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This article presents and adopts a new definition of the popularization of political communication, which is defined as a strategic communicative action through which political actors try to create new connections with those citizens who do not still know, follow and support them and to emotionally strengthen the political bond with their current sympathizers. Second, a comparative analysis of the Facebook pages of the main political leaders of 31 countries shows that the popularization of political communication is a relevant phenomenon on Facebook, while a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) indicates that the presence of a presidential system, a high digitalization of the media system, and a high level of trust in political institutions are three sufficient conditions for a "pop" communication on Facebook. Finally, the article identifies and discusses its main properties and development under the current hybrid media system.

Available Open Access digitally under CC-BY-ND licence This book pulls back the curtain on the link between technology and activism. It explores the intricate ways activists from Italy, Spain and Greece interact with data on a day-to-day basis and shows how they navigate the impact of digital media on today's grassroots politics. It is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of how modern politics' deep media integration reshape social movements and contemporary political landscapes.

AbstractThe growing popularity of Greta Thunberg has led an increasing number of pundits and scholars to consider her message to be an instance of 'climate' or 'environmental' populism. Following a qualitative content analysis of key speeches by the young activist, this paper challenges this view, and argues that her message is far from being a case of populism. On the contrary, it abides by a substantially different set of ideas that can be defined as technocratic ecocentrism. In particular, it is argued that rather than people‐centrism, anti‐elitism and vox populi, Greta Thunberg's message is grounded on three different core ideas: ecocentrism, technocracy, and on the exaltation of the vox scientifica. However, whereas Thunberg's technocratic ecocentrism is at odds with the foundations of the populist set of ideas, it shares a similar emphasis on monism, moralisation, a Manichean vision of the world, a critique of key features of the metapolitical status quo, and a tendency to personalisation.

The relationship between media and politics today is deeply entrenched in the wide use of information and communication technologies to the point that scholars speak about the emergence of hybrid media systems in which older and newer media logics combine. However, it is still unclear how the configuration of hybrid media systems changes across countries today, especially with regard to the interconnection between media and politics. In the article, we aim to develop a theoretical framework to capture such national differences. In so doing, we want to develop a heuristic device to understand whether the transformations brought about by information and communication technologies in the media and political realm also contribute to reshaping national media systems and to what extent. After outlining the main scope of the article in the 'Introduction' section, we discuss the theoretical framework that Hallin and Mancini developed to compare media systems across countries, and we present this framework's main strengths and weaknesses when used as a tool for understanding the relationship between media and politics in the digital era. We then argue for the need for an updated and expanded version of such a theoretical framework: first, we update its four original dimensions (structure of media market, political parallelism, state intervention and journalistic professionalism) transversely including information and communication technologies–related indicators; second, we expand the original theoretical framework with one new dimension (grassroots participation) and the related indicators. In the 'Conclusion' section, we summarize our theoretical proposal and present some indicators and potential comparative data sources to assess similarities and differences of national media systems across countries. Finally, we also note two limitations of the article.

Is Facebook "green"? Do political leaders use this social medium to spread information on green policies? The aim of this paper is to investigate on whether and how Facebook is used by politicians as an arena to spread environmental policy proposals or simply information about the environment. The study covers 127 Facebook pages of political leaders in 31 different advanced industrial democracies. The 127 pages have been under observation for 26 months and 99,234 posts were scrutinized. 25,151 out of these 99,234 posts were manually coded and analyzed in order to measure how often contemporary leaders use Facebook to talk about environmental issues. We found that: (i) environmental issues do not represent a relevant concern for the main political leaders of contemporary advanced industrial democracies; (ii) left wing and younger leaders are the ones who used Facebook the most for spreading information about environmental issues; and (iii) relevant differences between leaders of countries with different levels of economic wealth and environmental pollution are noted in regard to Western countries.

By considering the Facebook activity of 52 party leaders during national election campaigns held in 18 Western democracies that went to the polls between 2013 and 2017, we study users' engagement with popularization and with populist leaders. Applying negative binomial hierarchical models on original data of party leaders' Facebook pages, we find that elements of popularization in leaders' posts are associated with an increase in users' acknowledgement (number of likes), decreases in redistribution (number of shares), while they do not affect discursive interactions (number of comments). Our research also shows that, irrespective of their content, messages published by populist leaders are more capable of increasing both acknowledgement and redistribution, while they do not generate more comments than those published by non-populists. Finally, we find that when populist leaders adopt popularization as a communicative style, they do not achieve any extra gain vis-a-vis non-populist actors.

By focusing on the Facebook activities of eighty-three political leaders from twenty-six Western and Latin American countries, we analyze their reliance on elements of populist communication for their competitive strategies. By integrating both a communication-centered and an actor-centered approach to the study of populism, we tackle four major research questions: Do populist and non-populist leaders adopt similar communication strategies on Facebook? Is there any evidence of the so-called populist zeitgeist in such arena? What different combinations between the so-called three "elements of populist communication" characterize the communication strategies of political leaders on Facebook? Are there major differences between Western and Latin American leaders? The results of our analysis provide an important contribution to the existing literature on populism and political communication in different respects. First, the populist zeitgeist "thesis" does not apply to the communication strategies of political leaders on Facebook. Second, the spread of elements of populist communication in Latin America is considerably lower in comparison with Western countries, irrespective of party ideological background. Finally, this paper identifies all the logical combinations that can occur between the interplay of the different elements of populist communication, thus enabling the classification of the communication strategies employed by political leaders on Facebook.