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This paper defends the viability of de-idealization strategies in economic modeling against recent criticism. De-idealization occurs when an idealized assumption of a theoretical model is replaced with a more realistic one. Recently, some scholars have raised objections against the possibility or fruitfulness of de-idealizing economic models, suggesting that economists do not employ this kind of strategy. We present a detailed case study from the theory of industrial organization, discussing three different models, two of which can be construed as de-idealized versions of the first (the so-called Bertrand model of oligopoly). We conclude that recent pessimism about de-idealization in economics is largely unfounded, and that de-idealization strategies are not only possible but also widely employed in economics.

AbstractThe basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is "close to the truth" about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a "deterministic" truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or "the truth", or both, are "probabilistic" in nature. As a step forward in this direction, we first present a general characterization of both deterministic and probabilistic truth approximation; then, we introduce a new account of verisimilitude which provides a simple formal framework to deal with such issue in a unified way. The connections of our account with some other proposals in the literature are also briefly discussed.

Abstract: The global emergency caused by the spread of COVID-19 raises critical challenges for individuals and communities on many different levels. In particular, politicians, scientists, physicians, and other professionals may face new ethical dilemmas and cognitive constraints as they make critical decisions in extraordinary circumstances. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have long analyzed and discussed such issues. An example is the debate on moral decision making in imaginary scenarios, such as the famous "Trolley Problem". Similarly, dramatic and consequential decisions are realized daily in the current crisis. Focusing on Italy, we discuss the clinical ethical guidelines proposed by the Italian Society of Anesthesiology, Analgesia, Resuscitation and Intensive Care (SIAARTI), highlighting some crucial ethical and cognitive concerns surrounding emergency decision making in the current situation.Keywords: Moral Dilemmas; Cognition; Rationality; Bias; Clinical Decision Making; COVID-19 Problemi etici e cognitivi nell'emergenza COVID-19Riassunto: L'emergenza globale causata dal COVID-19 solleva problemi cruciali, sia per gli individui sia per le comunità, a molti livelli diversi. In particolare, politici, scienziati, medici e altri professionisti si trovano ad affrontare dilemmi etici e limitazioni cognitive legate a decisioni critiche in circostanze straordinarie. Sia i filosofi sia gli scienziati cognitivi hanno a lungo analizzato e discusso questi problemi. Un esempio è il dibattito sul ragionamento e le decisioni morali in scenari immaginari, come il famoso "problema del carrello". Nella crisi attuale, dilemmi drammatici di questo tipo sono all'ordine del giorno. Concentrandoci sull'Italia, discutiamo le linee guida proposte dalla Società Italiana di Anestesiologia, Analgesia, Rianimazione e Terapia Intensiva (SIAARTI), evidenziando alcuni aspetti critici, sia etici sia cognitivi, del processo decisionale in una situazione di emergenza come quella attuale.Parole chiave: Dilemmi morali; Cognizione; Razionalità; Bias; Decisioni cliniche; COVID-19

The provision of public goods is an important problem in economics and the social sciences. It is often claimed that this problem has the structure of the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma so that rational and self-interested individuals would not be able to provide any public good by spontaneous cooperation. In this paper, we argue that this pessimistic view of the possibility spontaneous cooperation is largely unjustified, since the game theoretic analysis of public goods shows how their voluntary provision is indeed feasible in a number of circumstances. We conclude by considering the implications of the game theoretic approach to the problem of public goods for political philosophy and, in particular, for the possibility of "ordered anarchy" as defended in the works of Anthony de Jasay.