Suchergebnisse

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1; 700 regressions and 57 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differs depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1; 700 regressions and 57 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differs depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitudeare still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intendto clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitudeare still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intendto clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However, the cost of participating in these agreements are often lower for developing countries, and they may benefit from indirect gains, which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre-electoral period. These hypotheses are empirically assessed by studying the ratification process of 48 global environmental agreements censused in the ENTRI database from 1976 to 1999. We use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis, enabling us to precisely identify pre- and post-electoral periods -- a significant challenge in political cycles studies. Our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non-linear over the pre- and post-electoral years.

Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However, the cost of participating in these agreements are often lower for developing countries, and they may benefit from indirect gains, which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre-electoral period. These hypotheses are empirically assessed by studying the ratification process of 48 global environmental agreements censused in the ENTRI database from 1976 to 1999. We use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis, enabling us to precisely identify pre- and post-electoral periods -- a significant challenge in political cycles studies. Our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non-linear over the pre- and post-electoral years.

Certains citoyens déçus par les représentants politiques habituels se tournent volontiers vers de nouveaux candidats issus de la société civile et sans expérience politique préalable. Cet article étudie de manière empirique si ce renouvellement d'élus mène à un changement dans la représentation politique. Notre analyse s'appuie sur une base de données compilant les votes et l'activité législative de plus de 1 000 députés entre 2012 et 2020. Afin d'isoler correctement un effet de novicité en politique, nous dissocions le fait que les élus de la société civile soient également novices au sein du Parlement. Notre stratégie empirique permet d'isoler cet effet en utilisant les données concernant les représentants ayant déjà une expérience politique mais nouvellement élus au Parlement. En premier lieu, nous notons d'importantes disparités des élus issus de la société civile concernant leur indépendance vis-à-vis des consignes de vote de leur groupe parlementaire. Si les élus appartiennent à des groupes avec une cohésion relativement faible, ils montrent davantage d'indépendance à l'égard du groupe, tandis qu'il n'y aucune différence notable dans les groupes à forte cohésion. Ensuite, en utilisant un indice multidimensionnel de l'activité législative des députés, nous montrons que les différences observées sont avant tout dues au manque d'expérience parlementaire se traduisant par une activité moindre en début de mandat. Cette différence s'estompe, et ne conduit pas à une distinction de l'activité entre nouveaux et anciens membres du parlement sur l'entièreté du mandat. Globalement, même si l'élection de nouveaux politiques permet un changement des caractéristiques individuelles usuelles des députés comme l'âge ou le sexe, cela semble insuffisant pour faire souffler un véritable vent nouveau sur la façon de faire de la politique. Classification JEL : P16, D72

Africa is well endowed with organizations to promote regional cooperation and integration. It has 8 African Union (AU)-recognized regional economic communities (RECs), 7 other economic organizations and 25 specialized regional organizations (ROs). On average each country is member of 3 RECs and 4 other ROs. The number of continental treaties signed by African Union member states has accelerated over the last four decades. At the same time, progress on ratifying and implementing these and their regional equivalents is slow, undermining their impacts. This has led to calls to rationalize memberships. At its 50th anniversary in 2013, the AU launched the 50year AU2063 programme, "The Africa we want, " with 15 flagship projects, heralding a renewed push towards continent-wide projects.

Africa is well endowed with organizations to promote regional cooperation and integration. It has 8 African Union (AU)-recognized regional economic communities (RECs), 7 other economic organizations and 25 specialized regional organizations (ROs). On average each country is member of 3 RECs and 4 other ROs. The number of continental treaties signed by African Union member states has accelerated over the last four decades. At the same time, progress on ratifying and implementing these and their regional equivalents is slow, undermining their impacts. This has led to calls to rationalize memberships. At its 50th anniversary in 2013, the AU launched the 50year AU2063 programme, "The Africa we want, " with 15 flagship projects, heralding a renewed push towards continent-wide projects.