes in respondents that did not express such attitudes pretreatment, but has no effect among those who were already populist. We demonstrate that this effect is primarily due to parties' representation failures triggering citizens' anti-elite sentiment.

Expert evaluations about countries form the backbone of comparative political research. It is reasonable to assume that such respondents, no matter the region they specialize in, will have a comparable understanding of the phenomena tapped by expert surveys. This is necessary to get results that can be compared across countries, which is the fundamental goal of these measurement activities. We empirically test this assumption using measurement invariance techniques which have not been applied to expert surveys before. Used most often to test the cross-cultural validity and translation effects of public opinion scales, the measurement invariance tests evaluate the comparability of scale items across any groups. We apply them to the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) dataset. Our findings suggest that cross-regional comparability fails for all eleven dimensions identified in PEI. Results indicate which items remain comparable, at least across most regions, and point to the need of more rigorous procedures to develop expert survey questions.

AbstractTwitter is a prominent communication tool for politicians with two potential uses: as a "substitute" channel to circumvent constraints from other political arenas, or as an "amplifier" that reinforces party messages. Using a novel dataset containing tweets and parliamentary speeches by members of parliament (MPs) in seven countries, we estimate politicians' positions and intra-party dissent on European integration. We find that MPs' sentiment about Europe on Twitter is a valid measure of their party's position, while also uncovering intra-party disagreements. Our results suggest that most MPs amplify the partisan message, but MPs who participate less in parliamentary debate tend to have larger differences with their party on Twitter. Social media thus can free politicians from their party's grip.

AbstractWomen in male‐dominated organizations often must adopt more stereotypical masculine traits to advance within those hierarchies. While politics, historically male‐dominated, should induce women to blend in, increasing numbers of women in parliaments may give women the opportunity to stand out by not adopting a masculine style. This paper investigates how these contradictory incentives influence female Members of Parliament (MPs) in 24 democracies between 1987 and 2022, applying machine learning to 6.8 million parliamentary speeches to measure how feminine is their speaking style. Findings indicate a socialization effect, whereby women adopt a more masculine style the longer they stay in office, even after controlling for their speeches' topics. The effect is strongest for women in socially progressive parties. This research highlights the role of parliaments as gendered workplaces, which still lead women to adapt to the male norm, and helps us understand the incentives that shape how women represent women in parliament.

AbstractWe explore the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiratorial beliefs on the individual level with two studies using American samples. First, we test whether and what kinds of conspiratorial beliefs predict populist attitudes. Our results show that belief in conspiracies with greedy, but not necessarily purely evil, elites are associated with populism. Second, we test whether having a conspiratorial mentality is associated with all separate sub‐dimensions of populist attitudes – people‐centrism, anti‐elitism, and a good‐versus‐evil view of politics. Results show a relation only with the first two, confirming the common tendency of both discourses to see the masses as victims on elites' hands. These findings contribute to research on the correlates of populism at the individual level, which is essential to understanding why this phenomenon is so strong in contemporary democracies.

AbstractIt is well known that politicians speak differently when campaigning. The shadow of elections may affect candidates' change in tone during campaigns. However, to date, we lack a systematic study of the changes in communication patterns between campaign and non-campaign periods. In this study, we examine the sentiment expressed in 4.3 million tweets posted by members of national parliaments in the EU27 from 2018 to 2020. Our results show that (1) the opposition, even populists and Eurosceptics, send more positive messages during campaigns, (2) parties trailing in the polls communicate more negatively, and (3) that the changes are similar in national and European elections. These findings show the need to look beyond campaign times to understand parties' appeals and highlight the promises of social media data to move beyond traditional analyses of manifestos and speeches.