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AbstractThe Biden administration has made equity a priority when issuing regulations, encouraging agencies to ensure that their regulations appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged groups. But scholarly examinations of agencies' practices to date on understanding the distributional consequences of their regulations and on promoting equity have revealed significant gaps. In particular, agencies pay very little attention to the incidence of the costs of their regulations. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, rarely considers the incidence of regulatory costs among disadvantaged groups, despite being an agency that conducts relatively complete benefit–cost analyses and explicitly analyzes environmental justice implications of its regulations. But this cost-blindness is a mistake; it presents a missed opportunity to use the current equity-focused momentum to make real improvements for disadvantaged groups that could have long-lasting effects. This essay calls for agencies to give more attention to the incidence of regulatory costs in order to identify needs and opportunities for grants and investments to disadvantaged groups. This approach could provide much-needed direction for a program like the Biden administration's Justice40 initiative.

AbstractWe know relatively little about the economic effects of "insignificant" rules because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be cumulatively important. We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants, which is not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit–cost test. We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to benefit–cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.

AbstractUS regulatory agencies have been encouraged to consider the equity and distributional impacts of regulations for decades. This paper examines the extent to which such analysis is done and provides recommendations for improving it. We analyze 189 regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) that monetize at least some benefits and costs prepared by a variety of agencies from October 2003 to January 2021. We find that only two RIAs calculated the net benefits of a policy for a specific demographic group. Furthermore, only 21% of RIAs calculate some benefits by group (typically for demographic groups) and only 20% calculate some costs by group (typically for industry groups such as small entities). Overall, the differences between presidential administrations are relatively small compared to the differences between agencies in their performance using our measures of distributional analysis. We then evaluate a sample of 23 analyses related to environmental justice (EJ) prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between January 2010 and January 2022. The EJ analyses frequently identify disproportionate exposures to pollutants for a variety of groups and discuss the effects of proposed regulations on these exposures, but they rarely consider the distribution of costs and less than half consider any alternatives. To date, virtually no agency prepares a distributional analysis that could help regulators evaluate whether a proposed regulation, on net, advantages or disadvantages a particular group and whether an alternative could generate a preferred distributional outcome.

AbstractGovernments throughout the world are requiring greater use of economic analysis as a way of informing policy decisions. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the use of impact assessment in the European Union, using US assessments as a benchmark. We find that recent EU impact assessments include more economic information than they did in the past, although important items are still missing. We also provide evidence that the quality of EU impact assessment increases with the expected cost of a proposal. Furthermore, we find that the quality of EU assessments that report high total costs is similar to that of US assessments.