Suchergebnisse

National sociopolitical structure: Chaplin, D. The revolutionary challenge and Peruvian militarism. Cotler, J. The mechanics of internal domination and social change in Peru.--Urban politics: Doughty, P. L. Social policy and urban growth in Lima. Goldrich, D., Bratt, R. B., and Schuller, C. R. The political integration of lower-class urban settlements in Chile and Peru. Powell, S. Political participation in the barriadas. Collier, D. The politics of squatter settlement formation in Peru. Chaplin, D. Blue-collar workers in Peru. Bayer, D. L. Urban Peru, political action as sellout.--Rural politics: Whyte, W. F. Rural Peru, peasants as activists. Alberti, G. Peasant movements in the Yanamarca Valley. Chaplin, D. La Convención Valley and the 1962-65 guerrilla uprising. Strasma, J. Agrarian reform. Strasma, J. Some economic aspects of nonviolent revolution in Peru and Chile. Hunt, S. Distribution, growth, and government economic behavior in Peru.--The military and the church: Einaudi, L. R. Revolution from within? Military rule in Peru since 1968. Palmer, D. S. and Middlebrook, K. J. Corporatist participation under military rule in Peru. Astiz, C. A. The Catholic Church in the Peruvian political system

In professional boxing, rags-to-riches-to-rags stories are as commonplace as elaborate ring entrances. In the wake of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, the U.S. Congress mandated that the Secretary of Labor undertake a study on the feasibility of establishing a pension plan for professional boxers. The results of the study have yet to be utilized for the development of such a plan. Employing data on those boxing in Nevada, 2008-2010, a model pension plan is developed herein, which may be used as a prototype for other states or a national boxers' pension plan.

While Peru's economic development is highly influenced by its resource endowment and the price structure of its exports, the style of industrialization will be determined in large part by the type and amount of social mobility its class structure permits. Although similar ethnically to Guatemala and Bolivia, Peru so far has managed to forestall a basic social revolution and has developed under one of the most private "free enterprise" regimes in Latin America. It should therefore be interesting to examine the type of class structure and social mobility that underlies this stage of development.In terms of a model of the process of industrialization, I shall emphasize the distinctive features of the transitional stage. It seems that a folk-urban, traditional-modern dichotomy—or even a transitional type that is merely halfway between these extremes—is not adequate.

Observers of Peru since Carleton Beals (1934) have been pre-dicting "fire on the Andes." When Bolivia began its basic social transformation in 1952, a Peruvian conflagration seemed all the more inevitable. Then, in 1962, what appeared to be Peru's version of the Sierra Maestra phase of "the revolution" began in the densely populated mountainous areas of the south.

The early stage of increase in econ inequality as generalized by K. Marx was studied through data on Peru, its industr development & distribution of mean/average per capita income by geographic regions. Both regional & class distribution were examined. It was found that the unequal distribution of wealth increases during the early stage of industr'ization, if 2 assumptions are tenable: (1) that cross-sectional diff'ials can be extrapolated historically; & (2) that intra-elite diff's can be projected onto the entire pop. The isolated Ru regions of Peru are held in their poverty partly by an excessive fractionalization of property. The modern coastal enterprises accumulate large unified holdings as success breeds more growth. This Ru dispersion of property is also the basis for the high level of SM among the landed aristocracy, contrary to a mistaken picture of rigid stability among such groups. Some speculations re the effect of increasing inequality of wealth distribution on Peru's revolutionary potential are offered. It is hyped that revolutionaries tend to be those whose income is rising absolutely, but still falling behind a higher referent group in relative terms. Those at the bottom, even if falling, would be less likely to initiate a radical change due to their traditionally fatalistic, passive outlook. Thus the pol'ay powerful proletariat, the organized workers in the Lima-Callao area, have enjoyed both an absolute & a relative increase in their level of income since 1920. They have had no common cause with either the Indians, whose standard of living may have declined in absolute terms, or the salaried Mc & provincial aristocracy, whose fortunes have declined relatively. Both diff'ial income shifts & group affiliation were relevant to Peru's failure to revolutionize. The 'standard' explanation is rejected as having overemphasized the role of the APRA (full name not given) & neglected Peru's extreme domination by Lima combined with the earnings improvement experienced by the organized Lima proletariat in comparison to other groups. 4 Tables. M. Maxfield.

In 2008 Joe Calzaghe (from Wales) fought Bernard Hopkins (from the USA) in a light-heavyweight boxing match. Prior to the fight Hopkins had taunted Calzaghe with the refrain that he would never lose to a white boy. This paper assesses the interplay of discourses surrounding race and nation in the build-up to the contest between the two boxers. The analysis highlights how simplistic binaries are used to perpetuate notions of difference and considers how this accentuates divides in contested racial and national terrains.