Suchergebnisse

This paper analyses the impact of trade openness on inflation in a strategic framework characterised by monopolistic production in the domestic sector and unionised labour markets. By stressing the interplay between internal and external sources of economic distortion, we show that the economy's inflationary bias reduces up to a critical level of trade openness. Beyond this threshold, wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in open economies, leading to higher equilibrium inflation. Based on a regression analysis that investigates the combined effect of labour market institutions and openness on inflation across nineteen OECD economies, we show that inflation is negatively related to openness when wage bargaining is decentralised, while there is virtually no link between openness and inflation at higher levels of wage centralisation.

The theoretical part of this paper analyses the positive and normative effects of a surprise monetary expansion in a small open economy characterized by imperfect competition and short‐run price rigidity in the domestic sector. The temporary output boom fostered by the monetary expansion is shown to come at the cost of a permanent squeeze of the domestic sector. This affects welfare ambiguously, as the overall welfare consequences of the monetary expansion may eventually turn negative for a critical value of external assets. The empirical part of the paper provides evidence in favour of a key role of monetary shocks in driving current account fluctuations in seven major industrialized countries.(J.E.L.: E61, F41).

Building on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economy in the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paper analyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the central bank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union. The establishment of a monetary union is shown to favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative. Wage discipline may reduce equilibrium in‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is centralised across member countries.