Who supports the Sunflower Movement: an examination of nationalist sentiments
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS, Band 52, Heft 8, S. 1193-1212
ISSN: 1745-2538
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In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS, Band 52, Heft 8, S. 1193-1212
ISSN: 1745-2538
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS, Band 52, Heft 8, S. 1193-1212
ISSN: 1745-2538
The Sunflower Movement—an occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the Congress) for 24 days—was an unprecedented moment in the history of Taiwan. We examine the social foundation of the Movement and explore an important factor that has long been missing in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. We divide nationalism into three dimensions: national attachment, national chauvinism, and feelings toward other countries. Using original survey data collected six months after the Movement, we find that national attachment (being proud of Taiwan) and anti-China feelings are unique dimensions and both lead to a higher level of support for the Sunflower Movement. National chauvinism, on the other hand, is not associated with supports for the Movement. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. The underlying logic is when people are more nationalistic they care more about the potential social impact of expanding socio-economic exchanges with another country. These results point to it being necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals' political behaviors.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 72, Heft 2, S. 278-292
ISSN: 1938-274X
How does the entrance of radical candidates influence election results? Conventional wisdom suggests that extreme candidates merely split the votes. Based on the range effect theory in cognitive psychology, we hypothesize that the entrance of an extreme candidate reframes the endpoints of the ideological spectrum among available candidates, which makes the moderate one on the same side to be perceived by the voters as even more moderate. Through two survey experiments in the United States and Taiwan, we provide empirical support for range effect in the vote choice in the plurality system. The results imply that a mainstream party can, even without changing its own manifesto, benefit from the entrance of its radical counterpart; it explains why the mainstream party may choose cooperation strategically. Our findings also challenge the assumption in regression models that the perceived ideological positions of candidates are independent of each other.
In: Journal of east Asian studies, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 97-115
ISSN: 2234-6643
World Affairs Online
In: Wang, Austin H., Wu, Charles K.S., Yeh, Yao-Yuan, and Chen, Fang-Yu. 'High-level Visit and National Security Policy: Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment in Taiwan' International Interactions conditional accept, Nov. 10, 2022.
SSRN
In: Political studies review
ISSN: 1478-9302
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation's future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the "status quo" option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the "status quo" means, nor do they specify when and how independence and unification will manifest in reality. We propose a new approach to measuring citizens' preferences of the nation's future by specifying five mutually exclusive options on the independence–unification spectrum and field a nationwide survey to illustrate the validity of the new typology. Compared with traditional measurements, our method has more substantial explanatory power for several key political issues in Taiwan.
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS, S. 002190962311680
ISSN: 1745-2538
Since 1992, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as "Taiwanese only" increased by 50%. The literature explains the increase by generation, democratization, and military threat. None of these foresees the decline of Taiwan identity between 2016 and 2018. We argue that the decline can be explained by issue ownership + hedging. After the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the Congress for the first time in 2016, DPP's performance was used by voters to evaluate the utility of Taiwan identity. Propensity score matching and regressions on three groups of surveys (TEDS, TISS, and TNSS) support the theory and rule out alternative explanations.
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 106-122
ISSN: 1460-373X
Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives.
In: Social science journal: official journal of the Western Social Science Association, S. 1-18
ISSN: 0362-3319
In: Foreign policy analysis, Band 20, Heft 3
ISSN: 1743-8594
Abstract
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the choice of Dual Clarity (DC)—the United States promises to defend only if Taiwan does not unilaterally declare de jure independence—is widely ignored. We examine the psychological mechanisms behind the three strategies through a pre-registered, within-subject survey experiment in Taiwan (n = 910). The result shows that DC can keep the status quo similar to SA—respondents lowered their support of independence in both DC and SA conditions. The results hold through robustness checks and formalized by a game-theoretical model.
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 132-146
ISSN: 1547-7444
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power's security agenda and confidence in the host country's defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during a one-week national survey (n = 1,500) in June 2021. Propensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis showed that the visit significantly increased Taiwanese respondents' confidence in their own military, the government's security policy, and support for the security policy favored by the US (strengthening the Taiwanese military). Limitations, scope conditions, and suggestions for future work were also discussed.
World Affairs Online
In: Social science journal: official journal of the Western Social Science Association, S. 1-14
ISSN: 0362-3319
In: Asian politics & policy: APP, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 212-227
ISSN: 1943-0787
AbstractThe 1992 Consensus is perhaps the most crucial political term for cross‐strait relations. Surveys show that the public consistently supports it in Taiwan. Despite the alleged broad support, there has not been an academic study examining if Taiwanese people understand the content of the 1992 Consensus. Such an inquiry is important as the administration in Taiwan has yet accepted the Consensus in its interactions with Beijing. A nearly representative online survey was conducted in July 2018, and 1001 Taiwanese respondents were recruited to choose among different "definitions" of the 1992 Consensus. Results show that only one‐third of the respondents chose the version that Kuomintang agreed on, while another one‐third misperceived the 1992 Consensus as a country‐to‐country agreement. Taiwanese people might have supported the Consensus for content that it is not. We then discuss the policy implications of our study for both China and Taiwan and provide future research orientations.
During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the COVIDiSTRESS Consortium launched an open-access global survey to understand and improve individuals' experiences related to the crisis. A year later, we extended this line of research by launching a new survey to address the dynamic landscape of the pandemic. This survey was released with the goal of addressing diversity, equity, and inclusion by working with over 150 researchers across the globe who collected data in 48 languages and dialects across 137 countries. The resulting cleaned dataset described here includes 15,740 of over 20,000 responses. The dataset allows cross-cultural study of psychological wellbeing and behaviours a year into the pandemic. It includes measures of stress, resilience, vaccine attitudes, trust in government and scientists, compliance, and information acquisition and misperceptions regarding COVID-19. Open-access raw and cleaned datasets with computed scores are available. Just as our initial COVIDiSTRESS dataset has facilitated government policy decisions regarding health crises, this dataset can be used by researchers and policy makers to inform research, decisions, and policy.
BASE
Funder: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONCYT); doi: https://doi.org/10.13039/501100007350 ; Funder: Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) postdoctoral fellowship ; Funder: The HSE University Basic Research Program ; Funder: JSPS KAKENHI Grant JP20K14222 ; Abstract: This N = 173,426 social science dataset was collected through the collaborative COVIDiSTRESS Global Survey – an open science effort to improve understanding of the human experiences of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic between 30th March and 30th May, 2020. The dataset allows a cross-cultural study of psychological and behavioural responses to the Coronavirus pandemic and associated government measures like cancellation of public functions and stay at home orders implemented in many countries. The dataset contains demographic background variables as well as measures of Asian Disease Problem, perceived stress (PSS-10), availability of social provisions (SPS-10), trust in various authorities, trust in governmental measures to contain the virus (OECD trust), personality traits (BFF-15), information behaviours, agreement with the level of government intervention, and compliance with preventive measures, along with a rich pool of exploratory variables and written experiences. A global consortium from 39 countries and regions worked together to build and translate a survey with variables of shared interests, and recruited participants in 47 languages and dialects. Raw plus cleaned data and dynamic visualizations are available.
BASE