Suchergebnisse

Despite a plethora of policy and scholarly discussions on how overlapping memberships affect the implementation of rules of origin meant to facilitate trade within regional trade agreements (RTAs) of developing countries, there has yet to be any theory development or empirical test to verify these claims. This article re-examines these previous discussions and articulates and empirically tests a theoretical model on the effects that overlapping memberships have had on intra-RTA trade. Using measures of overlapping memberships at both the RTA and country levels of analysis, I find that overlapping memberships in RTAs involving developing countries have had a negative effect on intra-RTA trade levels. These findings shed light on steps developing countries can take to address overlapping memberships and strengthen regional integration at a time when there is a push for north-south trade agreements such as those the European Union is negotiating with several of these developing countries. . Adapted from the source document.

The European Union has evolved into a system of multilevel governance. EU actions have facilitated the involvement of regional/subnational authorities in EU policy formulation and implementation, thus enabling a downward shift in competencies toward subnational authorities. In this article, I argue that regional attachment facilitates support for European integration. Specifically, I show that individuals holding inclusive regional attachment sentiments perceive EU policies that result in the empowerment of subnational authorities in a positive light. In the process, these individuals are more likely to be supportive of European integration. This article's findings contribute to the literature on public opinion and European integration by exploring regionalist sources of support for European integration. Moreover, these findings contribute to the growing research on the emergence of a 'Europe of the regions.'. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The European Union has evolved into a system of multilevel governance. EU actions have facilitated the involvement of regional/subnational authorities in EU policy formulation and implementation, thus enabling a downward shift in competencies toward subnational authorities. In this article, I argue that regional attachment facilitates support for European integration. Specifically, I show that individuals holding inclusive regional attachment sentiments perceive EU policies that result in the empowerment of subnational authorities in a positive light. In the process, these individuals are more likely to be supportive of European integration. This article's findings contribute to the literature on public opinion and European integration by exploring regionalist sources of support for European integration. Moreover, these findings contribute to the growing research on the emergence of a 'Europe of the regions.'

AbstractThe varieties of preferential trade agreements have increased in recent decades. Regional blocs concluding deals with third‐party actors have contributed immensely to these changes in trade agreements. These varieties have motivated our reexamination of the breadth–depth trade‐off in trade agreements. We argue that a breadth–depth trade‐off is present in initial plurilateral agreements. Large groups of states at this initial stage exhibit greater preference heterogeneity that discourages deeper cooperation. Conversely, we expect the breadth–depth trade‐off to be absent in follow‐up plurilateral agreements and region‐to‐third‐party agreements. For the former, the initial pacts serve a learning function that enables deeper cooperation. For the latter, institutional mechanisms lessen preference heterogeneity and transforms negotiations to approximate bilateral trade talks that alleviate the breadth–depth trade‐off. Our test on 234 trade agreements finds support for our argument. Our paper highlights the importance of distinguishing trade negotiation configurations to better understand how membership affects the depth of agreements.

Civil war intervention literature identifies colonial history as influencing the likelihood of interventions. This literature, however, has yet to clarify the mechanisms through which colonial history influences interventions. We develop and test an argument linking the relations established by colonialism—economic, political, and social—with interventions. We find that colonial history influences interventions, but its effect matters less once we control for these three relations. Importantly, we find that this effect of colonial history is particularly small in dyads with stronger economic relations. Our paper gives further credence to liberal arguments emphasizing the role of economic factors in international security.