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AbstractPrevious literature suggests a party's electoral result can shape its vote share and calculus of voting in a subsequent election. Less is known about whether this information-updating process helps explain the success of radical right parties (RRPs) in a multi-level system. To answer this question, I use the case of Germany to test whether a bottom-up spillover effect exists for RRPs. Through a regression discontinuity design, I first find that crossing regional electoral hurdles can substantially improve RRPs' electoral performance in a subsequent general election. Yet, this positive spillover effect cannot be found for other party families. Next, I use a panel to ascertain which mechanisms drive this effect for RRPs. The analysis suggests the legitimation mechanism is more dominant than the viability mechanism and exposure mechanism. These findings enrich our understanding of both the second-order election framework and RRP studies.

Under what circumstances do first‐time radical‐right party (RRP) voters become more identified with the right‐wing label? Also, when do they perceive the center‐right party as more left wing and evaluate it more negatively? To answer these two intertwined questions, this article leverages the dynamic political context of Germany during the 2013–17 election cycle. In this election cycle, the political arena became abruptly polarized, as the refugee crisis took place and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) broke into 13 subnational parliaments. Using a unique longitudinal dataset, I find that first‐time AfD voters experienced a persuasion effect in such a polarized environment, as they became slightly more right wing. In addition, I find a contrast effect among these voters, as they came to perceive the Christian Democratic Union as more left wing and judged it more negatively. These findings have important implications for understanding the psychological processes of first‐time RRP voters in a multiparty system, as they show how a polarized environment can shape RRP voters' ideological identity and motivate them to see the mainstream center‐right party as an outgroup.

Purpose
Since the launch of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003, Hong Kong cinema is believed to have confronted drastic changes. Hong Kong cinema is described to be dying, lacking creative space and losing local distinctiveness. A decade later, the rise of Hong Kong – China coproduction cinema under CEPA has been normalized and changed the once pessimism in the industry. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Hong Kong cinema adjusted its production and creation in the first 10 years of CEPA.

Design/methodology/approach
Beginning with a review of the overall development, three paradigmatic cases are examined for reflecting upon what the major industrial and commercial concerns on the Hong Kong – China coproduction model are, and how such a coproduction model is not developed as smooth as what the Hong Kong filmmakers expected.

Findings
Collectively, this paper singles out the difficulties in operation and the limit of transnationality that occur in the Chinese context for the development of Hong Kong cinema under the Hong Kong – China coproduction model.

Originality/value
This is the author's research in his five-year study of Hong Kong cinema and it contributes a lot to the field of cinema studies with relevant industrial and policy concern.

As immigration issues waned in salience during the COVID-19 pandemic, populist radical right (PRR) parties repositioned themselves by politicizing various pandemic policies. In light of this changing political landscape, scholars have analyzed what factors are associated with PRR voting. Yet, most studies focus on small sets of covariates that could easily ignore other key determinants. To address this limitation, we use MI-LASSO logistic regression, which is a more inductive data-driven approach that can incorporate a huge number of covariates. Our research analyzes the key determinants of voting for the People's Party of Canada—a PRR party that rose rapidly during the pandemic. Using the 2021 Canadian Election Study dataset ( N = 14,841), we confirm that PRR voters in the pandemic were both protest and policy-oriented voters. They were protest voters since anti-establishment attitudes consistently correlate with their vote choice. On the other hand, PRR voters' policy concern was about pandemic policies rather than immigration, as nativist attitudes never emerge as key determinants. Additionally, we uncover that the ideological placement of the mainstream right party and the defense of hate speech are strong correlates, while conventional variables like sociodemographics are not. These findings enrich our understanding of PRR voting during the pandemic.

When opposition elites cooperate to counteract authoritarian incumbents, they often deemphasize their fissures. But behind the scenes of cooperation, will their attitudinal divisions remain? If so, on what dimensions? Though these questions have important implications for the tenacity of cooperation and future political developments, the current literature does not shed much light on them. Our research answers these questions by examining the case of Hong Kong, which has undergone widespread repression. We surveyed district councilors in an autocratization episode in which opposition elites were highly cohesive. Using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov metric, we find that opposition factions share similar economic attitudes. Yet, despite their cooperative behavior, they still hold divided attitudes on the center-periphery and democratization strategies dimensions. These findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on autocratization by highlighting the (in)congruence of opposition elites' attitudes and behavior.

AbstractThe present research examined the psychological processes underlying engagement in non‐normative forms of resistance and the role of repression. We conducted two studies in the contexts of two distinct social movements, both characterized by high levels of repression— the Anti‐Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in Hong Kong and the "Chilean Spring" protests of 2019–2020. First, we tested whether non‐normative resistance was motivated by (1) moralization of non‐normative actions (moralization hypothesis), (2) perceived low efficacy of normative actions and lack of hope (nothing‐to‐lose hypothesis), or (3) perceived efficacy of non‐normative actions in achieving movement goals (strategic choice hypothesis). Our results provided converging evidence for the moralization and strategic choice hypotheses, but not the nothing‐to‐lose hypothesis. Furthermore, we proposed and provided evidence for a model of movement escalation, whereby experiences of police violence predicted stronger willingness to engage in future non‐normative actions via heightened motivations for non‐normative resistance and increased risk perceptions. Taken together, these findings illuminate that repression in the form of coercive police violence may be ineffective in quelling social unrest. Rather, it can contribute to the radicalization of protesters. Potential boundary conditions and cross‐contextual generalizability of the current results are discussed.