Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This paper uses a difference-in-differences (DID) framework to estimate the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) used to fight the 1918 influenza pandemic and control the resultant mortality in 43 US cities. The results suggest that NPIs such as school closures and social distancing, as implemented in 1918, and when applied relatively intensively, might have reduced individual and herd immunity reducing the life expectancy of people with co morbidity, thereby leading to a significantly higher number of deaths in subsequent years. It would be difficult to draw any inference regarding the predicted impact of NPIs as implemented during the Covid-19 crisis as influenza and Covid-19 are two entirely different viruses and nowadays' pharmaceutical technologies can limit these medium-term impacts.

This dissertation analyzes the mechanisms of the French housing market documenting its constraints and the impact of several housing policies. It aims to increase our understanding of the mechanisms at work on this very particular market where land has a key role. The first chapter tries to document the place of land through the past decades. Some economists have been documenting a steady decline of its importance during the XIX and XX centuries. However, such decline was progressively balanced by the sharp appreciation of housing wealth and more particularly its land component. The second chapter tries to understand the origin of this rise in residential land value documenting one of the key parameter of the housing market: the supply elasticity of the French urban areas. This chapter starts defining two different concepts related with the supply elasticity. The first one is the intensive margin supply elasticity and designates the reaction of developers following a short run increase in housing prices. The second one describes how real estate price vary when a city is growing. It shows that French urban areas are less elastic than their US counterparts. The third chapter uses a natural experiment, the Scellier Housing Tax Credit (STC) and shows that it had a limited quantitative impact on the housing production. The fourth chapter documents the crowding out effect of private construction by social housing. ; Cette thèse analyse les principaux mécanismes du marché du logement en s'intéressant au rôle des contraintes foncières naturelles et réglementaires et à l'impact des politiques publiques. Le premier chapitre met en perspective le rôle de la terre au cours des derniers siècles en montrant que si l'importance de la terre a progressivement reculé jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle, elle a été remplacée par l'importance croissante du foncier résidentiel. Le second chapitre tente d'estimer l'un des paramètres clé du marché du logement : l'élasticité prix. Il montre que ce concept recouvre deux notions différentes, ...

This dissertation analyzes the mechanisms of the French housing market documenting its constraints and the impact of several housing policies. It aims to increase our understanding of the mechanisms at work on this very particular market where land has a key role. The first chapter tries to document the place of land through the past decades. Some economists have been documenting a steady decline of its importance during the XIX and XX centuries. However, such decline was progressively balanced by the sharp appreciation of housing wealth and more particularly its land component. The second chapter tries to understand the origin of this rise in residential land value documenting one of the key parameter of the housing market: the supply elasticity of the French urban areas. This chapter starts defining two different concepts related with the supply elasticity. The first one is the intensive margin supply elasticity and designates the reaction of developers following a short run increase in housing prices. The second one describes how real estate price vary when a city is growing. It shows that French urban areas are less elastic than their US counterparts. The third chapter uses a natural experiment, the Scellier Housing Tax Credit (STC) and shows that it had a limited quantitative impact on the housing production. The fourth chapter documents the crowding out effect of private construction by social housing. ; Cette thèse analyse les principaux mécanismes du marché du logement en s'intéressant au rôle des contraintes foncières naturelles et réglementaires et à l'impact des politiques publiques. Le premier chapitre met en perspective le rôle de la terre au cours des derniers siècles en montrant que si l'importance de la terre a progressivement reculé jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle, elle a été remplacée par l'importance croissante du foncier résidentiel. Le second chapitre tente d'estimer l'un des paramètres clé du marché du logement : l'élasticité prix. Il montre que ce concept recouvre deux notions différentes, l'une décrit la réaction des promoteurs suite à une augmentation des prix alors que la seconde décrit la croissance des prix de l'immobilier accompagnant le développement urbain. Il montre que les marchés de l'immobilier des aires urbaines françaises sont inélastiques. Le troisième chapitre analyse l'impact du dispositif Scellier sur les marchés locaux et montre que son impact quantitatif a été limité. Enfin le quatrième chapitre étudie l'effet d'éviction du logement privé par le logement social.

N° 77 ; International audience ; Cet article explore la diversité des configurations locales du parc de logements locatifs sociaux. Nous réalisons une analyse quantitative et descriptive en nous intéressant aux caractéristiques des logements, au profil des locataires, aux dynamiques récentes de production et aux configurations d'acteurs intervenant dans leur gestion. Nous utilisons principalement les données du Répertoire du Parc Locatif Social (SOeS, 2013) et du Recensement de la population (Insee, 2013) pour construire une typologie des communes de l'unité urbaine de Paris. Notre approche localisée et systématique de l'offre de logement social fait ressortir dix types de parcs sociaux. Elle montre d'abord que le logement social n'est pas un habitat uniforme et n'accueille pas une population homogène. Outre les contrastes liés aux caractéristiques des logements, largement hérités des politiques passées (1960-1970), il ressort que la diversité actuelle des parcs sociaux tient aux types d'acteurs impliqués dans leur construction et dans la sélection des locataires. La pluralité de leurs objectifs, de leurs intérêts et de leurs pratiques alimente de forts contrastes dans la mobilisation de cet habitat à l'échelle locale, et ce même si les politiques du logement restent fortement centralisées en France.

N° 77 ; International audience ; Cet article explore la diversité des configurations locales du parc de logements locatifs sociaux. Nous réalisons une analyse quantitative et descriptive en nous intéressant aux caractéristiques des logements, au profil des locataires, aux dynamiques récentes de production et aux configurations d'acteurs intervenant dans leur gestion. Nous utilisons principalement les données du Répertoire du Parc Locatif Social (SOeS, 2013) et du Recensement de la population (Insee, 2013) pour construire une typologie des communes de l'unité urbaine de Paris. Notre approche localisée et systématique de l'offre de logement social fait ressortir dix types de parcs sociaux. Elle montre d'abord que le logement social n'est pas un habitat uniforme et n'accueille pas une population homogène. Outre les contrastes liés aux caractéristiques des logements, largement hérités des politiques passées (1960-1970), il ressort que la diversité actuelle des parcs sociaux tient aux types d'acteurs impliqués dans leur construction et dans la sélection des locataires. La pluralité de leurs objectifs, de leurs intérêts et de leurs pratiques alimente de forts contrastes dans la mobilisation de cet habitat à l'échelle locale, et ce même si les politiques du logement restent fortement centralisées en France.

Desde Cicerón hasta Augusto, la dureza de los griegos, que puede a veces transformarse en crudelidad, es un "topos" en Roma utilizado para justificar o bien poner de relieve diversas políticas de "clementia". Dionisio de Halicarnaso adapta este tema para demostrar que los romanos, porque fueron clementes en su conquista del mundo, al contrario que los Atenienses de la edad clásica, son los herederos auténticos de la ética griega. ; From Cicero to Augustus, the harshness of the Greeks to their fellow-citizens and to their ennemies, which may even turn into cruelty, is a "topos" in Rome. Political leaders used it to promote several policies of "clementia". Dionysius of Halicarnassus converts this theme in order to show that Romans, being merciful, contrary to the Athenians, are actually the heirs of the Greek values.

Dans son ouvrage, Le capital au XXI e siècle , Thomas Piketty souligne les risques d'une explosion des inégalités de patrimoine, car le capital augmenterait plus vite que le revenu dans plusieurs pays, dont la France. Dans cette note, nous montrons que cette conclusion n'est pas plausible. Elle dépend de la hausse d'une seule des composantes du capital : le capital logement. Le capital dit « productif », hors immobilier, n'a que légèrement augmenté dans les dernières décennies, et sur le long terme, n'est pas en hausse tendancielle. Ensuite, si la valeur du capital immobilier mesurée dans les comptabilités nationales a augmenté sur cette période, c'est en raison de la hausse des prix de l'immobilier, qui ont crû beaucoup plus vite que les loyers et que les revenus depuis 2000. Or, les prix de l'immobilier ne sont pas nécessairement corrélés aux revenus du capital logement. Ce sont au contraire les loyers qui le sont, et donc qui importent pour la dynamique des inégalités : ils représentent à la fois les revenus du capital des propriétaires-bailleurs et les dépenses économisées des propriétaires-occupants. Cela ne signifie pas que les prix de l'immobilier n'ont aucun impact sur les inégalités.

The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component. We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We introduce land and housing structures in Judd's optimal taxation framework. We show that an optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital. When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find that Judd's result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at the steady-state.

The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component. We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We introduce land and housing structures in Judd's optimal taxation framework. We show that an optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital. When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find that Judd's result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at the steady-state.

The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component. We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We introduce land and housing structures in Judd's optimal taxation framework. We show that an optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital. When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find that Judd's result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at the steady-state.

The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component. We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We introduce land and housing structures in Judd's optimal taxation framework. We show that an optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital. When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find that Judd's result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at the steady-state.

The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component. We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We introduce land and housing structures in Judd's optimal taxation framework. We show that an optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital. When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find that Judd's result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at the steady-state.