This article provides the first detailed account of recent fertility trends in Iraq, with a particular focus on the changes resulting from the 2003–2011 war and the factors underlying them. The study is based on retrospective birth history data from the 2006 and 2011 Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (I‐MICS). Estimates from the two surveys indicate that total fertility remained stable from 1997 to 2010, at about 4.5 children per woman. However, examination of the age patterns of fertility reveals an abrupt shift in the timing of births, with adolescent fertility rising by over 30 percent soon after the onset of the war. A decomposition analysis shows that the rise in early childbearing is due to an increased prevalence of early marriage among less‐educated women. The prevalence of early marriage and childbearing among women with secondary or higher education is relatively low and has not increased after 2003.
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait and consequently the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. In 1991, an international military alliance expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait during a short war. Nevertheless, the economic sanctions remained in place—their removal required that Iraq should destroy its weapons of mass destruction. Subsequent years saw reports of acute suffering in Iraq. The sanctions undoubtedly greatly reduced the country's ability to import supplies of food and medicine. Particular concerns arose about the state of young children. These concerns crystalised in 1999 when, with cooperation from the Iraqi government, Unicef conducted a major demographic survey. The results of the survey indicated that the under-5 death rate in Iraq had increased hugely between 1990 and 1991 and had then continued at a very high level. The survey results were used both to challenge and support the case for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. And they were cited by Tony Blair in 2010 in his testimony to the Iraq Inquiry established by the British government. Indeed, the results of the 1999 Unicef/Government of Iraq survey are still cited. Since 2003, however, several more surveys dealing with child mortality have been undertaken. Their results show no sign of a huge and enduring rise in the under-5 death rate starting in 1991. It is therefore clear that Saddam Hussein's government successfully manipulated the 1999 survey in order to convey a very false impression—something that is surely deserving of greater recognition.
Background: In the last few decades, Iraq's health care capacity has been severely undermined by the effects of different wars, international sanctions, sectarian violence and political instability. In the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion, the Ministry of Health has set plans to expand health service delivery, by reorienting the public sector towards primary health care and attributing a larger role to the private sector for hospital care. Quantitative assessments of the post-2003 health policy outcomes have remained scant. This paper addresses this gap focusing on a key outcome indicator that is the expansion of health facilities. Methods: The analysis is based on data on health facilities provided by the World Health Organisation and Iraq's Ministry of Health. For each governorate, we calculated the change in the absolute number of facilities by type from early 2003 to the end of 2012. To account for population growth, we computed the change in the number of facilities per 100,000 population. We compared trends in the autonomous northern Kurdistan region, which has been relatively stable from 2003 onwards, and in the rest of Iraq (centre/south), where fragile institutions and persistent sectarian strife have posed major challenges to health system recovery. Results: The countrywide number of primary health care centres per 100,000 population rose from 5.5 in 2003 to 7.4 in 2012. The extent of improvement varied significantly within the country, with an average increase of 4.3 primary health care centres per 100,000 population in the Kurdistan region versus an average increase of only 1.4 in central/southern Iraq. The average number of public hospitals per 100,000 population rose from 1.3 to 1.5 in Kurdistan, whereas it remained at 0.6 in centre/south. The average number of private hospitals per 100,000 population rose from 0.2 to 0.6 in Kurdistan, whereas it declined from 0.3 to 0.2 in centre/south. Conclusions: The expansion of both public and private health facilities in the Kurdistan region appears encouraging, but still much should be done to reach the standards of neighbouring countries. The slow pace of improvement in the rest of Iraq is largely attributable to the dire security situation and should be a cause for major concern.
Background In June 2014, an estimated 1500 fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized control of Mosul, Iraq's second city. Although many residents fled, others stayed behind, enduring the restrictive civil and social policies of ISIS. In December 2016, the military activity, known as the liberation campaign, began in east Mosul, concluding in west Mosul in June 2017. Methods To assess life in Mosul under ISIS, and the consequences of the military campaign to retake Mosul we conducted a 40 cluster-30 household survey in Mosul, starting in March 2017. All households included were present in Mosul throughout the entire time of ISIS control and military action. Results In June 2014, 915 of 1139 school-age children (80.3%) had been in school, but only 28 (2.2%) attended at least some school after ISIS seized control. This represented a decision of families. Injuries to women resulting from intimate partner violence were reported in 415 (34.5%) households. In the surveyed households, 819 marriages had occurred; 688 (84.0%) among women. Of these women, 89 (12.9%) were aged 15 years and less, and 253 (49.7%) were aged under 18 at the time of marriage. With Mosul economically damaged by ISIS control and physically during the Iraqi military action, there was little employment at the time of the survey, and few persons were bringing cash into households. The liberation of Mosul in 2017 caused extensive damage to dwellings. Overall only a quarter of dwellings had not sustained some damage. In west Mosul, only 21.7% of houses had little or no damage from the conflict, with 98 (21.7%) households reporting their house had been destroyed, forcing its occupants to move. No houses had regular electricity and there was limited piped water. Inadequate fuel for cooking was reported by 996 (82.9%) households. Conclusion The physical, and social damage occurring during ISIS occupation of Mosul and during the subsequent military action (liberation) was substantial and its impact is unlikely to be erased soon.
The increasing caseload of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in displaced populations poses new challenges for humanitarian agencies and host country governments in the provision of health care, diagnostics and medications. This study aimed to characterise the prevalence of NCDs and better understand issues related to accessing care among Yazidis and other minority groups displaced by ISIS and currently residing in camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
AbstractThis article investigates the determinants of remittance behaviours among foreigners in Italy and intends to gain a better understanding of the temporal pattern of remittances. The analysis is based on data from the 2009 "Italian Statistics on Income and Living Conditions of Households with Foreigners". The decisions on whether to remit and how much to remit are separately yet simultaneously estimated using a zero‐inflated beta regression model. The findings reveal that remittances are driven by a mix of altruistic and self‐interest motives that may persist for many years. Many covariates included in the model have a different effect on the propensity to remit and on the relative amount of remittances. We find some evidence that the average propensity to remit follows an M‐shaped trajectory over time. However, the model specification including only time and time squared proves that the inverted‐U shape trajectory, well‐established in the literature, still remains a better choice in terms of parsimoniousness and flexibility. Among those who remit, time since migration does not have any significant effect on the normalized amount remitted.
AbstractDespite international commitments to end female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), very little is known about the effectiveness of national policies in contributing to the abandonment of this harmful practice. To help address this gap in knowledge, we apply a quasi‐experimental research design to study two west African countries, Mali and Mauritania. These countries have marked similarities with respect to practices of FGM/C, but differing legal contexts. A law banning FGM/C was introduced in Mauritania in 2005; in Mali, there is no legal ban on FGM/C. We use nationally representative survey data to reconstruct trends in FGM/C prevalence in both countries, from 1997 to 2011, and then use a difference‐in‐difference method to evaluate the impact of the 2005 law in Mauritania. FGM/C prevalence in Mauritania began to decline slowly for girls born in the early 2000s, with the decline accelerating for girls born after 2005. However, a similar trend is observable in Mali, where no equivalent law has been passed. Additional statistical analysis confirms that the 2005 law did not have a significant impact on reducing FGM/C prevalence in Mauritania. These findings suggest that legal change alone is insufficient for behavioral change with regard to FGM/C. This study demonstrates how it is possible to evaluate national policies using readily available survey data in resource‐poor settings.
