Suchergebnisse

AbstractIndustry associations are NPOs formed of enterprise members; they are an important bridge and node linking enterprises, society and the government. Though industry associations have many functions, the Sanlu incident made it clear how self-regulation is among the most crucial of its functions. Over the course of this case study we find that although industry associations have existed at each link of the production and marketing process for dairy products, a holistic, functional failure at self-regulation contributed greatly to the whole dairy industry's loss of public accountability. In order to guarantee the well being of the dairy, food, and even manufacturing industries, they will need to establish a supervisory system combining both governmental supervision and industry self-regulation.

AbstractThis study examines whether executives justify their excess compensation through environmental information disclosure using a sample of listed companies in China's heavily polluting industries from 2010 to 2014. We find that executives' excess compensation is positively related to the quality of environmental information disclosure. The above relationship is significant in cases with strong demand for compensation justification (i.e., state‐owned enterprises and firms where an internal compensation gap is salient), indicating that executives manipulate environmental information disclosure about their companies according to their purposes. We also find that media pressure weakens the above relationship. A further test affirms a differential influence of media pressure in settings that involve public or private ownership, development of markets, and low or high product market competition. This study reveals a self‐serving motive of executives for environmental information disclosure. The findings of this study have practical implications for regulators, shareholders, and managers.