Suchergebnisse

FY 2014-2015. Project Lead: Charles Ferguson ; China conducted a successful ballistic missile defense (BMD) test in 2010 and again in January 2013 and is at least keeping the option open to deploy BMD. But it is unclear which way Beijing may go. This becomes a more urgent issue for consideration as China continues its military and economic rise and faces the upcoming Indian deployment of Agni-5 ballistic missiles. FAS will assess the possible incentives and disincentives that China may have to deploy some version of its recently tested missile defense system, the weight China may attach to these factors, how that would affect China's security policy, and possible security implications for the United States.

FY: 2014-2015. Principal Investigator: Feroz Khan ; This exercise builds upon the findings of the first iteration of the event, held March 19-22, 2013, in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The project will explore the fundamentals of regional military crises and escalation thresholds, as well as the role of the international community in crisis management and prevention. Lessons learned from this event will help identify escalation ladders, bridge strategic communication gaps, and nurture areas of cooperation among the United States, India, and Pakistan. The simulation will be set in a conjectural geopolitical scenario in the year 2020. The scenario will emphasize cross-domain crisis escalation (land, sea, and air) and examine nuclear force deployment and employment pressures. Discussions and deliberations will take place at the operational/strategic level, as opposed to the tactical level.

Performer: Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Principal Investigator: Bridge Colby, FY: 2014-2015 ; The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are of very high importance to U.S. interests. Iran's nuclear program has threatened to impel a nuclear arms race in the region inimical to those interests. Yet U.S. understanding of how the GCC states think about strategic issues—up to and including how they measure the efficacy and sufficiency of the U.S. security umbrella and how they would determine whether to acquire nuclear arms of their own—is often opaque to the U.S. government.

Performer: Monterey Institute of International Studies Principal Investigator: Nikolai Sokov, FY: 2014-2015 ; Russia has been trying to develop a modern conventional strike capability for more than ten years. Although reaching this goal is still years ahead, the gap appears to be narrowing. Moscow's plans for an even more ambitious project, a prompt global strike capability, are probably only two or three years behind American efforts. Moscow's new ability to support a more ambitious foreign policy will inevitably affect Washington's calculations. This project will review the R&D and acquisition programs in these areas together with Russian military doctrine, Russian nuclear strategy, Russia's relations with other nations, missile defense capabilities, and arms control agreements.

Performer: United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Principal Investigator: Dan Brumberg. FY: 2014-2015 ; Building on the first PASCC U.S.-Turkey Strategic Dialogue that was held November 1-2, 2012, USIP aims to continue the dialogue between U.S. and Turkish partners, including technical experts and academic leaders as well as representatives from the U.S. and Turkish governments.

Performer: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Principal Investigator: Sharon Squassoni. FY: 2014-2015 ; There is great uncertainty about the numbers and locations of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). This project will establish a Track II dialogue between Russian and American experts that provides a basis for understanding the specific challenges to negotiations to reduce these weapons. In light of Russia's actions in Crimea, Track II discussions will focus on how the crisis might affect thinking about NSNW as well as the political and technical factors that could influence efforts towards transparency. While PASCC has supported other U.S.-Russia strategic dialogues, none are specific to NSNW and yet NSNW are a key area of nuclear-weapon disagreement and are directly related to another area of significant disagreement, missile defense. Discussions will illuminate whether a narrower scope for reductions and applicable verification might be possible, feasible, and/or desirable.

Performer: CISAC, Stanford University Principal Investigator: Scott D. Sagan Cost: $100,000 Fiscal Year(s): 2014-2015 ; Policymakers and scholars widely believe that there is a deep public aversion to nuclear weapons. But there is no empirical evidence on the strength of "antinuclear instincts" and the conditions under which they operate in the United States and other countries. This is especially relevant in light of current debates over "red lines" for military intervention, concerns about non-combatant immunity, and escalation dangers in military conflicts. ; PASCC

Performer: UPMC Center for Health Security Principal Investigator: Gigi Kwik Gronvall Cost: $242,613 Fiscal Year(s): 2014-2015 ; Objective: The United States and Singapore face common biosecurity challenges. However, the two sides lack a united approach to mitigating the threat. Singapore is an important strategic partner in Asia for nuclear nonproliferation, trade agreements, and military-tomilitary cooperation and training; expanding this partnership to shared bilateral and regional concerns will strengthen the U.S.- Singapore partnership on security. The project will encourage dialogue between the expert communities of both nations on improving biosecurity and boosting mutual understanding of important developments relating to biosafety, advances in biology, dual-use science, and other relevant issues that shape the changing WMD threat. ; PASCC

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Brian Finlay ; In East Africa, small arms trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, terrorist activity, underdevelopment, and nuclear proliferation all share a common denominator: border insecurity. Bridging the security interests of the global North (nonproliferation) and the global South (development) could reduce WMD proliferation supply chains and increase international security. The project aims to address the challenge of porous borders by developing security regimes that formulate a _whole of government_ approach to border management. A plan for Kenya will prioritize sustainable nonproliferation cooperation in Eastern Africa, facilitate U.S. counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, and increase local on-the-ground capacity to promote security engagement. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Bruce W. MacDonald ; While America has been a space-faring nation for decades, space plays an increasingly important role in conventional military superiority, strategic nuclear posture, and civilian economies. With the proliferation of space and other technologies, China could exploit fast-growing U.S. dependence on space to weaken U.S. military and economic power. Though absolute U.S. advantages in space should continue, the margin of U.S. advantage will likely diminish with increased Chinese space capabilities and exploration. This project will build on current understandings of space deterrence and contribute research on possible crisis behaviors. Should a crisis erupt, understanding how space deterrence functions will dictate the path back to space stability. Furthermore, the analysis of factors that will influence behavior between the United States and China in a crisis or actual conflict will better inform U.S. crisis decision-making and peacetime planning. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Bruce Bennett ; Ironically, the greatest likelihood for nuclear proliferation in the coming years may come from U.S. allies. The development of nuclear weapons by South Korea (ROK) could result in a regional nuclear arms race and global failure of the Nonproliferation Treaty. As North Korean development of nuclear weapons continues irrespective of the U.S. security umbrella, fewer external options remain to ensure ROK security. To assist both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the larger U.S. national security community, the project will develop a framework for discouraging ROK development of its own nuclear weapons by meeting ROK security needs. RAND_s framework will seek to explain how ROK possession of nuclear weapons will undermine national security, jeopardize the U.S.-ROK alliance, and damage international security. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Clark Murdock & Franklin Miller ; NATO nuclear policy faces a variety of external challenges including the increased complexity of deterrence relationships, WMD proliferation to new actors capable of disrupting stability, and the increasing strategic significance of Asia. The three nuclear members of NATO, the United States, United Kingdom, and France (P-3), will drive the burden-sharing strategy and consensus necessary to weather a NATO drawdown while maintaining nuclear force posture. The project aims to increase the security of the United States by improving trilateral understanding, enhancing scholarship of the emerging challenges, and providing insight on the evolving nature and future of the P-3 partnership. The dialogue will continue to define the role of nuclear weapons, explore how the United States can foster a political consensus, and analyze the cross-domain deterrence of space, cyber, and nuclear issues. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Anne Clunan & Kirsten Rodine Hardy ; While those in the nanotechnology field emphasize the benefits for medicine, travel, and manufacturing, it is a dual-use technology that could lead to a disruptive and expensive arms race for technology dominance. Nanotechnology has significant implications for globalization, technological governance, and national sovereignty. Through a cross-national and strategic lens, the project will analyze the potential threats to national security and competitiveness arising from nanotechnology and its governance. The project will also explore the threats and opportunities for U.S. national security and economic prosperity from commercial and military nanotechnologies, divergent nanotech developmental strategies, and emerging governance structures in critical countries. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Richard Weitz ; Excluding the United States, Russia and China are the two most powerful militaries in the world. China is undertaking a comprehensive military modernization program and Russia still has approximately the same nuclear weapons capacity as the United States. While bilateral relations between Russia and China are strong in many areas, trilateral cooperation is inadequate in strategic nuclear arms control, operational arms control, and averting regional nuclear weapons proliferation. The Hudson Institute will focus on strategic offensive forces (intercontinental and short range), strategic defense (national and regional), and strategic stability issues that can contribute to further nuclear proliferation. Increased understanding of the trilateral relationship between the world_s three most important nuclear powers will shed key insight on the countries_ strategic positions. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Thomas-Durell Young ; The Obama Administration_s Pivot to Asia and the rise of Chinese power in the region greatly influences the U.S.-Australian alliance. To meet the regional security challenges, the United States will station Marine Corps forces in the North Territory; however, the Australian domestic debate is dominated by a narrative of defense _self-reliance._ The sometimes contradictory relationship and the shifts in the region provide the United States an opportunity to reengage the Australian domestic debate. The project will initiate a dialogue regarding Australia_s policy on international non-proliferation policy and analyze the view of domestic groups in Australia towards the U.S. Pivot to Asia. It will also identify emerging problems and opportunities in the areas of bilateral defense relations, U.S. basing, and the coordination of efforts to stem the growth of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced Conventional Weapons (CBRNE) proliferation in the region. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA