Buyer investment, product variety, and intrafirm trade
In: NBER working paper series 11752
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In: NBER working paper series 11752
In: China economic review, Band 62, S. 101482
ISSN: 1043-951X
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 667
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 441
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The journal of business, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 85
ISSN: 1537-5374
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 168
ISSN: 1756-2171
SSRN
In: HKUST Business School Research Paper No. 2023-093
SSRN
SSRN
In: The Economic Journal, Band 128, Heft 608, S. 55-80
In: Economica, Band 83, Heft 332, S. 564-583
ISSN: 1468-0335
An important question in horizontal merger analysis is what share of a firm's lost output from a unilateral price increase will divert to its merger partner. This 'diversion ratio' is often estimated using data on customer switching from a firm to its rivals ('churn'). We use a tractable oligopoly model to investigate the potential biases of such estimates, depending on what caused the churn: shifts in quality or marginal cost of the firm or of a rival; or demand‐side shifts due to changed circumstances or learning about product attributes. With demand‐side shifts, churn can be greater between more distant competitors.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 442-460
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 121, Heft 556, S. F309-F328
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 674-685
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Economica, Band 73, Heft 292, S. 659-672
ISSN: 1468-0335
The effects of information on market design are explored in a simple setting where firms have private information about their correlated fixed costs and the government aims to maximize its expected revenue conditional on achieving efficient allocations. Government revenues are higher when the costs are less correlated (or are more of a private value). The reduced correlation increases the firms' information rents, but a change in the information structure also changes the expected market structures with positive effects on government revenues. If the government faces the no‐deficit constraint, there are situations where efficient allocations are achieved under asymmetric information but not under symmetric information.