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The aim of this paper is to understand the relationship that exists, in Hegel's philosophy, between his conception of "habit" and that of "the world of right", insofar as both are defined by Hegel as "second nature". First of all, we will focus on the Hegelian conception of habit, as it is formulated in his anthropology (first section of the philosophy of subjective spirit). Secondly, we will show the connection between the concept of habit and that of custom, as it is formulated in the philosophy of right. Finally, on this basis we will provide an insight into some of the fundamental structures of the Hegelian conception of the State as the "actuality of the ethical idea". ; El propósito de este artículo es comprender la relación que existe, en la filosofía de Hegel, entre su concepción del "hábito" y la de "el mundo del derecho", en tanto ambas son definidas por Hegel como "segunda naturaleza". En primer lugar, nos centraremos en la concepción hegeliana del hábito, tal y como fue formulada en su antropología (la primera sección de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo). A continuación, expondremos la conexión entre el concepto de hábito y el de costumbre, tal y como fue formulado en la filosofía del derecho. Finalmente, sobre esta base, ofreceremos un análisis de algunas de las estructuras fundamentales de la concepción hegeliana del Estado como "realidad efectiva de la idea ética".

El propósito de este artículo es comprender la relación que existe, en la filosofía de Hegel, entre su concepción del "hábito" y la de "el mundo del derecho", en tanto ambas son definidas por Hegel como "segunda naturaleza". En primer lugar, nos centraremos en la concepción hegeliana del hábito, tal y como fue formulada en su antropología (la primera sección de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo). A continuación, expondremos la conexión entre el concepto de hábito y el de costumbre, tal y como fue formulado en la filosofía del derecho. Finalmente, sobre esta base, ofreceremos un análisis de algunas de las estructuras fundamentales de la concepción hegeliana del Estado como "realidad efectiva de la idea ética". Palabras clave: Hegel, hábito, costumbre, gobierno. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to understand the relationship that exists, in Hegel's philosophy, between his conception of "habit" and that of "the world of right", insofar as both are defined by Hegel as "second nature". First of all, we will focus on the Hegelian conception of habit, as it is formulated in his anthropology (first section of the philosophy of subjective spirit). Secondly, we will show the connection between the concept of habit and that of custom, as it is formulated in the philosophy of right. Finally, on this basis we will provide an insight into some of the fundamental structures of the Hegelian conception of the State as the "actuality of the ethical idea". Keywords: Hegel, Habit, Custom, Government.

The aim of this article is to give an account of Hegel's conception of right as a mutual implication of ethical and political life against the backdrop of the modern theories of right, based on the construction of a sovereign will authorized by the procedure of representation and on the notion of a threefold division of the powers of the State. After having clarified Hegel's definition of State as the actuality of the ethical Idea, I will provide a stepwise reconstruction of the inner logic of the constitution (Verfassung), as it is articulated in its three main moments: the power of the monarch (singularity), the civil society (particularity), and the legislative power (universality). Specifically, I will argue that, from the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1820) to the Enciclopedia of 1827 and 1830, passing through the course of 1824/25, Hegel's texts show the discontinuous development of a broad and original notion of government (Regierung), which, in the §541 of the Enciclopedia of 1830, culminates in the identification of government with the political State. Thus, the traditional distinction of powers ends up being transformed into the articulation of three ruling agencies, which are actively present in every sphere of the constitution, without, however, pretending to reduce or eliminate any of them.