Israeli counter-insurgency and the Intifadas: dilemmas of a conventional army
In: Middle Eastern Military Studies
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In: Middle Eastern Military Studies
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 30-64
ISSN: 0140-2390
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 30-64
ISSN: 1743-937X
This article -- based on data that employs interviews conducted with British Army personnel -- adopts a social theory of learning in order to examine how both formal and informal learning systems have affected organizational learning within the Army in relation to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It argues that while the Army has adopted new, or reformed existing, formal learning systems, these have not generated a reconceptualization of how to conduct counter-insurgency warfare. It, furthermore, argues that while informal learning systems have enabled units to improve their pre-deployment preparations, these have created adaptation traps that have acted as barriers to higher-level learning. Adapted from the source document.
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 30-64
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 513-539
ISSN: 0140-2390
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 513-539
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The RUSI journal: publication of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Band 154, Heft 4, S. 66-73
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: The RUSI journal: independent thinking on defence and security, Band 154, Heft 4, S. 66-73
ISSN: 0307-1847
World Affairs Online
The following paper analyzes the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) counter-insurgency strategy and campaign carried out against the Palestinian insurgency within the Occupied/Disputed Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005). It provides a detailed examination of the tactics, operations and strategic effect that actions carried out by the Israel Defense Forces had on the overall conflict dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The paper argues that while the IDF was able to achieve quite significant tactical innovation and success, the overall strategic result of Israel's counter-insurgency campaign during the Al-Aqsa Intifada was a stalemate rather than 'victory' given that, in effect, clear political goals and direction were lacking during the conflict.
BASE
In: Contemporary security policy, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 584-587
ISSN: 1352-3260, 0144-0381
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 57-75
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 17, Heft 1-2, S. 245-264
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 57-75
ISSN: 0140-2390
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 28, Heft 6, S. 1084-1086
ISSN: 0140-2390
In: The RUSI journal: publication of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Band 149, Heft 5, S. 72-76
ISSN: 1744-0378