Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn an outsourcing arrangement, the principal must weigh the potential savings in manufacturing cost against the risk of intellectual property (IP) misappropriation by suppliers. While formal legal measures for protecting IP exist in many countries, they are by no means perfect. We consider a market‐based approach where the supplier can sell the acquired IP to a third party imitator or can become an imitator if the imitation‐cost is not large. We identify economic‐equilibrium scenarios that discourage excessive misappropriation of IP. We find that IP sell/purchase transactions can happen only if the market potential has a moderate value. It can also motivate the supplier to become imitator. A large market, while attractive to the imitator, causes the principal not to outsource. In a small market, on the other hand, the imitator is unable to compete especially with a high‐quality imitation. Interestingly, we also find that the combined sales of the principal and imitator decreases, if the imitator increases IP purchase. We establish that the principal can benefit from partial outsourcing implying that a proportion of the components are outsourced, if the market potential is large.

To alleviate flooding, caused by hurricanes, governments build structural barriers called levees. In addition, relief providers such as the nongovernmental organizations and charities raise funds, and procure and deliver supplies (food, water, and medicines) for humanitarian relief. The strategy for managing disasters must, therefore, weigh the costs and benefits of building levees as well as procuring and delivering supplies. We use a three‐stage decision making framework to study how the investment in levee capacity can be integrated with supply procurements, fundraising, and rapid response. One of our major findings is that a large fundraising cost discourages postdisaster funding, implying relatively large investments in levee and prepositioned supplies. That notwithstanding, a large social value (of saving life) can tilt the balance in favor of postdisaster funding. If the levee capacity increases, funding for predisaster procurement is reduced without affecting postdisaster funding. For a sufficiently large increase in capacity, however, postdisaster response becomes superfluous. We also find that hurricane uncertainty motivates levees with large capacity. In contrast, levee‐failures motivate levees with small capacity.

AbstractWe study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007