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Imposing fear either by the way of using force or with intention to inflict pain is termed as terrorism. Opting such anti-social act by people often termed as terrorists. It has become a global disease found in almost every society. There is hardly any country which is not threatened by it. Their activities may either be small or large in operation, but the motive behind each is to defeat the peace. Several other issues related to it are there as in relation to Politics, Social integrity, Trade, Globalization, Employment, Education, Disturbance in financial market, Violation of human rights, Uncertainty of Constitutional machinery, Social and geographical infrastructural development, etc. Right from the post-independence time the whole Jammu and Kashmir is facing this serious threat, comparatively much more in the valley. Here it is an attempt to study the socio-legal impact of terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of Union of India.

AbstractIn this paper, I introduce and study the $\gamma$-core of a general strategic game. I first show that the $\gamma$-core of an arbitrary strategic game is smaller than the conventional $\alpha$- and $\beta$- cores. I then consider the partition function form of a general strategic game and show that a prominent class of partition function games admit nonempty $\gamma$-cores. Finally, I show that each $\gamma$-core payoff vector (a cooperative solution) can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of an intuitive non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the $\gamma$-core is non-empty.

This paper characterizes the optimal income tax function when the agent is risk averse and the objective of the principal is to maximize a social welfare function. We show that the optimal tax function is generally non‐decreasing and concave if the principal's objective is maximin and the agent's utility function satisfies a reasonable condition which we call 'repetitive risk aversion'. It is shown further that in many cases the optimal tax function is similarly concave when the social welfare function is utilitarian.

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of "self enforcement" any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett's (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of "self enforcement" any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett's (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

The paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative steady state in the context of a model of climate change. It also explores the possibility of cooperation and attainment of an optimal steady state. It is shown that the problem is similar to that in the static model (Chander and Tulkens (1997)).

Illustrates the itinerary of Henry Tulkens, an applied theorist, on the occasion of his retirement from teaching. This work is structured in four parts: decentralized resource allocation processes for public and private goods; environment, public goods and externalities; efficiency analysis; and fiscal competition and optimality