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This book explores a large variety of topics involved in Arabic philosophy. It examines concepts and issues relating to logic and mathematics, as well as metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. These topics are all studied by different Arabic philosophers and scientists from different periods ranging from the 9th century to the 20th century, and are representative of the Arabic tradition. This is the first book dealing with the Arabic thought and philosophy and written only by women. The book brings together the work and contributions of an international group of female scholars and researchers specialized in the history of Arabic logic, philosophy and mathematics. Although all authors are women, the book does not enter into any kind of feminist trend. It simply highlights the contributions of female scholars in order to make them available to the large community of researchers interested in Arabic philosophy and to bring to the fore the presence and representativeness of female scholars in the field.

Abstract
In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames, despite their closeness. Al-Fārābī distinguishes between an accidental conditional and two "essential" conditionals. The accidental conditional can occur only once and pragmatically involves succession. In the first "essential" conditional, the consequent follows regularly the antecedent; pragmatically it involves likeliness. The second "essential" conditional can be either complete or incomplete. Semantically the former means "if and only if"; pragmatically it means "necessarily if and only if". The latter is expressed by 'if, then' and means entailment; pragmatically, it involves necessity and the inclusion of the antecedent into the consequent. As to Avicenna, he rejects explicitly al-Fārābī's complete conditional and distinguishes between the luzūm (real implication) and what he calls ittifāq. He quantifies over situations (or times) to express the various conditionals. The two universals A
C and E
C are expressed by "In all situations, if…, then…", while the two particulars I
C and O
C are expressed by "In some situations, if…, then..". This gives them a modal connotation, and makes the universals close to strict implications. Pragmatically, A
C presupposes the truth of the antecedent, but there is no such presupposition in E
C, while what is presupposed in both I
C and O
C is a (possible) conjunction.
Despite these differences, in both systems, the conditional is not truth functional, unlike the Stoic conditional.