Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Antitrust is high on the reform agenda at present, associated with calls to "break up big tech." Proponents of reform have invoked history with regularity in making their case. They say reform is essential to reverse the baleful influence of the Chicago School of antitrust, which, in their telling, disastrously and abruptly ended in the 1980s a "golden" era of beneficially lively antitrust enforcement. In fact, antitrust enforcement was, at best, uneven, from the early 20th century through to the end of the 1970s. As for the antitrust "counter-revolution" of the late 20th century, this was fostered as much by fears of foreign competition and skepticism of government regulation as Chicago School theorizing. The pattern helped to ensure that the counter-revolution was largely sustained through the opening decades of the 21st century. This article, in addition to getting antitrust and history in tune by drawing attention to the foregoing points, provides insights regarding antitrust's future direction.

This Article forms part of the proceedings of the 10th Annual Berle Symposium (2018), which focused on Adolf Berle and the world he influenced. He and Gardiner Means documented in The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) what they said was a separation of ownership and control in major American business enterprises. Berle and Means became sufficiently closely associated with the separation of ownership and control pattern for the large American public firm to be christened subsequently the "Berle–Means corporation." This Article focuses on the "rise" of the Berle–Means corporation, considering in so doing why ownership became divorced from control in most of America's biggest companies. It also assesses whether developments concerning institutional investors and shareholder activism have precipitated the "fall" of the Berle–Means corporation, in the sense that U.S. corporate governance is no longer characterized by a separation of ownership and control.

In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterised by a strong emphasis on pay–for–performance and by a highly lucrative "upside". There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalise in accordance with this pattern. This paper assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. It does so by considering market–oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global compensation imperative". It also takes into account possible obstacles to the Americanisation of executive pay, such as legal regulation, "soft law" and "culture". The paper concludes with a brief series of normative observations.