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This book attempts to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of contributors -- An introduction to the philosophy of practical reason -- Part 1 Foundational matters -- 1 Some central questions about practical reason -- 2 Practical reason: rationality or normativity but not both -- 3 Can reason be practical? narrow and broad conceptions and capacities -- 4 Practical reason and social practices -- 5 How to be a pragmatist -- 6 What is it to be a rational agent? -- Part 2 Practical reason in the history of philosophy -- 7 Practical reasoning in early Chinese philosophy -- 8 Aristotle on deliberation -- 9 Hume's robust theory of practical reason -- 10 Kant's approach to the theory of human agency -- 11 Anscombe on acting for reasons -- Part 3 The philosophy of practical reason as action theory and moral psychology -- 12 Three dogmas of agency theory -- 13 Some reflections on the relationship between reason and the will -- 14 Three for the price of two -- 15 The guise of the good -- 16 Motivational internalism and externalism -- 17 Emotions in practical reasoning -- 18 Psychopathy, agency, and practical reason -- 19 Practical reason and social science research -- Part 4 The philosophy of practical reason as the theory of practical normativity -- Section 1 The nature and grounds of normative practical reasons -- 20 Objectivism about reasons -- 21 How to be a subjectivist -- 22 Kantian constructivism -- 23 Constitutivism: on rabbits, hats, and holy grails -- 24 Reasoning first -- 25 Normative nonnaturalism -- Section 2 Some substantive matters -- 26 Non-requiring reasons -- 27 Requirements of reason -- 28 Normative pluralism and skepticism about 'ought simpliciter' -- 29 There is no moral ought and no prudential ought -- 30 Practical reason and the second-person standpoint.