Suchergebnisse

This article asks the simple question of why East and Southeast Asian rivals have experienced a sharp increase in military activity despite their decisive shift to democracy. To explain this puzzle, I develop a "theory of perverse political accountability" in East and Southeast Asian rivalries. Central to my theory is that perverse political accountability, in which a hawkish leadership adopting a more conflictual policy toward foreign rivals is rewarded by a hard-line constituency or selectorate, makes democratic leaders in rival states highly conflict-prone. In addition, the theory claims that democratic rivals will likely initiate military conflicts against autocratic rivals due to their leaders' hawkish preferences and to perverse political accountability, and that autocratic rivals will likely initiate conflicts against democratic rivals and against each other due to their leaders' hawkish preferences and to the absence of perverse political accountability. The article finds strong empirical evidence for these theoretical arguments. The findings contribute to an enhanced understanding of the causes of increased militarism in East and Southeast Asian rivalries.