Machine generated contents note: I Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs -- Lars-Erik Cederman -- Part One: Conceptual and -- Historical Background -- 2 The Virtues of Inconsistency: Identity and Plurality -- in the Conceptualization of Europe -- Craig Calhoun -- S Example, Exception, or Both? Swiss National -- Identity in Perspective -- Pascal Sciarini, Simon Hug, and Cedric Dupont -- Part Two: Europe's Cultural Identity -- 4 From Cultural Protection to Political Culture? -- Media Policy and the European Union -- Philip R Schlesinger -- 5 Why the European Union Failed to Europeanize -- Its Audiovisual Policy -- Tobias Theiler -- Part Three: Europe's External -- Political Identity -- 6 European Identity, EU Expansion, and the -- Integration/Exclusion Nexus -- Iver B. Neumann -- 7 Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: -- The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union -- Frank Schimmelfennig -- Part Four: Europe's Civic Identity -- 8 European Identity and Migration Policies -- JefHuysmans -- 9 European Asylum Policies and the Search -- for a European Identity -- Vera Gowlland-Debbas -- Part Five: Conclusions for -- Theory and Policy -- 10 Exclusion Versus Dilution: Real or -- Imagined Trade-Off? -- Lars-Erik Cederman -- List of Acronyms -- Selected Bibliography -- The Contributors -- Index -- About the Book
Agent-based modeling promises to overcome the reification of actors. Whereas this common, but limiting, assumption makes a lot of sense during periods characterized by stable actor boundaries, other historical junctures, such as the end of the Cold War, exhibit far-reaching and swift transformations of actors' spatial and organizational existence. Moreover, because actors cannot be assumed to remain constant in the long run, analysis of macrohistorical processes virtually always requires "sociational" endogenization. This paper presents a series of computational models, implemented with the software package REPAST, which trace complex macrohistorical transformations of actors be they hierarchically organized as relational networks or as collections of symbolic categories. With respect to the former, dynamic networks featuring emergent compound actors with agent compartments represented in a spatial grid capture organizational domination of the territorial state. In addition, models of "tagged" social processes allows the analyst to show how democratic states predicate their behavior on categorical traits. Finally, categorical schemata that select out politically relevant cultural traits in ethnic landscapes formalize a constructivist notion of national identity in conformance with the qualitative literature on nationalism. This "finite-agent method", representing both states and nations as higher-level structures superimposed on a lower-level grid of primitive agents or cultural traits, avoids reification of agency. Furthermore, it opens the door to explicit analysis of entity processes, such as the integration and disintegration of actors as well as boundary transformations.
Computational modeling is used to improve our understanding of how the democratic peace unfolds as a historical process in time and space. Whereas most of the conventional literature interprets the phenomenon as a constant and universal law operating at the state level, the author follows Immanuel Kant and treats democratic cooperation as an emergent macroprocess. The current study explores three causal mechanisms. First, strategic tagging introduces a way for democracies to select out like-minded cooperators. Second, regime-sensitive alliances enable democratic states to defend the gains of cooperation. Third, liberal collective security complements the liberal alignments. Based on these processes, it is possible to "grow" cooperative outcomes in an inhospitable geopolitical environment. Because tagging alone is insufficient, alliances, and sometimes even collective security, are necessary to produce perpetual peace. Such outcomes are characterized by high levels of spatial clustering.
This article uncovers some crucial key assumptions of polity-formation underpinning the debate about the European Union's democratic legitimacy. It uses theories of nationalism to understand why a demos is unlikely to develop easily at the European level. Based on a two-by-two categorization of the logic and scope of identity-formation, I conclude that the most promising approach to European demos-formation conceives of identities as both constructed and `sticky'. Labeling this theoretical position `bounded integration', I suggest that it provides a more realistic foundation for developing democracy-enhancing reform proposals than does post-nationalist theorizing, especially due to the former's explicit attention to identity-conferring mechanisms such as education, language and media.
The contemporary international relations literature links the democratic peace hypothesis to Kant's famous peace plan. Yet, whether attempting to prove or disprove the hypothesis, most quantitative studies have lost sight of important dimensions of the Kantian vision. I reinterpret the democratic peace as a dynamic and dialectical learning process. In order to assess the dynamic dimension of this process (while controlling for exogenous dialectical reversals), I rely on quantitative evidence drawn from popular data sets. In conformance with the Kantian perspective, the conflict propensities among democracies exhibit a steadily falling trend since the nineteenth century. Yet, in partial opposition to Kant's expectations, other dyads also experience a significant, although weaker, pacifying trend. A series of tests shows that these findings are robust to epochal effects, various control variables, and "maturity effects" measuring the age of democratic dyads.
The contemporary international relations literature links the democratic peace hypothesis to Kant's famous peace plan. Yet, whether attempting to prove or disprove the hypothesis, most quantitative studies have lost sight of important dimensions of the Kantian vision. I reinterpret the democratic peace as a dynamic and dialectical learning process. In order to assess the dynamic dimension of this process (while controlling for exogenous dialectical reversals), I rely on quantitative evidence drawn from popular data sets. In conformance with the Kantian perspective, the conflict propensities among democracies exhibit a steadily falling trend since the nineteenth century. Yet, in partial opposition to Kant's expectations, other dyads also experience a significant, although weaker, pacifying trend. A series of tests shows that these findings are robust to epochal effects, various control variables, and "maturity effects" measuring the age of democratic dyads. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
